Anglo-French diplomacy and Nazi Germany on the eve of the Second World War. V.l. Israeli diplomacy during the war years (1941–1945)
After the attack fascist Germany in the USSR, Soviet diplomacy concentrated all its forces on ensuring the most favorable external conditions to quickly defeat the enemy. First of all, it was necessary to create a reliable allied camp, to ensure that the allies fulfill their obligations in a timely and consistent manner, especially with regard to the supply of weapons and military materials, the opening of a “second front,” and the refusal to conduct separate negotiations with the enemy. One of the key areas of these efforts was the coordination of a program for the post-war world order, including the establishment of post-war borders and ensuring their security.
The formation of military-political cooperation between the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition was difficult and contradictory. Both Great Britain and the United States were in no hurry to provide real assistance to the Soviet Union. This concerned, first of all, our persistent appeals for the immediate opening of a “second front” (this issue was first raised by the Soviet side with the British in July 1941, and the landing of Anglo-American troops in Normandy took place in June 1944).
In May 1942, the Soviet-British Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitler's Germany and its accomplices in Europe, on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war, and in June 1942, the Soviet-American Agreement on Principles Applying to Mutual Assistance in the Prosecution of the War against Aggression. These documents, which were based on the principle of mutual assistance in the war against Nazi Germany, played an important role in rallying the forces of the anti-Hitler coalition.
The achievement of real breakthroughs in relations between the allies is rightly associated with holding meetings of the leaders of the Big Three countries. Three conferences of this level that took place during the war years - Tehran in 1943, Crimean (Yalta) and Berlin (Potsdam) in 1945 showed that despite the differences in assessments of a number of military and political problems, the great powers, in the presence of political will and mutual understanding and trust are able to act in concert in the interests of international peace and security.
The scale of the decisions made at these meetings, especially with regard to the opening of a “second front,” required active action by Soviet diplomacy in all directions. She participated in the development of all fundamental inter-allied documents, in coordinating the political approaches of the allies in bringing the countries of the fascist coalition out of the war, in establishing relations with the liberated countries of Europe, and in restoring peace in the Asia-Pacific region.
Employees of the People's Commissariat not only worked selflessly in the diplomatic field. On July 5, 1941, when registration for the people's militia began in Moscow, almost half of the NKID workers, including the entire graduating class of the Higher Diplomatic School, became volunteers and went to the front. They took part in the battles near Yelnya. Of the 163 people of the Nida militia, 72 remained forever in the land of the Smolensk region. The memory of their feat is immortalized on a memorial plaque in the building of the Russian Foreign Ministry and on a memorial plaque on the first building of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs on Kuznetsky Most, opened on February 10, 2014 on Diplomat's Day.
During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet diplomats worked in difficult conditions. The routes from the Soviet Union to the destination and back were far from safe. In London, our diplomats worked under fierce bombing by fascist aircraft and V-missiles.
The life of embassy and consulate teams during the war years took place in cramped material conditions. Despite this, employees voluntarily contributed a significant portion of their wages to the defense fund and to subscribe for military loans. They carried out extensive explanatory and propaganda work among the local community, spoke at various meetings and rallies, educational institutions, at enterprises, in front of port workers and sailors who sent cargo to the Soviet Union.
The departure of employees to the militia caused a forced reduction in the staff of the NKID. Thus, in the divisions of the People's Commissariat that oversaw relations with Great Britain, Germany and the United States, there were only 4 employees left. However, thanks to their high business qualities, the NKID employees invariably ensured the rhythmic, highly professional work of the People's Commissariat in the most difficult wartime conditions. Only after the battle of Moscow did mobilized employees begin to return to the NKID.
Twice, in 1941 and 1944, reorganizations of the People's Commissariat were carried out, which affected mainly the European and American departments - in terms of reorienting their structure and functional purpose, taking into account the new realities that were emerging at that time in international affairs. The total number of NKID employees in 1942 was 522 people.
Confirmation of the special role of the foreign policy department in common system State building was the establishment in May 1941 of ranks for diplomatic representatives of the USSR abroad - ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary, envoy extraordinary and plenipotentiary, charge d'affaires. In May 1943, diplomatic ranks were introduced for all NKID workers. Uniforms for diplomats were introduced.
In March 1946, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR became known as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In the first post-war decade, the tasks of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expanded significantly, the volume of work increased enormously, therefore an important component of the reorganization of the ministry, carried out in 1945-1946, was the increase in its staff to 1,642 people. The structure of the Central Apparatus changed, new territorial (operational) divisions were created, and requirements regarding the selection of personnel for the ministry were strengthened.
By the end of the first post-war decade The ministry's network of foreign institutions has expanded significantly. The USSR already had diplomatic relations with 68 states, 62 of them had diplomatic missions and 34 independent consular offices.
Soviet diplomacy wrote bright, impressive pages in the diplomatic history of the Second World War. Complementing the national economic and military efforts, it made a significant contribution to achieving Victory, ensuring the foreign policy interests of our state, and establishing a just post-war settlement.
Today, Russian diplomacy sees its task as preventing a revision of the results of World War II, preserving historical truth for future generations and ensuring our country’s worthy place in the emerging world order.
Methodological development of a lesson on General History
11th grade
Diplomacy during the Great Patriotic War:
Tehran – Yalta – Potsdam
"Third Front" of World War II
Problematic conference on the role of Soviet diplomacy in the victory over fascism
“Russia wins wars, but not
knows how to enjoy the fruits of victories"
I.Stalin
Teacher: Lushchikova G.S., MKOU "Kolybelskaya Secondary School" of Liskinsky district, Voronezh region
2012
Goals and objectives of the lesson:
Educational: show the main stages and directions of development of the foreign policy of the USSR during the Second World War and the Great Patriotic War; trace the process of formation of the anti-Hitler coalition; evaluate the contribution of Soviet diplomacy to the victory over fascism.
Developmental: formation of a multipolar vision of the historical process; developing skills in working with historical sources and the ability to conduct historical debate; formation of historical thinking using specific historical examples, design and research skills.
Educational: to awaken interest in the period of national history being studied; formation of an active civic position, a sense of pride in one’s historical past.
Conference plan (projected on screen):
- Introductory word teachers: designation of the goals and objectives of the conference participants; posing the problem of the role of Soviet diplomacy during the 3 meetings of the Big Three.
- Creative project of the 1st group: “Tehran - 43” - victory or defeat? Discussion of the project.
- Creative project of the 2nd group: “Yalta Conference: problems and assessment of their resolution.” Discussion of the project.
- Creative project of the 3rd group: “The diplomatic “kitchen” of Potsdam: historical lessons.” Discussion of the project.
- Analysis of historical sources on the topic “Tehran – Yalta – Potsdam”.
- Summing up: assessing the role of Soviet diplomacy during the Big Three conferences.
- Introductory word from the teacher.
From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the main task of the USSR's foreign policy and its diplomacy was to create international conditions for the defeat of Nazi Germany and to form an anti-Hitler coalition. By the will of history, the USSR, USA and Great Britain found themselves on the same front line, and a special place in the cooperation of the three countries is occupied by personal meetings of the leaders of the USSR, USA and Great Britain, their personal correspondence, unique personal contact, despite the ambitions of each of the political leaders.
International politics is a tough thing, and there is no room for personal likes and dislikes. Everyone knows that in the first months of the war the British and Americans were in no hurry to provide real assistance to the Soviet Union; waited until the USSR and Germany got bogged down in war and weakened each other. Senator Harry Truman is often quoted in this regard: “If we see Germany winning, then we should help Russia; and if Russia wins, then we should help Germany. And thus let them kill each other as much as possible." This explains the constant delay in the opening of the second front in Western Europe.
The diplomatic “kitchen” is always mysterious, classified as “secret”, and at this conference we will try to open it up, relying only on original documents, memoirs, film and photos - documents. We will look not at the trenches, but at the armchair “front line” of the Second World War; Let's try to agree or refute I. Stalin's skeptical statement about our Russian diplomacy. During the conference, we will analyze and independently summarize the facts, and, possibly, predict the consequences of the decisions made by the “Big Three” in Tehran-Yalta-Potsdam, especially since it was there that the fate of humanity was decided. On this “third front” no shots were fired, no armies moved, but its impact on the world truly decided the fate of humanity as a whole.
- Defense of the creative project “Tehran-43” - victory or defeat? Discussion of the project.
Sample questions for discussion on the topic:
What was W. Churchill referring to when he delayed the question of opening the Second Front? What were the real reasons?;
At the Tehran conference, Stalin asked a question about the fate of Soviet repatriates and Soviet prisoners of war. Why was this question so interesting to the Soviet leader?;
On what issue did the Tehran conference reach a deadlock? What favorite method did Stalin the diplomat resort to to speed up the resolution of this issue? (When the question of the timing and place of the opening of the Second Front reached a dead end, Stalin leisurely stood up and addressed the members of the Soviet delegation: “Come on, comrades, we have nothing to do here. We have a lot to do at the front.” W. Churchill was forced to make excuses, and with the support of Roosevelt, a decision was made to open the Second Front in France no later than May 1944);
Why did the American president support not Churchill, but Stalin on the issue of opening the Second Front not in the Balkans, but in Normandy? (Roosevelt believed that this would be “... the shortest path to victory, and our boys will be home for Christmas.” The Soviet Union would be able to quickly enter the war with Japan, which was in the interests of the United States. Stalin was able to play on the contradictions between Churchill and Roosevelt, Churchill was openly afraid the spread of the “red plague” in Europe; Roosevelt was primarily interested in the price of success. He agreed with Stalin that the shortest path to victory over Germany lay through northern France).
3. Creative project of the 2nd group: “Yalta Conference: problems and assessment of their resolution.” Discussion of the project.
- The “Polish” question was one of the most painful issues during the discussion in Yalta. Why did I. Stalin not want to cooperate with the Polish émigré government? (The Polish government insisted on the return of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, which became part of the USSR under the agreement with Germany of August 23, 1939, i.e., it refused to recognize the border along the Molotov-Ribbentropp line);
Can the decision of the conference on the “Polish” issue be considered a success of Soviet diplomacy? (The success of Soviet diplomacy is obvious: a decision was made according to which Western Ukraine and Western Belarus remained part of the USSR. Poland received an increase in its territory at the expense of Germany. The western border should pass along the Oder-Neisse rivers. The polemic between Churchill and Stalin is interesting in this regard: Churchill - “Lvov was never a Russian city.” Stalin retorted: “But Warsaw was.”);
What result was achieved on the issue of the composition of the future Polish government? (the government must be coalition, i.e. formed on a “broad democratic platform” - 80% of politicians pro-Soviet people living in Poland, and 20% from the Polish émigré government. Thus, Stalin got the opportunity to create a future puppet government);
At the conference, Churchill remarked: “For England, Poland is a matter of honor. How do you think Stalin ended his answer: “For Russia, this is a question...”? (“And for Russia this is a security issue, because throughout history Poland has been a corridor through which Russia’s enemies passed to attack it”);
The terms of which peace were revised in Yalta on the issue of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan? (The USSR returned the territories annexed by Japan in 1905 under the Treaty of Portsmouth: the Kuril Islands, South Sakhalin, as well as the Chinese Eastern Railway and Port Arthur);
What is your opinion on resolving the issue of the size of reparations? (the decision was in favor of the USSR: 50% - to the USSR as the most affected party, 50% - to everyone else). Reparations can be paid in the form of supplies of industrial equipment and food for a period of 10 years. Churchill tried to argue that these were too difficult conditions for Germany: “For a horse to carry, it must be fed hay and oats.” Stalin retorted: “But at the same time, the horse should not attack and bite”;
How did Churchill and Stalin divide Europe? (Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary are 90% sphere of influence of the USSR; Greece is 90% sphere of influence of Great Britain. It should be noted that Soviet troops could occupy the territory of Greece without problems, but this did not happen according to the Yalta decisions).
4. Creative project of the 3rd group: “Diplomatic “kitchen”
Potsdam: historical lessons." Discussion of the project.
Sample questions for discussion:
What decisions of the Potsdam Conference do you consider an obvious success of Soviet diplomacy? And, conversely, what, in your opinion, can be called failure? (The main issue of the conference was the question of the post-war structure of Germany and reparations. It was decided to carry out denazification and exercise supreme power in Germany through the forces of the Control Council consisting of the commanders-in-chief of the occupation forces of the USSR, USA, Great Britain, and also, at the insistence of the USSR, France (a special zone was allocated occupation). Stalin achieved the inclusion of France, because he understood that in the future the Anglo-American zone would not unite, because they were afraid of the “German danger” more than the communist one. weakened the western zone of influence. It was no less successful that the Soviet side achieved (despite the evasive position of Churchill and Truman) O The majority of reparations were paid not in monetary terms, but in industrial supplies - equipment, food, railway rolling stock for 10 years. Moreover, in monetary terms, the Soviet Union was destined for 10 billion marks out of 20. And finally, in Potsdam the final decision was recorded on the transfer of East Prussia with the city of Königsberg to the Soviet Union. This was a significant territorial increase. As for the failures of Soviet diplomacy in Potsdam, it can be stated that almost all the decisions that Stalin and the Soviet delegation insisted on one way or another laid the foundation for the future split of Europe into two hostile camps and were the cause of the Cold War. But these were objective historical realities and Soviet diplomacy could not “act” any other way;
Was the question raised about the fate of the Germans in those territories of Germany that went to Poland? (This issue was raised by Churchill, and then by Attlee and Truman. Stalin stated that ethnic Germans, for example in East Prussia, Silesia and Pomerania, had already “voluntarily” left for the West. In fact, it was about 8-10 millions of Germans who were either forcibly deported by special units of the NKVD or were exterminated);
What international pact followed after the signing of the Declaration on the Far East? (about the USSR's entry into the war with Japan).
5. Analysis of historical sources on the topic “Tehran – Yalta – Potsdam”.
Questions to the document “Declaration of the Three Powers” (Tehran) – see Appendix No. 1.
- Determine the areas of cooperation between the USSR, Great Britain, and the USA.
(- destruction of the German armed forces until the complete and unconditional surrender of Germany; opening of a second front; post-war cooperation in the field of denazification; establishment of democratic regimes in liberated countries);
2) What operation is the document talking about: “... we have come to full agreement regarding the scale and timing of the operation... from the west) (Operation Overlord, no later than May 1, 1944 in northern France);
3) What is the name of the policy that the allies talk about: “A peace that will eliminate the disasters and horrors of war.” (denazification).
Questions to the document “Crimean Agreement of the 3 Great Powers on Far East Issues” (Yalta) - see Appendix No. 2.
- What treaty between Russia and Japan revises this document? (Peace of Portsmouth 1905);
- Which of the Big Three leaders was more interested in signing this document and why? (Stalin - because of the territorial claims of the Soviet Union and the desire to take revenge for defeat in the Russo-Japanese War; Roosevelt - because it was Japan that attacked the US naval base on December 7, 1941 in Pearl Harbor, and the main the theater of military operations for the USA is the Pacific Islands, i.e. also the idea of revanchism);
- What pact handed over Japanese Ambassador in Moscow, followed the signing of this document? (Pact of Denunciation of Neutrality with Japan of April 5, 1945)
Questions for the document “Extract from the Potsdam Conference of the Three Powers” (Potsdam) - see Appendix No. 3.
- Why does the document contain a detailed listing of military organizations and institutions associated with the Nazi Party of Germany? (To prevent forever the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism);
- Formulate the main aspects of denazification referred to in the document (liquidation of the Nazi party and the repressive apparatus of the Nazi regime; dissolution of the German armed forces; establishment of control over the German military industry; punishment of war criminals; reorganization of the German judicial system);
- How did the allies subsequently implement paragraph 5 of the document? (an international military tribunal over Nazi criminals took place in Nuremberg in 1945).
Individual research project (presentation) “Faces of History: Tehran – Yalta – Potsdam.”
Slide – Roosevelt, Stalin, Churchill – the famous “Big Three”. The war united them, but the world, unfortunately, will separate them. Friends are enemies;
Slide – text of the document of D. Cannon’s memoirs about Stalin;
Slide – “Big Three” in Yalta;
Slide - W. Churchill during one of the meetings of the Yalta Conference;
Slide – new line-up the Big Three in Potsdam;
W. Churchill about Stalin's intractability: “Patience is the motto of everyone who has to deal with the Kremlin”;
Slide – Stalin and Churchill. From the transcript of the Yalta Conference: “Stalin on misunderstandings in relations with Churchill during the negotiations: “... the best friendship is the one that begins with misunderstandings”;
Slide - From a conversation between F. Roosevelt and his son about the Allied landing in northern France: “When Uncle Joe spoke about the advantages of an invasion in the West, he also had in mind the political consequences. I’m sure of it, although he didn’t say a word about it.”
7. Summing up: assessment of the role of Soviet diplomacy during the Big Three conferences.
We must pay tribute to Soviet diplomacy during the Great Patriotic War: the Soviet delegation and Stalin were able to play on the contradictions between Roosevelt and Churchill and achieve the result the USSR needed on most issues at the conferences. Both Roosevelt and Churchill (who certainly cannot be suspected of sympathizing with the Soviet leader) highly appreciated Stalin's diplomatic abilities. Most memoirs contain information that Stalin had a special style of negotiations. At first, Stalin escalated tensions during conversations with the allies, skillfully cultivating in them a sense of uncertainty regarding the Soviet position. Roosevelt, for example, recalled that Stalin forced his partners to constantly justify themselves and prove their loyalty to their allied obligations. Such methods of diplomacy bore fruit. When Stalin got his way, he became a “charming interlocutor.” It is no coincidence that both Roosevelt and Churchill had a lot of laudatory statements about the Soviet leader. Apparently, Churchill initially underestimated the diplomatic abilities of the Soviet leader, but then the British prime minister was forced to change his mind: “A brilliant polemicist, Stalin behaved with extreme restraint. He did not give in to provocations. He combined perseverance and determination with a willingness to compromise. He never humiliated his opponent, giving him the opportunity, even in a losing situation, not to feel disgraced.” For the anti-communist Churchill, this is an unexpected characteristic of Stalin. Apparently, it is not worth giving an unambiguous and primitive assessment of Stalin as an uncouth, narrow-minded tyrant. Of course, he knew a lot about intrigue.
The decisions of the “Big Three” meetings can hardly be overestimated: they influenced the entire post-war history and brought the long-awaited victory closer. The international authority of the Soviet Union has never been as high as after World War II. The Soviet Union took advantage of the fruits of victory: the world split into two poles. Europe will never again be the center of the world, and the USSR will be the only power that restrained the imperial ambitions of the United States. There will be a cold war ahead, an arms race, the threat of a third world war, the tragedy of the collapse of the USSR, but this is another page of history.
Applications (shown on screen)
Appendix No. 1.
CONFERENCE OF THE LEADERS OF THE THREE ALLIED POWERS - USSR, USA AND GREAT BRITAIN IN TEHRAN. DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS (Tehran, December 1, 1943)
We, the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met for the past four days in the capital of our ally Iran and have formulated and reaffirmed our common policy.
We express our determination that our countries will work together both in times of war and in subsequent peacetime.
Regarding the war, representatives of our military headquarters participated in our negotiations for round table, and we agreed on our plans for the destruction of the German armed forces. We have come to full agreement regarding the scale and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.
The mutual understanding we have achieved here guarantees our victory.
As for peacetime, we are confident that the agreement that exists between us will ensure lasting peace. We fully recognize the great responsibility that rests on us and on all the United Nations to bring about a peace that will receive the approval of the overwhelming mass of peoples globe and which will eliminate the disasters and horrors of war for many generations.
Together with our diplomatic advisers, we looked at the challenges of the future. We will seek the cooperation and active participation of all countries, large and small, whose peoples are committed in heart and mind, like our own people, to the task of eliminating tyranny, slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them to join the global family of democracies whenever they wish to do so.
No power in the world can stop us from destroying the German armies on land, their submarines at sea, and destroying their munitions factories from the air.
Our offensive will be merciless and increasing.
Having concluded our friendly conferences, we confidently look forward to the day when all the peoples of the world will live freely, free from tyranny, and in accordance with their various aspirations and their consciences.
We came here with hope and determination. We leave here truly friends in spirit and purpose.
Appendix No. 2
Agreement
The leaders of the Three Great Powers - the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain - agreed that two to three months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allies, provided:
1. Preservation of the status quo of Outer Mongolia (Mongolian People's Republic);
2. Restoration of the rights belonging to Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904, namely:
a) return to the Soviet Union the southern part of Sakhalin Island and all adjacent islands;
b) the internationalization of the commercial port of Dairen, ensuring the priority interests of the Soviet Union in this port and the restoration of the lease on Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR;
c) joint operation of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, giving access to Dairen, on the basis of organizing a mixed Soviet-Chinese Society, ensuring the primary interests of the Soviet Union, it being understood that China retains full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. Transfer of the Kuril Islands to the Soviet Union.
It is assumed that the agreement regarding Outer Mongolia and the aforementioned ports and railways will require the consent of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. On the advice of Marshal I.V. Stalin, the President will take measures to ensure that such consent is obtained.
The Heads of Government of the Three Great Powers agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unconditionally satisfied after the victory over Japan.
For its part, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Chinese Government a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China to assist it with their armed forces in order to liberate China from the Japanese yoke.
I. Stalin
F. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill
Appendix No. 3
About Germany
Political and economic principles to guide the treatment of Germany during the initial control period
A. Political principles
1. Subject to the agreement on the control mechanism in Germany, supreme authority in Germany will be exercised by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the French Republic, each in its own zone of occupation, under the instructions of their respective governments, and jointly on matters affecting Germany as a whole, acting as members of the Control Council.
2. As far as is practicable, there should be equal treatment of the German population throughout Germany.
3. The objectives of the occupation of Germany, which must guide the Control Council, are:
I) the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the liquidation or control of all German industry that could be used for war production. For these purposes:
a) all German ground and air forces, the SS, SA, SD and Gestapo with all their organizations, headquarters and institutions, including the general staff, officer corps, reservist corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and paramilitary organizations , together with their clubs and associations serving the interests of maintaining the military traditions in Germany, will be completely and finally abolished in order to forever prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;
c) all weapons, ammunition and weapons of war and all specialized means for their production must be at the disposal of the allies or must be destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all weapons, ammunition and instruments of war will be prevented...
III) destroy the National Socialist Party and its branches and controlled organizations, dissolve all Nazi institutions, ensure that they do not revive in any form, and prevent all Nazi and militaristic activities or propaganda...
4. All Nazi laws that created the basis for Hitler's regime or that established discrimination on the basis of race, religion or political opinion must be repealed. No such discrimination, legal, administrative or otherwise, will be tolerated.
5. War criminals and those who participated in the planning or execution of Nazi activities resulting in or resulting in atrocities or war crimes must be arrested and tried. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi sympathizers and the leadership of Nazi institutions and organizations and any other persons dangerous to the occupation and its goals must be arrested and interned.
6. All members of the Nazi Party who were more than nominal participants in its activities, and all other persons hostile to the Allied goals, should be removed from public or semi-public positions and from positions of responsibility in important private enterprises. Such persons must be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are considered capable of assisting in the development of truly democratic institutions in Germany...
8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, justice based on the rule of law and equality of all citizens, without distinction of race, nationality and religion.
9. Management in Germany should be carried out in the direction of decentralization of the political structure and the development of a local sense of responsibility. To this end:
II) throughout Germany all democratic political parties with granting them the right to convene meetings and public discussion...
IV) no central German government will be established for the time being. However, despite this, some essential central German administrative departments will be established, headed by secretaries of state, in particular in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. These departments will operate under the direction of the Control Council...
B. Economic principles
11. In order to destroy the German military potential, the production of weapons, military equipment and weapons of war, as well as the production of all types of aircraft and sea vessels should be banned and prevented...
12. As soon as practicable, the German economy must be decentralized with a view to eliminating the existing excessive concentration of economic power, especially in the form of cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.
13. When defacing the German economy, the main attention should be paid to development agriculture and peaceful industry for domestic consumption.
14. During the period of occupation, Germany must be considered as a single economic whole...
15. Allied control over the German economy must be established...
15% of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, primarily in the metallurgical, chemical and engineering industries, which is not necessary for the German peaceful economy and must be withdrawn from the western zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value in food, coal , potash, zinc, forest materials, clay products, petroleum products and other types of materials, which will be determined by agreement.
c) 10% of such industrial capital equipment as is not necessary for the German peace economy and which is to be removed from the Western zones for transfer to the Soviet Government as reparations without payment or compensation in any way...
5. The amount of equipment to be withdrawn from the western zones on account of reparations must be determined at the latest within six months starting from now.
6. Removals of industrial capital equipment will begin as soon as possible and will be completed within two years after the decision referred to in paragraph 5, deliveries of products covered by paragraph 4(a) will begin as soon as possible, and will be produced by the Soviet Union in agreed batches within 5 years from the mentioned date...
9. 8. The Soviet government renounces all claims regarding reparations for shares of German The governments of the United States and the United Kingdom renounce all claims for reparations for shares of German enterprises located in the eastern zone of occupation of Germany, as well as for German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland , Hungary, Romania and Eastern Austria.
10. The Soviet government has no claims to gold captured by Allied forces in Germany
Slide captions:
What do the concepts have in common and how do they differ?
The topic of the lesson in grade 10 is “Conflict in interpersonal relationships” LESSON PLAN Structure and dynamics of interpersonal conflict Personal behavior in conflict How to successfully resolve conflicts?
Causes of social conflicts social heterogeneity of society differences in income levels, power, culture, access to education and information religious differences human behavior, his socio-psychological traits
TYPES OF CONFLICTS Intrapersonal conflict Intergroup conflict Conflict that covers certain spheres of social life Conflict that covers society as a whole Conflict with the external environment Interpersonal conflict Occurs between two or more members of one group or several groups Occurs within the individual at the level of individual consciousness Conflict of one group with another [for example , conflict between different classes, nationalities, religious and generational (conflict of “fathers and sons”) groups] Pressure on a person from the outside from cultural, administrative, economic norms and regulations, conflict with organizations that support these norms and regulations Economic (production), political, ethnic, etc. Social revolution (from Latin revolution - turn, revolution) - a rapid transition from one socio-political system to another; war
Gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine Great Patriotic War Revolution of 1917 TYPES OF CONFLICTS
Conditions for successful conflict resolution Timely and accurate diagnosis of the causes of the conflict, i.e. identification of existing contradictions, interests, goals Mutual interest in overcoming contradictions based on mutual recognition of the interests of each party
BASIC STRATEGIES FOR INTERACTION IN CONFLICT
The role of social conflict Informing about the presence of common problems Stimulating social changes Relieving psychological tension of participants in the conflict: awareness of one’s interests and the interests of others Creation stressful situations Disruption of the order of social life Destruction of the balance of power, a stable position positive negative
How to successfully resolve conflicts? Conflict should not be feared, it should be RESOLVED! Ways to resolve the conflict: Negotiations Mediation Arbitration
THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION!
Having successfully played his diplomatic game and carried out the conquest of Eastern and Western Europe in the shortest possible time, A. Hitler chose the disastrous path of invasion of the USSR, based on an esoteric-ideological concept that provided for the conquest of “living space” (Lebensraum) in the east.
Today there are many interpretations of the mistakes of the Soviet leadership in assessing the degree of likelihood and timing of a German attack on the Soviet Union. However, taking into account the historical role of I. Stalin’s personality in these events, it is very interesting to look at the situation of the American diplomat, a famous expert in the field of international relations, Henry Kissinger, who noted: “Stalin was not only more patient, but also, as a communist, respected more the strength of the historical process. During almost thirty years of his reign, he never once put everything on the line in one fell swoop and mistakenly believed that Hitler would never do it either.”
The Soviet policy of “waiting” to a certain extent can be explained by diplomatic tasks, among which the factor of assigning full responsibility to Hitler Germany for the unreasonable, pre-planned outbreak of war against the USSR was of great fundamental importance, which gave the Great Patriotic War a just, liberating, truly domestic character and expanded the international political capabilities of the Soviet Union.
During the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union faced new international tasks, which were determined by the course of the war and had to be implemented in emergency conditions. As the outstanding Soviet diplomat Andrei Gromyko noted: “The main task of Soviet foreign policy was to ensure the most favorable international conditions for organizing resistance to the enemy.<…>Soviet diplomacy, first of all, had to ensure that countries that had already fought with fascist Germany and Italy became strong allies of the USSR. To do this, it was necessary to achieve the creation and strengthening of a coalition of states that fought against Nazi Germany, and the early opening of a second front in Europe. It was also necessary to make every effort to prevent an attack from states that were still neutral in Germany’s war against the USSR: Japan, Turkey, Iran, etc.”
The USSR not only managed to adjust its foreign policy doctrine to solve problems in the most difficult conditions of warfare, but also, without losing momentum, took an active part and took a leading position in the formation of a common international political line of the countries of the anti-fascist bloc, which united the states of two opposing systems. Without exaggeration, it can be stated that the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the USSR I. Stalin became the central figure of the anti-Hitler coalition, which subsequently ensured the leading role of the Soviet Union in resolving issues of the post-war reconstruction of the world.
From the first days of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet government took a number of diplomatic steps to unite anti-fascist states. Already on the twentieth day of the war, on July 12, 1941, the “Agreement between the governments of the USSR and Great Britain on joint actions in the war against Germany” was concluded, which marked the beginning of the creation of an anti-Hitler coalition and made it possible to avoid the danger of international isolation of the USSR at a responsible initial stage. In July 1941, Soviet-Czechoslovak and Soviet-Polish agreements were also signed, containing similar obligations of the parties.
In general, the formation of a military-political alliance consisting of the USSR, England and the USA was not a one-time act; the legal formalization of the coalition of anti-fascist states took place in several stages and was completed in the first half of 1942. Significant interstate documents that cemented the anti-Hitler coalition were the Soviet-British Treaty of Alliance in the War against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation after the war of May 26, 1942, as well as the Soviet-American Agreement on Principles Applicable to Mutual Assistance in the conduct of the war against aggression of June 11, 1942
During the first years of the war, there were two main issues in the USSR's relations with Great Britain and the United States: the supply of equipment and weapons for Soviet army and the opening of a second front (the issue was first raised by the Soviet Union on July 18, 1941).
The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR managed to solve the first task in legal terms quite quickly; already on September 28, 1941, during the Moscow Conference, agreements were concluded on military supplies to the USSR from October 1, 1941 to July 1, 1942.
At the same time, from the first steps of interaction with its Western allies, Soviet diplomacy was faced with a whole range of difficulties and contradictions, solving which it gained unique experience and new opportunities for its professional development.
Despite W. Churchill’s solemn assurance that Great Britain would provide “all the assistance it can to Russia and the Russian people,” in 1941 the Soviet Union did not receive significant assistance. Loud allied statements carried a propaganda load and were largely intended for the Western public, since a month after Germany attacked the Soviet Union, in July 1941, he informed the Soviet government that Great Britain did not see “the opportunity to do anything in on such a scale that it could bring even the slightest benefit to the USSR."
The governments of England and the United States were clearly waiting to see how events would develop on the Soviet-German front. The essence of the “fighting tigers” strategy they use is clearly expressed in the words of the British Minister of Aviation D. Moore-Brabazon: “let Germany and the USSR exhaust each other,” he said, “at the end of the war England will become the master of the situation in Europe.”
From an international political point of view, the above explains the approach of the Western powers to concluding an alliance with the USSR, whose calculation was based on the fact that in any outcome, even in the event of victory, the Soviet Union would be so weakened that it would not be able to prevent them from dominating Europe. In this context, the implementation of the post-war policy by the Soviet Union to establish control over the Eastern European region is in many ways a forced response to strengthening its national security as opposed to the Western policy aimed at isolating it.
At the same time, during the difficult war years, the USSR agreed to the rules of the game and some conditions dictated by the allies. In this light, a significant diplomatic step was the accession of the USSR to the Atlantic Charter on September 24, 1941 (declaration of the heads of government of the USA and Great Britain - F. D. Roosevelt and W. Churchill of August 14, 1941). The declaration, which consisted of 8 points, spoke about the goals of the war and the post-war structure of the world. Having declared its accession to the Atlantic Charter, the Soviet Union indicated that the application of its principles “... will have to be consistent with the circumstances, needs and historical characteristics of a particular country...”; and the main task is to “... concentrate all the economic and military resources of freedom-loving peoples for the complete and fastest possible liberation of the peoples.”
Solving its tasks in emergency conditions, Soviet diplomacy often faced difficult situations, when, despite the existence of the necessary legally formalized international agreements, the political and ideological attitudes of foreign partners, combined with military circumstances, introduced a significant imbalance in the relations of the allies.
One striking example is the events of the summer of 1942. During this most difficult period of the war for the Soviet Union, when German troops were rushing to the Volga and the Caucasus, the American and British governments completely stopped sending convoys with military cargo to the USSR in the North by sea, through which 3/4 of all cargo intended for the USSR was supposed to be sent.
The most important diplomatic mechanism that was actively used throughout the Second World War were personal meetings and direct negotiations of the heads of state and government of the anti-Hitler coalition. They made it possible to establish important interpersonal contact, contributed to a political “synchronization of watches,” the development of further plans and the achievement of fundamental agreements at the “gentleman’s” level, helping to relieve political tension in relations.
Thus, during the Moscow negotiations between I. Stalin and W. Churchill in August 1942, it was possible to reach a certain consensus and weaken mutual suspicion. The British prime minister promised to open a second front in 1943 and carry out systematic destructive bombing of Germany already in the current 1942.
An important international result of the diplomatic interaction of the world's leading states during the Second World War was the resolution of issues of the post-war arrangement of the world, which became the central focus of the coalition's attention already at the initial stages of cooperation.
It is difficult to overestimate the international significance of the adoption of the United Nations Declaration, which was signed on January 1, 1942 in Washington by representatives of the Big Four (USSR, USA, England and China) and 22 other states, becoming the basis for the future UN. The declaration proclaimed that complete victory over the fascist aggressors was necessary to protect the life, freedom and independence of peoples. It contained an obligation to use all resources, military and economic, against those members of the Berlin Pact with which this party to the declaration was at war.
By the beginning of 1943, the situation in the anti-fascist coalition remained controversial. The Soviet Union continued to bear the brunt of the German forces. The question of a second front continued to cause mutual irritation.
The defeat of the German group at Stalingrad and then at the Kursk Bulge marked the beginning of a general German retreat. It became clear that the German war machine would not recover. Accordingly, the international importance of the USSR continued to grow, which, being the main military force of the anti-fascist coalition, also laid claim to one of the leading roles in the post-war settlement. To resolve accumulated problems and pressing international issues, an important diplomatic mechanism was used - a tripartite conference of foreign ministers.
On October 19-30, 1943, the Moscow Conference took place, at which the main issue was reducing the duration of the war, raised at the initiative of the Soviet government. In response, Allied assurances were received to open a second front in the spring of 1944. The conference also decided that the cooperation of the three powers established for the conduct of the war should be continued for the period following the end of hostilities.
34. The issue of the USSR entering the war with Japan was resolved at a conference in Yalta on February 11, 1945 by a special agreement. It provided that the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan on the side of the Allied powers 2-3 months after the surrender of Germany and the end of the war in Europe. Japan rejected the July 26, 1945 demand from the United States, Great Britain, and China to lay down their arms and unconditionally surrender. According to V. Davydov, on the evening of August 7, 1945 (two days before Moscow officially broke the neutrality pact with Japan), Soviet military aircraft suddenly began bombing the roads of Manchuria.
On August 8, 1945, the USSR declared war on Japan. By order of the Supreme High Command, back in August 1945, preparations began for a military operation to land an amphibious assault force in the port of Dalian (Dalny) and liberate Lushun (Port Arthur) together with units of the 6th Guards Tank Army from the Japanese occupiers on the Liaodong Peninsula of Northern China. The 117th Air Regiment of the Pacific Fleet Air Force, which was training in Sukhodol Bay near Vladivostok, was preparing for the operation.
On August 9, troops of the Transbaikal, 1st and 2nd Far Eastern Fronts, in cooperation with the Pacific Navy and the Amur River Flotilla, began fighting against Japanese troops at a front of more than 4 thousand kilometers.
The 39th Combined Arms Army was part of the Transbaikal Front, commanded by Marshal of the Soviet Union R. Ya. Malinovsky. The commander of the 39th Army is Colonel General I. I. Lyudnikov, member of the Military Council, Major General Boyko V. R., Chief of Staff, Major General Siminovsky M. I.
The task of the 39th Army was a breakthrough, a strike from the Tamtsag-Bulag ledge, Halun-Arshan and, together with the 34th Army, the Hailar fortified areas. The 39th, 53rd General Arms and 6th Guards Tank Armies set out from the area of the city of Choibalsan on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic and advanced to the state border of the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchukuo at a distance of 250-300 km.
In order to better organize the transfer of troops to concentration areas and further to deployment areas, the headquarters of the Trans-Baikal Front sent special groups of officers to Irkutsk and Karymskaya station in advance. On the night of August 9, the advanced battalions and reconnaissance detachments of three fronts, in extremely unfavorable weather conditions - the summer monsoon, bringing frequent and heavy rains - moved into enemy territory.
In accordance with the order, the main forces of the 39th Army crossed the border of Manchuria at 4:30 am on August 9th. Reconnaissance groups and detachments began to operate much earlier - at 00:05. The 39th Army had at its disposal 262 tanks and 133 self-propelled artillery units. It was supported by the 6th Bomber Air Corps of Major General I.P. Skok, based at the airfields of the Tamtsag-Bulag ledge. The army attacked the troops that were part of the 3rd Front of the Kwantung Army.
On August 9, the head patrol of the 262nd division reached railway Khalun-Arshan - Thessaloniki. The Halun-Arshan fortified area, as reconnaissance of the 262nd division found out, was occupied by units of the 107th Japanese Infantry Division.
By the end of the first day of the offensive, Soviet tankers made a rush of 120-150 km. The advanced detachments of the 17th and 39th armies advanced 60-70 km.
On August 10, the Mongolian People's Republic joined the statement of the USSR government and declared war on Japan.
The assessment of the personality of V.M. Molotov in the life of the Soviet state, like most other top leaders of the Soviet era, has changed several times over the decades - from laudatory to indecently abusive.
Molotov had to work hard in party work and in the highest executive bodies. However, first of all, his personality is associated with foreign policy activities as People's Commissar, and then Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In total, Molotov led the NKID/Ministry of Foreign Affairs for almost 13 years, including the extremely difficult pre-war and war years from the point of view of the Soviet Union gaining international positions.
The strategic course of the Soviet Union in the 1930s was the creation of a system of collective security in Europe. However, these plans were thwarted by the Western powers, who, to an agreement with the USSR against the growing danger of Nazism, preferred a policy of appeasing the increasingly brazen aggressor in the hope of diverting possible German expansion from themselves and directing it to the east. When the USSR initiated Soviet-British-French negotiations in Moscow in March 1939, proposing to conclude an agreement “on a mutual obligation to immediately provide each other with all kinds of assistance, including military assistance, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states” 1, this kind of obligation scared British and French politicians, and the agreement did not take place.
While conducting formal negotiations with the USSR and hoping to tie its hands with some symbolic agreement, London simultaneously continued contacts with Berlin. British Prime Minister N. Chamberlain, talking on June 8, 1939 with German Foreign Ministry employee A. von Trotzu Solz, did not hide the fact that “from the very day he came to power, he defended the idea that European problems can be solved only on the Berlin-London line" 2.
This position of Western countries raised the question of the security of the Soviet Union in a new way. The Soviet leadership, not without reason, feared the possibility of a new conspiracy between Western democracies and Hitler along the lines of the Munich Agreement, but at the expense of the USSR. Therefore, it was considered possible to try to resume economic, and, with a favorable turn of events, political contacts with Germany.
In May 1939, M.M. Litvinov was replaced as People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs by V.M. Molotov. It is “his name that is associated with the forced retreat of Soviet diplomacy from pre-war policy aimed at ensuring collective security in Europe to attempts independent decision issue of national security" 3.
On July 29, V.M. Molotov telegraphed the Soviet embassy in Berlin: “We, of course, would welcome any improvement in political relations between the two countries” 4. At the same time, the Soviet leadership, in order to maintain freedom of hands, preferred to expect the initiative from the Germans. Berlin has indeed been much more active in mutual rapprochement than Moscow. His actions were logical in their own way: Hitler was moving towards war against Poland and was ready to make many concessions just to prevent the creation of an independent front in the east with the participation of the Red Army. In this regard, it is difficult not to agree with the opinion of I.A. Chelyshev: “The Moscow negotiations from the very beginning acquired an ambiguous character. Both sides negotiated with Germany in secret from each other and played on two tables at once. We can say that a third party, Germany, was invisibly present at the negotiations in Moscow. Hitler also led his own party." 5
When it became extremely clear to the Soviet leadership that the negotiations between the military missions of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France, which began on August 12 in Moscow, were being conducted by Western countries not to conclude an effective military alliance, but to put pressure on Hitler so as not to allow him, in turn, to come to an agreement with USSR, they were interrupted. Having made a choice in favor of contacts with Germany, J.V. Stalin agreed to the arrival of German Foreign Minister I. Ribbentrop in Moscow.
On August 23, 1939, a non-aggression treaty was signed with Germany, which read, in part: “Both Contracting Parties undertake to refrain from any violence, from any aggressive action and from any attack against each other, both separately and jointly with other powers... In the event the occurrence of disputes or conflicts between the Contracting Parties on issues of one kind or another, both Parties will resolve these disputes and conflicts exclusively peacefully through a friendly exchange of views or, if necessary, by creating commissions to resolve the conflict” 6. The document was signed by V.M. Molotov and I. Ribbentrop.
In modern Western historiography, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact is often considered a kind of “trigger”, pressing which allowed Hitler to start World War II. In fact, Germany was given the opportunity to unleash a world massacre by the short-sighted policy of appeasement pursued by Western democracies. The pact was a temporary military-political compromise, which the Soviet leadership agreed to in order to gain time and geographical space in anticipation of the inevitable military clash with Germany. The Soviet Union was objectively forced to enter into such agreements with an open enemy by the interests of its own security and the need to build defense lines on distant approaches.
As a result of the August and then September 1939 agreements with Germany, the Soviet Union, by signing secret additional protocols, achieved the inclusion in the sphere of its interests of some countries that were previously territorially part of Russian Empire, but either gained independence after the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia (Finland), or after the First World War were torn away as a result of direct annexation (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the eastern part of Poland - Western Belarus and Western Ukraine, Bessarabia).
Molotov was directly involved in the preparation of secret protocols for the non-aggression treaty of August 23, 1939 and the friendship and border treaty of September 28 of the same year. He negotiated with Ribbentrop and signed the documents. It is characteristic that until the end of his days he never recognized the existence of such documents. To the question asked in 1983 by historian G.A. Kumanev whether there was a secret protocol to the non-aggression pact, the former People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs answered extremely eloquently: “A difficult question has been raised. Well, in general, Ribbentrop and I verbally agreed on everything then.” 7
Molotov was directly involved in reaching an agreement with Japan to conclude a neutrality pact with it on April 13, 1941, which made it possible to remove the danger of war on two fronts simultaneously - in the West and the East. The pact also bears the signature of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR 8 .
Moscow was fully aware of the compromise nature of the agreements reached with Germany in the fall of 1939. The Soviet leadership did not believe in Hitler’s sincerity, and therefore made efforts to probe the further plans of their future enemy. To this end, Molotov went to Berlin on an official visit in November 1940. On the eve of the trip, November 9, in a personal conversation with Stalin, he received a number of important directives. First of all, it was necessary to find out the real intentions of Germany, as well as Italy and Japan, in implementing the plan for creating a “New Europe”, as well as a “Great East Asian Space”; identify prospects for other countries joining the Tripartite Pact; find out what place Berlin assigned to the Soviet Union in these plans at that moment and in the future.
Judging by the directives to the People's Commissar, Stalin proceeded from the fact that the agreement reached in 1939 on the partial delimitation of the spheres of interests of the USSR and Germany had been exhausted as a result of the liberation campaign of the Red Army in Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, and the entry into the USSR of the Baltic republics, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. Exhausted, as emphasized in the directives, with the exception of Finland. Therefore, during his visit to Berlin, Molotov was instructed, starting from the “initial outline” of the sphere of interests of the USSR in Europe, as well as in Near and Central Asia, to test the possibility of an agreement on this matter with Germany and Italy, but not to conclude any agreements, with a view to continuing negotiations in Moscow with the participation of Ribbentrop.
As for Finland, it was prescribed to strive during the negotiations for it to be included in the sphere of interests of the USSR “on the basis of the Soviet-German agreement of 1939, in the implementation of which Germany must eliminate all difficulties and ambiguities (withdrawal of German troops, cessation of all political demonstrations in Finland and Germany, aimed at harming the interests of the USSR).”
During the negotiations, Molotov had to achieve the inclusion of the mouth of the Danube in the sphere of interests of the USSR, as well as Bulgaria with the introduction there Soviet troops and with guarantees from the Soviet side, similar to those given to Romania by Germany after Berlin sent its troops there. It was necessary to convey to the German leadership the dissatisfaction of the USSR that it did not consult with the Soviet government on the issue of guarantees and the entry of troops into Romania. “The question of the future fate of Romania and Hungary, as bordering the USSR, is of great interest to us - it was emphasized in the directives - and we would like to have this agreed upon with us.” Without the participation of the USSR, according to Stalin, the issue of Turkey and Iran, where there were “serious interests” of the Soviet Union, could not be resolved 9.
A number of modern authors consider this kind of instructions as evidence of Stalinist expansionism, a continuation of the course of “delimitation of spheres of interest”, which the USSR allegedly began to implement in its own selfish interests by signing a secret protocol to the non-aggression pact with Germany. In reality, this was an attempt by the Soviet Union, in the conditions of an impending war, to push back the lines of its defense as far as possible: where by territorial acquisitions, and where - by strengthening its own influence in the adjacent states of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe.
The Soviet leadership played a complex political game in this regard. The trip to Berlin on November 12-13 turned out to be a difficult test for Molotov. As it became known later, Hitler a month later, on December 18, 1940, signed Directive No. 21 on the Barbarossa plan, thereby giving the start practical training Germany to war against the USSR. Negotiations with the Soviet delegation were needed by the Nazi leadership only as a cover for the military preparations that had begun. All this, of course, left an imprint on the atmosphere of Molotov’s visit.
German leaders tried to persuade Moscow to participate in a joint division of the British Empire and talked about the “expediency” of the USSR moving south to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula. This was done with the aim of complicating Soviet-British relations and preventing a possible rapprochement between Moscow and London. Molotov, while negotiating with Hitler, Goering and Ribbentrop, insisted first of all on the withdrawal of German troops from Soviet borders(in Finland - in the north and in Romania - in the south) and providing additional guarantees for the security of the USSR.
He had to put into action all his diplomatic baggage, which was relatively sparse by that time, all his endurance and perseverance. The course of the negotiations showed that the German side was ready to lively discuss the division of the British inheritance, but as soon as the Soviet People's Commissar reminded that “ big questions tomorrow” should not obscure the problems of today, that is, he returned the interlocutors to problems on which the security of the USSR directly depended; they immediately became depressed or, like Hitler, became irritated. The Fuhrer, unable to persuade the Moscow guest to make decisions beneficial to himself, pointedly did not arrive at the return dinner, which Molotov gave at the embassy on the evening of December 13.
The last conversation with Ribbentrop was also unsuccessful, during which the German minister spoke “about the transition to future cooperation between the member states of the Three Powers Pact - Germany, Italy, Japan and the Soviet Union” and about searching for ways to “jointly determine general outlines of the sphere of interests of these four states.” Molotov said that the Soviet side does not object to the joint work of the USSR with the Axis countries, but specific areas of such work require elaboration. As for the delimitation of spheres of interest, until now such a question, as the People’s Commissar noted, has not been raised by Germany and “it is new for the Soviet government.” In other words, he did not tie the hands of Soviet diplomacy with any specific decisions, accepting Ribbentrop’s proposal to continue further exchange of views through ambassadors in Moscow and Berlin.
In order to eliminate or at least postpone the danger of aggression, the Soviet leadership, having comprehensively weighed all the pros and cons, agreed to “basically accept the draft pact of the four powers” (Germany, Japan, Italy and the USSR) “on their political cooperation and economic mutual understanding,” that is, to be included in a new section of “spheres of influence.” Molotov reported this to Berlin through the German Ambassador F. Schulenburg on November 25. Moreover, the agreement was subject to a number of conditions unacceptable to Hitler, such as the requirement to withdraw German troops from Finland or ensure the security of the USSR in the Mediterranean straits by concluding a mutual assistance pact between the USSR and Bulgaria and organizing a military and naval base of the USSR in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles area on a long-term basis rent. Such a tactical move, in the opinion of the Soviet side, made it possible to ensure freedom of hands and at the same time retained the possibility of preventing or at least delaying the moment of Nazi aggression for more late date. However, there was no response from Berlin: the Third Reich had already made its choice in favor of war against the USSR.
When analyzing Molotov’s line of behavior during negotiations with Nazi elite A natural question arises about the degree of its independence. When answering this question, one should proceed from several considerations. Until his appointment as People's Commissar, Molotov had no diplomatic experience, had minimal contact with foreign representatives, and did not sufficiently speak any European language. Especially at the beginning, this could not help but affect his activities. According to the veteran of the diplomatic service V.V. Sokolov, “V.M. Molotov, having arrived at the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, was extremely careful, trying to coordinate with I.V. Stalin all the issues that arose. Considering himself a politician, he did not prepare for diplomatic activities, foreign languages didn’t own..." 10.
We cannot discount the regime of authoritarian power in the USSR, under which all significant decisions, including in the field of foreign policy, were made personally by the leader. Stalin “not only determined the main directions of the country’s foreign policy, but also had a direct influence on the resolution of specific issues of the NKID” 11. Everything was presented to him for review and approval. important documents of a diplomatic nature - drafts of all documents that the USSR submitted for consideration by the international community, directives to Soviet delegations at bilateral and multilateral negotiations, statements of a diplomatic nature, recordings of conversations of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs and his deputies with foreign diplomatic representatives, diplomatic correspondence, information received from ambassadors. As Molotov himself emphasized, “we [had] centralized diplomacy. The ambassadors did not have and could not have any independence... Everything was in the fist of Stalin, of me - we could not do otherwise at that time... Our diplomacy was not bad. But Stalin played the decisive role in it, and not some diplomat...” 12.
Molotov compensated for his minimum diplomatic skills with vast experience in managing entire areas of state activity. By the end of the 1930s, he was a mature and sophisticated politician, he had his own opinion on everything, which he was ready and able to defend, including before Stalin. The practical implementation of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the head of the ruling party, which rested with him and the team he led, reflected the style and methods of Molotov’s work.
Returning to his Berlin trip, it should be noted that the People's Commissar coordinated all his actions with Stalin through encrypted correspondence, and received specific instructions and recommendations from Moscow, which he followed. But it is clear that he communicated with Hitler and Ribbentrop directly himself, and here Molotov showed himself to be a stubborn negotiator, a firm politician, well aware of the situation and persistently defending the interests of his country. It is no coincidence that the very demanding leader sent Molotov an encouraging telegram: “We consider your behavior in the negotiations to be correct.”
True, not everything is so simple. On the one hand, summing up the results of Molotov’s visit to Berlin, Stalin, as the head of the affairs of the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR Ya.E. Chadayev recalled, at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks stated: “One thing is clear: Hitler is playing a double game. While preparing aggression against the USSR, he is at the same time trying to gain time, trying to give the Soviet government the impression that he is ready to discuss the issue of further peaceful development of Soviet-German relations... We must always remember this and make intensive preparations to repel fascist aggression” 13. But at the same time, both Stalin and Molotov believed that until the defeat of Great Britain the Germans would not fight the USSR, and hoped to gain a year or two to prepare the country to repel aggression. G.K. Zhukov recalled how, shortly after his appointment as Chief of the General Staff, during a report to Stalin in February 1941, Molotov, who was present at the report, interrupted his speech with a question: “Do you think that we will soon have to fight the Germans?” 14
In this duality of position, in playing along with Stalin in his conviction that he would be able to deceive Hitler (and this line was adhered to by everyone around the leader), was the reason for the catastrophic blunder in determining the possible timing of German aggression made by the top Soviet leadership. This is also a significant fault of the head of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.
The war that began on June 22, 1941 highlighted the special role of Molotov in the management of Soviet diplomacy and the country as a whole. He was the first of the Soviet leaders, due to his official position, to learn from the German Ambassador F. Schulenburg the tragic news of the declaration of war on the Soviet Union. It was from his speech on the radio at noon on June 22, 1941, and not from the head of the party and government Stalin or the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR M.I. Kalinin, that the Soviet people learned about the impending disaster, as well as about the fair nature of the ongoing struggle against Nazism: “Our it's a good thing, the enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours!”
The unprecedented test that befell the USSR required the strictest centralization of power. It was concentrated in their hands by a narrow circle of Stalin’s associates, led by the leader himself, forming the State Defense Committee on June 30, 1941. In its composition, Molotov took the post of deputy chairman, that is, Stalin.
It was Molotov, and not Beria, as A.I. Mikoyan claimed, who initiated the creation of the State Defense Committee 15. His action is logical: after all, he was the only one, besides Stalin, who knew in practice, being Secretary of the Party Central Committee in the 1920s, the work of the Labor and Defense Council, in the likeness of which the State Defense Committee was created, as well as the technology of the work of the “troikas” in the Politburo - the secret authorities, created from the leaders of the party and the country in the conditions of the Civil War and the severe economic crisis and demonstrated high efficiency. On June 30, at a critical moment after the first, catastrophically developing week of the war (Minsk fell on June 28, and a day later the main forces of the Western Front were surrounded by the enemy), Molotov took the much-needed initiative to form the State Defense Committee. Together with G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria, who were invited to his Kremlin office, he discussed the idea of creating an emergency government body, after which the idea was brought to the court of Stalin, who had retired that day to the “near dacha”, and received full approval from the leader OK.
Even earlier, Molotov became part of the High Command Headquarters formed on the second day of the war (from August 8, 1941 - the Supreme High Command Headquarters) - the strategic control body of the Armed Forces. According to Marshal G.K. Zhukov, “he was almost always present at Headquarters when operational-strategic and other important issues were considered. Between them [Molotov and Stalin] disagreements and serious disputes often arose, during which the the right decision» 16.
Members of the State Defense Committee, while continuing to carry out the main workload, received significant additional responsibilities. By decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942, Molotov was entrusted with “control over the implementation of decisions” on the production of tanks 17 . And at the end of the year, in accordance with the GKO decree of December 8, 1942, he became part of the GKO Operations Bureau - along with Malenkov, Beria and Mikoyan. The responsibility of the OB included “control and observation of current work", as well as the preparation and implementation of production and supply plans for the People's Commissariats of the defense industry, railways, ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, power plants, coal and chemical industries 18.
The redistribution of powers also affected members of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. On August 16, 1942, Molotov was approved as first deputy chairman of the Council of People's Commissars "on all issues of the work of the Council of People's Commissars", and a little later as chairman of the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars 19. The review and approval of “national economic plans (production and supply plans), the state budget and lending to all sectors of the national economy, as well as the organization of the work of the people’s commissariats that were not included in the sphere of the leadership of the State Defense Committee were transferred to the jurisdiction of the BSNK - the mechanical engineering people’s commissariats, the people’s commissariats for construction and production of building materials, food and light industry, agriculture, agricultural procurement and trade, sea and river transport, rubber industry, forestry industry, pulp and paper industry, healthcare, justice, and all committees and departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.
Thus, taking into account Molotov’s responsibilities within the framework of the State Defense Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, the entire defense industry and the entire national economic complex were under his direct command. Of course, he relied on large number deputies and the apparatus, but, in the end, he was responsible for everything himself. And he coped with the assigned duties well. Let us refer to just one fact: on September 30, 1943, he was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for his contribution to the production of armored vehicles. Behind this award are the impressive figures for the growth in production of tanks and self-propelled artillery since the beginning of the war: from 4,968 in 1941 to 24,134 in 1943 20 .
At the same time, we should not forget that Molotov’s main job responsibility continued to be the leadership of the NKID. With the outbreak of war, serious adjustments were made to the activities of the People's Commissariat. The main thing that was now required of him was to ensure favorable international conditions for a decisive rebuff to the countries of the fascist “axis”, to search for allies and establish effective political, military and economic cooperation with them, primarily with the United States of America and Great Britain. The People's Commissar played an exceptional role in solving this problem.
On June 26, he sent a telegram to the Ambassador to the USA K.A. Umansky: “You should immediately go to Roosevelt or Hull [K. Hull - US Secretary of State], and in his absence, to Welles [S. Welles, US Deputy Secretary of State, replaced K. Hall during his illness] and, reporting on the treacherous German attack on the USSR, ask what the attitude of the American government is to this war and to the USSR. There should be no questions about help now” 22. In the tone of both telegrams one can feel the independent position of both the People's Commissar and the country behind him, which found itself in an extremely difficult situation, but was not going to curry favor with anyone and beg for help.
Only after the People's Commissar received the American Ambassador L. Shteynhardt on June 29 and heard from him about “the desire and readiness to give all possible assistance to the Soviet Union, which would be within the power of the United States, so that the Soviet Union defeats Hitler,” did he give K.A. Umansky an instruction to meet with F. Roosevelt or the US Secretary of State and raise with American leaders the question of the possibility of providing assistance to the USSR (the telegram further contained a list of specific weapons and strategic materials).
Almost from the very beginning, the Soviet leadership raised with future allies the issue of the inadequacy of mutual economic assistance, encouraging them to create a broad military-political base for the development of comprehensive cooperation. When, during a conversation with British Ambassador S. Cripps on June 27, the latter noted that in the economic field his country could provide the USSR necessary materials, which she has, “the time is not yet ripe for a political agreement, since a lot of mutual distrust has accumulated from the past,” Molotov reacted immediately. He stated that “it is better not to return to the past”, since the situation has changed dramatically: “Both sides have one enemy, and they have general questions and common interests." At the same time, “it is necessary to condition mutual assistance on some kind of agreement on a certain political basis on which it would be possible to carry out military and political rapprochement between both countries” 23 .
Such persistence on the Soviet side bore fruit. On July 12, 1941, the Soviet-British agreement “On joint actions in the war against Germany” was concluded in Moscow, which recorded the mutual readiness of the parties “to provide each other with assistance and support of all kinds in the real war against Nazi Germany” 24 . V.M. Molotov affixed his signature to the document.
The special value of the agreement was that it marked the beginning of the practical formation of the anti-Hitler coalition as a military-political alliance. Such an alliance also provided a serious material base: a month later, on August 16, a Soviet-British agreement on trade turnover, credit and clearing was signed in Moscow, which provided for the provision of a loan to the Soviet Union in the amount of 10 million pounds sterling for purchases for the needs of the Red Army and Navy military equipment and weapons.
Washington was also brought closer to the emerging alliance between London and Moscow, which was facilitated by the visit to the Soviet capital at the end of July 1941 by H. Hopkins, F. Roosevelt’s personal envoy and friend.
As a result of common efforts, on September 29 - October 1, 1941, the first ever conference of representatives of the USSR, USA and Great Britain was held in Moscow, which considered issues of mutual supplies and the best use of the material resources of the three countries in the war. A secret protocol was signed on the supply of weapons and strategic materials to the USSR for nine months at once - until June 30, 1942.
No less important was the political result, which the head of the Soviet delegation, Molotov, defined succinctly and exhaustively: “The political significance of the conference lies in the fact that it showed how decisively ... the intentions of the Nazis were being thwarted, against whom a powerful front of freedom-loving peoples, led by the Soviet Union, was now created , England and the United States of America" 25.
Of course, many politicians and diplomats contributed to the achievement of this success on the Soviet side. It is impossible not to note the role of Stalin, who personally, sparing no time, negotiated with the leaders of the American (A. Harriman) and British (Lord W. Beaverbrook) delegations. Nevertheless, the role of Molotov cannot be diminished.
Moreover, contacts with important, but still secondary, persons from the Allied camp did not allow us to achieve a full-fledged military-political alliance with the USA and Great Britain, without which a viable anti-Hitler coalition would have been impossible. Moscow came to the conclusion that it was necessary to send the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for a personal meeting with the top officials of the allied countries.
In May-June 1942, Molotov, by decision of the government (read Stalin), on a four-engine TB-7 (Pe-8) bomber, made a long-distance flight even by today’s standards (about 20 thousand km) and extremely risky flight to the British Isles, and then to USA. On May 21, Molotov began negotiations with Churchill and Foreign Minister A. Eden with the aim of: 1) concluding an alliance treaty, which could not be signed in December 1941 during Eden’s stay in Moscow, and 2) reaching an agreement on the opening of a Second Front. Moreover, the People's Commissar emphasized the priority importance of the second issue, announcing his intention to consider it with the President of the United States. Showing due respect for the British ally, Molotov told his interlocutors, the Soviet government recognized the need for him, Molotov, to first discuss the issue of the Second Front with Churchill and Eden.
The search for a reasonable compromise was difficult. The British side did not agree to include in the draft a clause proposed by Stalin during Eden’s visit to Moscow on the post-war structure of Europe with recognition of the borders of the USSR as of June 22, 1941. In other words, the British did not want to recognize the fact of the entry of Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, Bessarabia and the Baltic countries into the USSR, as well as the new border with Finland after the Winter War. At negotiations with the Moscow envoy, Churchill and Eden continued to categorically object to this point.
Molotov, together with Ambassador Maisky, following the instructions received earlier, sent a telegram to Stalin in which they regarded English project as “an empty declaration that the USSR does not need.” An unexpected answer was received from Moscow: the “Instance” ordered that the agreement be immediately signed on English terms, while explaining: “There [in the agreement] there is no question of border security, but this is probably not bad, since our hands remain free. The issue of borders, or, rather, guarantees of the security of our borders in one or another part of our country, will be resolved by force” 26.
Stalin set the task of quickly signing the agreement and flying to America in order to get the allies to open a Second Front back in 1942.
On May 26, 1942, an agreement between the USSR and Great Britain on an alliance in the war against Nazi Germany and its accomplices in Europe and on cooperation and mutual assistance after the war was signed. It replaced the agreement of July 12, 1941 and became a full-fledged legal basis for providing each other with military and other assistance “against Germany and all those states that are associated with it in acts of aggression in Europe.” The parties confirmed their obligations, which prohibited conducting any negotiations with Germany and its allies and concluding an armistice or peace treaty with them “other than by mutual agreement” 27 .
An interesting assessment is that Churchill gave the Soviet People's Commissar when he first clashed with Molotov in a diplomatic duel. On May 27, 1942, informing Roosevelt about the signed Soviet-British treaty, the prime minister wrote: “Molotov - statesman and has a freedom of action very different from that which you and I had to observe in Litvinov. I am very confident that you will be able to come to an agreement with him” 28.
Unfortunately, not everything depended on Molotov. From May 29 to June 5, he held a series of negotiations, primarily with Roosevelt. This was the first official visit at this level in the history of interstate relations between the USSR and the USA. The US President received Moscow's envoy immediately and talked with him before and after the dinner given in honor of Molotov. However, as soon as the head of the Soviet delegation raised the direct question of opening a Second Front in 1942, Roosevelt and his advisers in the person of H. Hopkins, Chief of Staff of the American Army General J. Marshall and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral E. King did not show much enthusiasm . As Molotov reported to Moscow on May 31, “Roosevelt and Marshall said that they wanted to do this in every possible way, but so far the matter rests on the lack of ships to transport troops to France. They didn’t tell me anything specific” 29.
“My mission to Washington can be considered completed,” Molotov concluded pessimistically. However, this conclusion turned out to be premature. On June 3, it was possible to agree on the draft Soviet-American communiqué proposed by the Soviet side. It stated that "during the negotiations, complete agreement was reached regarding the urgent tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942."
On the day the communiqué was published, June 11, 1942, in Washington, the USSR Ambassador and the US Secretary of State signed an agreement between the governments of both states on the principles applicable to mutual assistance in waging war against aggression 30 . This act completed the process of forming the anti-Hitler coalition. True, the declared “full agreement” on the creation of the Second Front was implemented only in 1944.
The Allies, under various pretexts, postponed the opening of hostilities against the Wehrmacht in Western Europe, so that the Red Army took on the entire brunt of the armed confrontation with the common enemy. Soviet diplomacy made persistent efforts to change the situation. In October 1943, a conference of the foreign ministers of the USSR, USA and Great Britain took place in Moscow. In discussions with K. Hull and A. Eden, Molotov managed to prepare a solid basis for the first in the history of the anti-Hitler coalition conference of the “Big Three” in Tehran at the end of November 1943.
The Moscow Conference adopted a declaration on the issue of general security, in which for the first time the formula for the unconditional surrender of fascist states was proclaimed as an indispensable condition for ending the war. In the final communiqué, the governments of the three powers recognized the primary goal of “accelerating the end of the war” and proclaimed the opening of a Second Front through the landing of Allied troops in Northern France as one of the main means of achieving this goal. True, the Allies did not go beyond assurances about the possibility of an invasion of the continent from the British Isles in the spring of 1944 31 .
After the end of the work, the head of the American delegation, K. Hull, addressing Molotov, who chaired the conference, said: “I am sure that I will express not only my own opinion, but also the opinion of Mr. Eden, if I say that we are both delighted with the manner , with which you conducted the conference. I have personally attended many international conferences and have never met such experienced and skillful conduct of work...” The success of the conference suggests that these were not empty words.
With the formation of the anti-Hitler coalition and the establishment of the practice of personal correspondence between leaders and their communication at the Big Three conferences, Stalin began to play a growing role in foreign policy affairs. Molotov involuntarily began to fade into the shadows. This happened, in particular, at the Tehran, Yalta (February 1945), Potsdam (July-August 1945) conferences of the heads of the great powers. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is justified only when considering the public side of cooperation with the allies; the People's Commissar still took upon himself the actual work on the diplomatic front and carried it out consistently and intensively.
Even Western politicians could not help but appreciate Molotov’s contribution to the achievement of foreign policy successes, which, in addition to military successes, marked the path of the Soviet Union to victory over Germany and its allies. The characterization given to him by W. Churchill is noteworthy: “Vyacheslav Molotov was a man of outstanding abilities and cold-blooded ruthlessness... I have never met a person who more perfectly represents the modern concept of a robot. And for all that, he was still, apparently, an intelligent and sharply honed diplomat... In Molotov, the Soviet machine, without a doubt, found a capable and in many respects typical representative for it - an always faithful member of the party and a follower of the communist doctrine... Mazarin, Talleyrand, Metternich would have accepted him into their company if there had been another world into which the Bolsheviks allowed themselves to enter” 32.
Important role Molotov continued to play after the end of the World War. Speaking about the work to implement the decisions of the Yalta, Potsdam and San Francisco conferences in organizing the post-war world, signing peace treaties with states that were allies of Nazi Germany during the war, he recalled: “I saw my task as Minister of Foreign Affairs in how it is possible to expand the borders of our Fatherland as much as possible... I extorted peace treaties from states” 33 .
In March 1949, Molotov was removed from the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, precisely removed, not released, because he was suspected by Stalin of indulging “enemies of the people.” And in 1952, at a plenum held after the 19th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the leader subjected him to devastating criticism 34 . It is possible that, had Stalin lived longer, Molotov, along with Mikoyan and Voroshilov, could have become victims of a new wave of purges in the highest leadership circles of the country. This circumstance, however, did not force the former Minister of Foreign Affairs to change his view of Stalin’s role in achieving victory in the Great Patriotic War. “I want to emphasize that we were all very lucky that Stalin was with us from the very beginning of the war,” he said on this occasion. - Let me at least note his enormous role in leadership national economy. He kept all the main issues of military restructuring and the functioning of our economy, even in detail, in his memory and skillfully carried out all the levers of control along a given course” 35.
1 Year of crisis. 1938-1939. Documents and materials. In 2 volumes. T. 1. M., 1990. P. 386-387.
2 World wars of the 20th century. In 4 books. Book 4. World War II: documents and materials. M., 2002. P. 67.
3 Essays on the history of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 1802-2002. In 3 volumes. T. 2. 1917-
2002 M., 2002. P. 355.
4 Year of crisis. 1938-1939... T. 2. P. 145.
5 Soviet foreign policy 1917-1945. Searching for new approaches. M., 1992. P. 177.
6 World wars of the 20th century... P. 81.
7 Kumanev G.A. Next to Stalin. Frank evidence. M., 1999. P. 10.
8 World wars of the 20th century... P. 182-183.
10 Sokolov V.V. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov // International Affairs. 1991. No. 5.
P. 103.
11 Essays on the history of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia... P. 273.
12 Chuev F.I. One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov. M., 1991. S. 98-99.
13 Quoted. By: Kumanev G.A. Decree. op. pp. 404-405.
14 Zhukov G.K. Memories and reflections. In 3 volumes. Ed. 10th, add. by hand author. T. 1. M., 1990. P. 326.
15 Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. In 12 volumes. T. 10. State, society and war. M., 2014. P. 73.
16 Zhukov G.K. Decree. op. T. 2. P. 112.
17 RGASPI. F. 644. Op. 1. D. 20. L. 218.
18 Ibid. D. 72. L. 165.
19 Ibid. F. 17. Op. 3. D. 1045. L. 17.
20 The Great Patriotic War... T. 7. Economics and weapons of war. M., 2013. P. 509.
22 Ibid. P. 39.
23 Ibid. pp. 46-48.
24 Ibid. P. 145.
25 Ibid. P. 341.
26 Quoted. By: Rzheshevsky O.A. Stalin and Churchill. Meetings. Conversations. Discussions. Documents, comments, 1941-1945. M., 2004. P. 157.
27 Documents of the foreign policy of the USSR. January 2 - December 30, 1942. T. 25. Book. 1. M., 2010. P. 392.
28 Quoted. By: Rzheshevsky O.A. Stalin and Churchill... P. 207-208.
29 Ibid. P. 231.
31 The Soviet Union at international conferences during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. T. 1. Moscow Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, USA and Great Britain (October 19-30, 1943). M., 1978. P. 311.
32 Quoted. By: Medvedev R.A. They surrounded Stalin. M., 2012. P. 17.
33 Chuev F.I. Decree. op. pp. 98-99.
34 Simonov K. Through the eyes of a man of my generation. M., 1988. S. 241-242.
35 Kumanev G.A. Decree. op. P. 12.
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