• Interior
• Window
• Walls
• Projects
• The buildings

Fascist commanders in chief. How the Nazi elite ended their lives: the last conspiracy

This is a general of Hitler's army - Guderian, one of the participants in the inhuman fascist regime in Germany and a Nazi criminal. But like any person, he has his own story. I found her quite interesting.

The Germans did not invent the tank. But they were the first to organize effective tank forces, come up with the theory of their use and apply them. The most famous theorist and practitioner of the use of tanks was Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, who was called “fast Heinz” and “Heinz-hurricane”.

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was born on June 17, 1888 in the city of Chelm on the banks of the Vistula (At that time it was a region of West Prussia bordering Germany. Now it is a town called Szelmno in Poland.) in the family of a career Prussian officer, which predetermined his career. After graduating from the cadet corps in 1907, he began military service in the Jaeger battalion, commanded by his father. He received the rank of lieutenant in 1908.

In 1911, Guderian began an affair with Margarete Goerne, but his father considered that Heinz was still too young to marry and sent his son with special instructions to the third telegraph battalion. After completing the course, Guderian married Margaret. They had two sons, both of whom fought in World War II in German tank units. The younger, Heinz Günther, later rose to the rank of major general in the Bundeswehr.

Before the First World War, Guderian was sent to the Berlin Military Academy to train as a staff officer, as he showed outstanding abilities. In November 1914, he became first lieutenant, and a year later - captain.

During the First World War, Guderian held various positions and participated in many battles: the failure at the Marne, the massacre at Verdun, although he himself did not command combat units. However, he was awarded the Iron Crosses, second and first class. Early in 1918, Guderian underwent a special "Sedan" test, during which he demonstrated his ability to solve tactical problems in unusual situations, which greatly impressed his instructors. He successfully passed the exams for the rank of officer of the Supreme Command Headquarters (he became the youngest staff officer). After the war, he was accepted into the Reichswehr, which then, due to restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, numbered only 100,000 people, and only the best could enter there. Guderian began to write regulations for motorized units, and was the commander of various motorized units. These were just supply units equipped with trucks and motorcycles.

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the fate of the career officer was very successful. As an excellent specialist, he was among the four thousand German officers selected to create the new German army. The remaining German officers, according to the Versailles Peace Agreement, were subject to demobilization.

In the 1920s, Guderian became interested in methods of waging mechanized warfare. It cannot be said that it was Guderian who was the creator of the Panzerwaffe, but it was he who had the greatest influence on the development of German tank forces. He became interested in the works of Liddell-Hart and Faller and even translated some of them into German. However, Guderian's superiors did not share his views on the future of tank forces.

Since 1922, Guderian connected his service with motorized troops. First he served in automobile units, then in tank units in various staff positions. At this time, Guderian collaborated with Colonel Lutz of the Inspectorate of Motorized Troops and worked there for three years as an instructor. The officer used his official position to promote the concept of “tank warfare,” without which he did not see Germany’s future military power. Gradually, Guderian emerged as a military theorist.

Guderian always tried to find as much material as possible on the use of motorized units in military operations. He talked with knowledgeable French and English officers, translated the works of Captain Liddell-Hart (who later became an excellent historian) and Major General Fuller. When Guderian mounted wooden turrets armed with guns on some of his trucks and successfully maneuvered such pseudo-tanks in training exercises, his superiors initially forbade this. In 1927 he was promoted to the rank of major.
In 1929, Guderian traveled to Sweden to visit the Swedish tank battalions equipped with the STRV m/21 and m/21-29 tanks (Swedish versions of the German LK II tank). He also visited a secret tank test site in Kazan, in the USSR (at the time, Germany was prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles from developing its own tanks), where he met some of the Soviet officers who would later become his mortal enemies. At that time, Guderian was commander-inspector of all motorized units of the Reichswehr, and also taught motorized tactics in Berlin. In February 1931, Guderian was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (lieutenant colonel), and two years later to colonel. He completed the drafting of regulations for motorized combat units and assisted in solving technical problems on the first tanks built.

Attitudes towards armored forces in Germany changed after the Nazis came to power in 1933.

When Adolf Hitler came to power, he attended military maneuvers and saw several of Guderian's small Panzer Is on the "battlefield". Hitler was delighted. Officially ignoring the Treaty of Versailles and establishing conscription, in 1934 Hitler ordered the formation of three tank divisions. Professional training of German tank crews began, some of them studied in the Soviet Union, in particular at the Kazan Tank School.

Guderian, who then had excellent relations with Hitler, was appointed commander of the 2nd Panzer Division and, a short time later, was promoted to major general. No later than a year and a half later, Guderian became a lieutenant general and received the 16th Army Corps under his command.

In 1935, the first three tank divisions were formed. Guderian received the post of commander of the 2nd Panzer Division and the rank of major general. In 1938, General Lutz “resigned” and Guderian was appointed in his place, who by that time was already wearing lieutenant general’s shoulder straps. For the first time, an army corps was under his command.

Guderian participated in the Polish campaign as commander of the XIX Corps, a mechanized formation that swept uncontrollably across Poland from the western border to Brest-Litovsk. For his excellent campaigning, Guderian was one of the first to receive the Knight's Cross. During the invasion of Poland, Guderian commanded the 19th Army Corps and was again awarded the Iron Crosses of the second and first classes, and then the Knight's Cross. During the invasion of France, Guderian made the blitzkrieg strategy a reality. Completely disobeying orders from headquarters, he inexorably pushed his tanks forward and forward until the crews had enough fuel and strength, causing devastation far beyond the expected front line, blocking communications, capturing entire French headquarters, who naively believed that German troops were still are located on the western bank of the Meuse River, thereby leaving the French units without command.

BREST - LITHOVSK 22. SEPTEMBER 1939. Joint parade with units of the Red Army

Then the troops under the command of Guderian were transferred to the West, where preparations were underway for an attack on France.

The defeat of the French army was not due solely to the superiority of German tanks. Only one type of German tank, the Panzer IV, armed with a 75mm gun, could compete with the French Char B heavy tanks, while the other Panzer I, II and III were either outdated or underpowered. There were several other reasons for the success of German tank weapons, for example, each German tank was equipped with a walkie-talkie, which in combat conditions helped in coordinating combat operations and made it possible to quickly and easily direct tank forces to where they were most needed at that moment. In addition, all tanks participated in combat operations as part of fully equipped independent units and were not assigned to infantry units. Last but not least, all tank units were under the command of officers who were trained and trained by the creator of the German armored forces himself - Heinz Wilhelm Guderian. After reaching the English Channel, Guderian's tank group was formed, which penetrated deep into French territory, breaking through the giant Maginot Line. Starting from this time, each piece of equipment included in Guderian's tank group had a special identification mark - a large letter "G".

During the Strange War, the experience of fighting in Poland was taken into account. By May 1940, Guderian commanded a formation of three tank divisions. In June 1940, Guderian was appointed commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, aimed at France. Having quickly passed through Belgium and crossed the Marne River, German tanks suddenly attacked French troops, who did not have time to prepare for the enemy invasion. After being defeated, the French abandoned the well-fortified Maginot Line.

Operating in close contact with the “flying artillery” - dive aircraft, and sometimes ignoring orders to stop the offensive, Guderian achieved stunning success and fell into the ranks of one of the best tank commanders. Guderian ended the French campaign right at the Swiss border.

After the victory in France, Guderian was promoted to colonel general, however, until 1941 he remained aloof from big affairs, training new tank crews. As he wrote in his memoirs, it seemed to him that a new “war was not in sight.”

When the general became aware of preparations for an attack on the USSR, Guderian became very concerned. He was little concerned about the moral aspects of this operation - Guderian was worried precisely about the military impracticability of the plans being developed. However, Guderian took command of the 2nd Panzer Group, which consisted of five tank and three motorized infantry divisions, combined into two corps. In June 1941, Guderian's tank columns marched in the first echelon of the German army, breaking into the defenses of Soviet troops in the main directions.

In the summer and autumn, Guderian managed to achieve excellent results. Just 15 days after the start of the war, units of the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper and were aimed at Moscow. Guderian believed that the capital of the Soviet Union should be taken on the move, but he was not supported.

In early September, Guderian's army, deployed to reinforce Army Group South, took part in the operation to encircle Kyiv, in the area of ​​which four Soviet armies were defending. The tank wedge of the 2nd Army was advancing on the city of Nezhin, going to join the tank forces of Colonel General E. von Kleist. However, the brilliant tank “blitzkrieg” near Kiev did not work out, and the Germans achieved only great tactical success here, which delayed their attack on Moscow.

Kyiv fell on September 19, and to the south of the city, in the bend of the Dnieper, more than 600 thousand Soviet troops found themselves in a “cauldron”.

In October of the same year, with the rank of Colonel General, he commanded the 2nd Tank Army on the Soviet-German front, which was part of Army Group Center under Field Marshal von Bock. This group of armies was to advance through Smolensk to Moscow. Guderian's tank army took part in the encirclement of Soviet troops near Smolensk and in the Lokhvina region.

After this, the tank wedges of the 2nd Tank Army aimed at Moscow. However, the resistance of the Red Army grew, and in the conditions of the onset of winter, the advance of tank columns slowed down significantly. Guderian told Hitler that the German army was not prepared for winter, that it was necessary to retreat to more suitable positions, but the Fuhrer did not listen to his words.

As you know, at the beginning of December 1941, advanced German detachments reached the suburbs of Moscow. Guderian's greatest success in this winter offensive against Moscow was the capture of the city of Kaluga thanks to the successful bypass of the Mozhaisk defense line of Soviet troops from the south.

A battle began near Moscow, which ended in the complete defeat of the Germans. During the counter-offensive of Soviet troops under the overall command of G.K. Zhukov, the German armies of the Center group were thrown back far from the Soviet capital. Moreover, during defensive battles and during the counter-offensive, Soviet tank troops demonstrated the high art of fighting enemy tanks.

It seemed that the star of the German ideologist of the “tank war” was going down. In December 1941, after a heavy defeat near Moscow, Guderian quarreled with his superior, von Kluge, and was removed from command of the troops and sent to reserve.

Guderian was out of work for more than a year. Only in March 1943 was he appointed to the post of inspector general of tank forces. In his new place, Guderian, due to official needs, had to often meet with Hitler. Not once was the Fuhrer able to convince Guderian to agree with his plans, however, Guderian also rarely managed to convince the Fuhrer that he was right. His lively mind was constantly in search of strategic solutions.

The unsuccessful attempt on the Fuhrer's life in July 1944 took Guderian by surprise - he knew nothing about the impending plot. Soon, Guderian was included in the military tribunal that tried the rebel generals, and then, in June 1944, he was appointed chief of the general staff of the ground forces. However, even Guderian's great abilities could not correct the catastrophic situation on the fronts.

Guderian was one of the few German generals who dared to argue with the Fuhrer and defend his opinion. One of the reasons for the disagreement between them was the efforts of the Colonel General to save Army Group North, which was surrounded in Latvia. However, Hitler delayed decisions too long, and the encircled German armies received no help.

In March 1945, Heinz Guderian began to insist on concluding an immediate peace with the enemy, for which he was immediately transferred to the reserve and never returned to Hitler’s army.

Guderian went to the Austrian Tyrol, where in May 1945 he was captured by the Americans, but they soon released the retired German military leader. Although Guderian was officially detained as a war criminal, the victors did not bring any charges against him for his actions on the territory of Poland, France and the Soviet Union. Throughout the war, Guderian managed not to sully the honor of his uniform with war crimes.

The creator of the German tank forces had many reasons to especially fear for his fate. Many considered him one of the most pro-Nazi generals. In addition, Poland demanded that Guderian be extradited as a war criminal: he was considered responsible for the actions of the German armed forces that suppressed the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. However, Guderian was helped by the Cold War: the Americans could not release a military specialist of this level into Stalin’s zone of influence. He was sent to Nuremberg, but was not put on trial. In 1946, Guderian was imprisoned in Allendorf and then in Neustadt. But in 1948 he was released.

In the post-war years, Guderian wrote memoirs in which he tried to rehabilitate the fascist generals and place all responsibility for the defeat of Germany in World War II on Adolf Hitler. However, this is typical for most memoirs written by Hitler’s generals.

Heinz Guderian actively advocated the restoration of pre-war European borders and the military power of post-war Germany. In the last years of his life he was one of the leaders of the extreme right forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. But his revanchist positions were condemned by the entire democratic public of the country.

Guderian died on May 14, 1954 in Schwangau, Bavaria, exactly 14 years after his decisive crossing of the Meuse River at Sedan.

sources
http://www.nazireich.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=169&Itemid=41
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html
http://velikvoy.narod.ru

At the beginning of the war, the Nazis were confident of their superiority. It was obvious to them. If all of “civilized Europe” quickly and without resistance fell under the German machine, then there is nothing to say about the “eastern barbarians.”
« We have the greatest army, led by the greatest military genius of all time." "We are the striking sword of the new Germany!»
Haape G. Grin of Death. 1941 on the Eastern Front. M., 2009. P.86, 94, 125.

Already a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War - July 24, 1941 in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Ground Forces, General Galdera a recording appeared from the address of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal General von Brauchitsch to the participants of the meeting that was held at that time:
“The uniqueness of the country and the unique character of the Russians gives the campaign a special specificity. First serious opponent " .

Quotes from diaries and memoirs of German soldiers, German generals and other military officials of the Wehrmacht.
***
First - Joseph Goebbels.
A significant evolution in Goebbels's attitude towards the Soviet army from 1939 to 1945 is noticeable.
By 1945, Goebbels generally came to the idea that repressions in the German army were needed back in 1934.
**
Entry dated November 11, 1939
“The Russian army is not of great value. It is poorly led and even worse equipped and armed.”
dated June 29, 1941
“The Russians are defending themselves bravely. Their command is operating operationally better than in the first days”...

The last notes.
March 5, 1945
“The Fuhrer again sharply criticizes the General Staff.<...>The Fuhrer is right when he says<...>What Stalin carried out this [Purge of the command staff of the Red Army] reform in a timely manner and therefore is now enjoying its benefits.If such a reform is forced upon us today by our defeats, it will be too late for final success."

March 16, 1945
“The General Staff provides me with a book with biographical data and portraits of Soviet generals and marshals. From this book it is not difficult to glean various information about what mistakes we have made in the past years. These marshals and generals are on average extremely young, almost none of them are older than 50 years .They are<...>extremely energetic people, and on their faces you can read that they have a good folk culture... In short, I am forced to draw the unpleasant conclusion that the leaders of the Soviet Union come from better people than our own<...>I inform the Fuehrer about the book of the General Staff about Soviet marshals and generals provided to me for review, adding that I have the impression that we are not at all able to compete with such leaders. The Fuhrer fully shares my opinion. Our generals are too old, they have outlived their usefulness<...>, which speaks of the colossal superiority of the Soviet generals."

March 26, 1945
"Luftwaffe. Fundamental reform is needed - from top to bottom."
J. Goebbels. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Sämtliche Fragmente. 1987. Munich
***
Next - Manstein.
Part of the troops of the Crimean Front, numbering five thousand heroes, from the second half of May until the end of October 1942, held the defense against German troops in the Adzhimushkai quarries, withstanding shelling, explosions and gases.
On May 24, they sent a radiogram from the dungeon: " To all the peoples of the Soviet Union! We, the defenders of the defense of Kerch, are suffocating from the gas, dying, but not giving up!" (Ionina N.A. Adzhimushkaya quarries)
Manstein wrote:
"Dense mass,leading individual soldiers by the arm so that no one could fall behind, they rushed towards our lines. Often in front of everyone were women and girls of the Komsomol, who, also with weapons in their hands, inspired the fighters.”
Manstein E. "Lost Victories." M.1999. P.294-295.

“On the Eastern Front: the fighting continues. Strengthened and desperate enemy resistance... The enemy has many killed, few wounded and prisoners... In general, very heavy fighting is taking place. There can be no talk of a “walk.”The Red regime mobilized the people. Added to this is the fabulous stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers can barely cope. But so far everything is going according to plan. The situation is not critical, but serious and requires every effort."
From the diary of Propaganda Minister Goebbels (Revelations and Confessions. P. 321; Rzhevskaya E.M. Goebbels... P. 283.)

"The Russians have proven themselves to be skillful, hardy and fearless soldiers, smashing to smithereens our past prejudices about racial superiority".
Metelman G. Through Hell... P.288, 294.

" Those damn peasants fought like hell..."
Zenger F. Neither fear, nor hope...P.67; Haape G. The Grin of Death... P.125, 129.

" The new generation in Russia had strength and courage...They often acted mechanically, like robots... These people believed in their authority and obeyed it.”
Wolfsanger V. Merciless slaughter... P.99, 100.

" The Russians showed themselves to be first-class warriors from the very beginning, and our successes in the first months of the war were simply due to better preparation. Having gained combat experience, they became first-class soldiers. They fought with exceptional tenacity, had amazing endurance and could withstand the most intense battles."
Colonel General von Kleist. (Liddell-Hart B. They know how to defend themselves and stand to the death... // Another war, 1939-1945. - M.: Russian State University for the Humanities, 1996. - P. 379; Liddell-Hart B . Battles of the Third Reich... P. 265.)

“Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet army was,” recalled the general Blumentrite, chief of staff of the 4th Army, advancing in Belarus. “We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles.” Border guards and women defended the old fortress in Brest for over a week, fighting to the last limit, despite the shelling of our heaviest guns and air bombing. Our troops soon learned what it meant to fight against the Russians..."
Liddell-Gart B. They know how to defend themselves... P. 382; Liddell-Hart B. Battles of the Third Reich... P. 271-272.

"Information from the front confirmsthat Russians fight everywhere to the last man... It is striking that when capturing artillery batteries, etc. Few surrender. Some Russians fight until they are killed, others flee, throw off their uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants."
Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel General Halder F. Military diary. T. 3. P. 53

“The fighting with the Russians has been extremely stubborn. Only a small number of prisoners have been captured.”
ibid., p. 84.

"Russian soldiers and junior commanders are very brave in battle, even a single small part always takes the attack. In this regard, human treatment of prisoners should not be allowed. The destruction of the enemy by fire or cold steel must continue until the enemy becomes safe...
Fanaticism and contempt for death make the Russians enemies whose destruction is mandatory..."
From the order of the command of the 60th Motorized Infantry Division (RAVO. T. 24(13). Book 2. P. 42.)

Behind enemy lines, the Soviet government organized the fight of 6,200 partisan detachments with up to 1 million people. “The fight against partisan detachments was a monstrous reality... in July 1943, 1,560 railways were blown up in Russia, in September - 2,600. That is, 90 per day.”
Just G. Alfred Jodl is a soldier without fear or reproach. The combat path of the head of the German OKW. M., 2007. P.97.

“The Party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissioners are urban residents and come from working class backgrounds. Their courage borders on recklessness; These people are very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline.Such merciless military discipline - which I am sure no other army could have endured - turned the unorganized crowd into an unusually powerful weapon of war. Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in achieving Stalin’s enormous political and military successes. ...

A Russian remains a good soldier everywhere and in any conditions...
A field kitchen, almost a shrine in the eyes of soldiers of other armies, is just a pleasant surprise for Russians and they can go without it for days and weeks.The Russian soldier is quite satisfied with a handful of millet or rice, adding to them what nature gives him. Such closeness to nature explains the Russian’s ability to become, as it were, part of the earth, to literally dissolve in it. A soldier of the Russian army is an unsurpassed master of camouflage and self-entrenchment, as well as field fortification...

The industrialization of the Soviet Union, carried out persistently and mercilessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number of highly qualified specialists. R The Russians quickly learned to use new types of weapons and, oddly enough, showed themselves capable of conducting combat operations using sophisticated military equipment.Carefully selected specialists helped the rank and file to master modern military equipment, and it must be said that the Russians achieved serious success, especially in the signal forces. The longer the war dragged on, the better the Russian signalmen worked, the more skillfully they used radio interception, created interference and transmitted false messages...

The skillful and persistent work of the communists has led to the fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way.There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level of his education is constantly growing. It is quite possible that over a long period of preparation in peaceful conditions, he will develop personal initiative...

The conduct of military operations by the Russians, especially on the offensive, is characterized by the use of a large amount of manpower and equipment, which the command often introduces into battle recklessly and stubbornly, but achieves success. Russians have always been famous for their contempt for death; The communist regime has further developed this quality, and now the massive Russian attacks are more effective than ever before.An attack undertaken twice will be repeated a third and fourth time, regardless of the losses incurred, andand the third and fourth attacks will be carried out with the same stubbornness and composure...

Russian divisions, which had a very large composition, attacked, as a rule, on a narrow front. The area in front of the defending front was suddenly filled with Russians in the blink of an eye.They appeared as if from underground, and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche.The huge gaps from our fire were immediately filled; Waves of infantry rolled in one after another, and only when the manpower reserves were exhausted could they roll back. It was not often that they did not retreat, but rushed forward uncontrollably. Repelling this kind of attack depends not so much on the availability of technology, but on whether the nerves can withstand it.

Only battle-hardened soldiers were able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone. Only a soldier who is aware of his duty and believes in his own strength, only one who has learned to act, relying on himself, will be able to withstand the terrible tension of a Russian massive attack...

The strength of the Russian soldier is explained by his extreme closeness to nature. There are simply no natural obstacles for him: in impenetrable forests, swamps and swamps, in the roadless steppe, he feels at home everywhere.He crosses wide rivers using the most basic means at hand, and he can build roads everywhere. In a few days, the Russians build many kilometers of roads through impassable swamps.”
From the book of General Friedrich von Mellenthin "Tank battles: 1939-1945"

“Many [German] soldiers had no trace left of their previous enthusiasm, of the faith in victory that inspired them in the first year of the war.” “It’s pure hell on the front line. I’ve never seen anything like this in this war. And I took part in it from the very beginning.Ivan does not retreat a single step. The path to the Russian positions is paved with their corpses, but many of ours will die before. In essence, there are no real positions here. They fight for every ruin, for every stone..... In Stalingrad we forgot how to laugh.The worst thing is the night battles. The Russians use every hillock for defense and do not give up a single inch without a fight."
Wider I., Adam V. Stalingrad nightmare. Behind the scenes of the battle. M., 2007. P.25, 100, 113.

In 1943, the Wehrmacht's defeats were replaced by victories. “Graveyards” of Soviet tanks, cars, killed and prisoners were shown. In the newsreels, after several shots were fired, the Russians fled. But in the cinema halls, where the wounded German front-line soldiers were sitting, there was a whistle, screams of lies! “Not a single soldier or officer now speaks disparagingly about Ivan, although not long ago they often spoke like that. Every day the Red Army soldier increasingly acts as a master of close combat, street battles and skillful camouflage.”
ibid., pp. 122, 126, 127.

"Everyone is equally unwashed, unshaven, lice-infested and sick,mentally depressed. The soldier became not a thinking person, but just a container of blood, entrails and bones.Our camaraderie arose from the dependence on each other of people gathered in one closed space, our humor... was the humor of gallows, satyrs, filled with a collection of obscenities. Rage and playing with death. The soldiers, covered with lice, pus and excrement, did not try to strain their brains. No one considered it necessary to tidy up the littered bunker. ... We no longer believed in anything. ...The fact that we were soldiers served as an excuse for our crimes and loss of humanity.... Our ideals were limited to tobacco, food, sleep and French prostitutes".
Schmitz S. “We lived, destroying our soul.” Contact with evil and a sense of duty // Wolfsanger V. Merciless slaughter... P.265

" The Russians were a good thousand years behind other European nations in general historical development. Stalin set the task of bridging the thousand-year gap in 20 years and largely achieved its fulfillment. He became like God."
Haape G. Grin of death... P. 177.

“Having spent so much time here in this country, I could not help but admire the strength of spirit of this people, which it seemed that nothing could break - neither sacrifices nor suffering. Two young fanatical Russian students proudly admitted that they belonged to the great communist movement - they themselves threw nooses around their necks and jumped off the bench without waiting for the executioner to knock them out from under their feet. It’s hard not to admire such courage.”
Hoffman I. Stalin's war of extermination...

General G. Blumentritt wrote: “We were confronted by an army whose fighting qualities were far superior to all other armies that we had ever encountered on the battlefield.”

"The Red Army of 1941-1945 was a much stronger opponent than the Tsarist Army, because it selflessly fought for an idea. This strengthened the steadfastness of the Soviet soldiers. Discipline in the Red Army was also observed more clearly than in the Tsarist Army. They know how to defend themselves and stand Attempts to defeat them cost a lot of blood."
General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. (Liddell-Hart B. They know how to defend themselves... P. 382.)

“Until today, persistence in battle was explained by fear of the pistol of the commissar and political instructor. Sometimes complete indifference to life was interpreted based on the animal traits inherent in people in the East. However, again and again the suspicion arose that naked violence is not enough to cause actions that amount to disregard for life in battle...Bolshevism... instilled an unyielding determination in the majority of the Russian population."
From the SD memo. ("Source". - 1995. - No. 3. - P. 89.)

" The Russians held on with unexpected firmness and tenacity, even when they were outflanked and surrounded.By doing this, they gained time and pulled together more and more reserves from the depths of the country for counterattacks, which were also stronger than expected... the enemy showed an absolutely incredible ability to resist.”
General Kurt Tippelskirch

“The broadly and skillfully planned operations of the Red Army led to numerous encirclements of German units and the destruction of those that resisted.
...The Russian command developed this operation well and carried it out perfectly. We lost an army of 100 thousand under Koenigsberg..."
General O. von Lasch

"...In the Second World War it became obvious that The Soviet high command has high capabilities in the field of strategy...
Russian generals and soldiers are characterized by obedience. Theydid not lose their presence of mind even in the most difficult conditions of 1941..."
Oberst General G. Guderian

"...During the course of the war, I observed how the Soviet command became more and more experienced...
...It is absolutely true that the high Soviet command, starting from Stalingrad, often exceeded all our expectations. It skillfully carried out rapid maneuver and transfer of troops, shifting the direction of the main attack, showed skill in creating bridgeheads and equipping starting positions on them for the subsequent transition to the offensive..."
Oberst General G. Frisner, commander of Army Group "Southern Ukraine"

Their commanders immediately learned the lessons of the first defeats and in a short time began to act surprisingly effectively .
Field Marshal G. von Kleist

“That the soldiers of the Red Army continued to fight in the most hopeless situations, without any regard for their own lives, can be largely attributed to the brave behavior of the commissars.
The difference between the Russian Imperial Army during WWII and the Red Army, even in the very first days of the German invasion, was simply colossal. If in the last war the Russian army fought as a more or less amorphous mass, inactive, devoid of individuality, the spiritual uplift caused by the ideas of communism began to show itself already in the summer of 1941."
General Erich Routh

" The behavior of the Russian troops, even in this first battle (for Minsk), was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and the troops of the Western allies in conditions of defeat.Even when surrounded, the Russians did not retreat from their lines."
General Blumentritt

P.S. The feat of Alexander Matrosov was repeated by more than 215 soldiers and partisans. The massive self-sacrifice of the soldiers of the world's first socialist Fatherland has no analogues in the world.

German generals about Hitler

After the war, most German generals tried to portray the Fuhrer as an incompetent commander and blame all the defeats and collapses on him. And General Kurt Tippelskirch, generally admiring the military successes of the Wehrmacht, said that it was headed by "a demon hungry for power and destruction". There were those who continued to praise him immensely. Von Senger wrote: “The art of a strategist is given from birth, and even then very rarely. It requires a good understanding of the human race and a knowledge of history.". However, he probably did not classify the Fuhrer as such.

One gets the impression that between Hitler and the bulk of the generals there was a certain gulf that neither one nor the other either could or did not want to overcome. The Führer's lack of understanding of technical issues that were obvious to them irritated them so much that they rejected in advance the possible value of his ideas. Hitler was furious at the reluctance of the old generals to accept new ideas.

It is important to understand that the blame for the fact that Hitler eventually imagined himself as a military genius lies primarily with those around him. Even War Minister von Blomberg, who held this position until 1938, repeatedly publicly stated that “The Fuhrer has outstanding military leadership talent”. And this was long before the tremendous successes of the Wehrmacht in 1939–1941. During the first military campaigns, the number of rave reviews increased sharply. Any person who continuously listens to only praise addressed to him will, after a while, become unable to adequately assess his capabilities.

German propaganda made a great contribution to creating the image of a brilliant military leader. After the Polish campaign, party workers and the Ministry of Propaganda felt that the army was in every possible way emphasizing its role in the defeat of its eastern neighbor at the cost of belittling the military genius of the Fuhrer and his organizational talents. The Nazi leadership especially did not like the documentary film “The Polish Campaign,” in which the role of the leader and his party was covered very modestly, and the Wehrmacht command and the OKH General Staff were highlighted. Hitler's personal photographer Heinrich Hoffmann was urgently tasked with compiling albums of front-line photographs of the Fuhrer. Soon, a huge edition of the photo album “With Hitler in Poland” was printed, where Hitler personally stood at the crest of all events. This almanac was sold in all kiosks and bookstores in Germany and was in great demand. Hoffmann himself, in his photographs, quickly made a fortune. During all subsequent campaigns, Goebbels and the party carefully controlled the flow of information and the content of war newsreels.

After the defeat of France, Joseph Goebbels publicly declared the Fuhrer "the greatest commander of all time" and further this thesis was invariably supported until 1945. According to the famous German military historian Jacobsen, after Hitler’s French campaign “The crazy idea of ​​being a “commander” who, thanks to his unmistakable intuition, can do the same thing as highly qualified generals and general staff officers has become increasingly overwhelming”. From now on, the Fuhrer saw in the generals only a background for his own decisions, although he still depended on his military advisers, especially Jodl. Friesner later recalled: “He felt like a “chosen one of Providence,” and this feeling was strengthened in him after the sudden successes at the beginning of the war.” After the successful completion of the main phase of Operation Barbarossa in October 1941, Hitler began to compare himself to the Prussian Field Marshal Moltke. He told his entourage: “ I became a commander against my will; I deal with military problems only because at the moment there is no one who could do it better than me. If we had a military leader today of Moltke’s level, I would give him complete freedom of action.”. However, there was no great exaggeration here. In terms of the number of successes achieved, the Fuhrer greatly surpassed the Prussian military leader of the 19th century.

However, their vision of strategy differed. Moltke believed that if the war had already begun, then “ politics should not interfere in the conduct of operations, because for the course of the war, military considerations are decisive, and political ones - only insofar as they do not require anything unacceptable from a military point of view.”. He also believed that the strategist should concentrate entirely on military tasks, forgetting political intuition. Hitler often did the opposite. Political motives were put in first place, as a result of which the military never had freedom of action.

Keitel was one of Hitler's main apologists for a long time. For many years he did not spare words of praise addressed to his boss: “I think he was a genius. He demonstrated his brilliant mind many times... He had an amazing memory.". The field marshal even explained who a genius is in his understanding: “For me, a genius is a person with an excellent ability to predict the future, with the ability to feel things, with enormous knowledge of historical and military events.”. Commenting on the brilliant campaign in the West in 1940, he said: “Hitler exerted his personal influence as a commander. He himself exercised military leadership and was responsible for it.” After the war, while in prison in Nuremberg, Keitel continued to praise his boss: “...I, in any case, believed in his genius. We followed him even in those cases where the objective study and use of our own experience of war required us to resist.”. He also admitted that, among other things, the Fuehrer “was so knowledgeable about the organization, weapons, leadership and equipment of armies and navies around the world that it was impossible to notice even one mistake in him" Keitel argued that " even in simple everyday organizational issues of Wehrmacht armament and related areas, I was a student, not a teacher.”

However, according to the field marshal, the Fuhrer also had shortcomings. He thought Hitler "demonic man", obsessed with unlimited power, who brought all, even crazy, ideas to completion. According to Keitel, “This demon moved forward towards his goals and succeeded.” As for the art of war, he believed that the Fuhrer knew how to find the right solutions to operational problems and intuitively navigated complicated situations, usually finding a way out of them. However, he often lacked practical knowledge when planning operations. “This led to the fact that he either made a decision too late, or could not really assess the damage that we suffered from his decision,”- Keitel recalled.

Other representatives of the generals, for example, General Jodl and Field Marshal von Kluge, joined in the positive assessments of the Fuhrer as Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht. The latter, even in his farewell letter, which he sent to Hitler before committing suicide, wrote about “ the geniuses of the Fuhrer." During the Nuremberg trials, Jodel sang the praises of his boss: “Hitler was a leader of extraordinary proportions. His knowledge and intellect, rhetoric and will have triumphed in recent years on any intellectual plane.".

General Friesner considered Hitler a very extraordinary person, who knew history well and had an amazing ability to understand weapons issues. He also appreciated many of the Führer's operational ideas. However, he noted that he “there was a lack of scale and breadth of specialist views necessary to implement these ideas.”

The chief of staff of the 6th Army, General Schmidt, recalled after the war that Hitler’s decision to launch a counterattack on the Barvenkovsky ledge in May 1942 convinced the commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, of the Fuhrer’s genius, which he spoke about publicly and repeatedly.

Hitler's official historiographer, Major General Walter Scherff, who was entrusted with keeping the war diary, saw the Fuhrer "the greatest commander and state leader of all time", and "strategist and man of invincible trust". He was echoed by the official historian of the Wehrmacht, Schramm, who argued that, although after serving in the General Staff, senior officers ceased to sympathize with Hitler’s way of thinking, they obeyed him "not simply out of obedience to the Supreme Commander and Head of State, but because they respected Hitler as a man who, despite all his mistakes and failures, had greater talent than themselves".

The Luftwaffe adjutant, Oberst von Below, also had quite a few occasions to appreciate the Fuhrer’s incredibly subtle instinct and sharp logic in assessing the military situation, in particular during the Polish campaign. Belov wrote: “ He knew how to mentally put himself in the place of his opponents and anticipate their military decisions and actions. His assessments of the military situation corresponded to reality.". Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich described the Fuhrer of the Third Reich as follows: “Persistence and motivating energy were Hitler’s great qualities as a military leader. He was the bearer of the revolutionary spirit of the German Wehrmacht, its driving force. He inspired his organizational machine.". According to Dietrich, the Fuhrer rightly reproached many German officers for the lack of the spirit of improvisation.

Manstein also rated his commander-in-chief quite highly: “ He was an outstanding personality. He had an incredible mind and exceptional willpower... He always got his way.”. However, the field marshal was still more restrained in his assessments. In his opinion, Hitler had the ability to analyze operational capabilities, but at the same time was often unable to “to judge the prerequisites and possibilities for implementing a particular operational idea”. Moreover, the Führer lacked an understanding of the relationship between any operational task and the spatial factors associated with it. He often did not take into account the possibilities of logistics and the need for strength and time. Hitler, according to Manstein, did not understand that a major offensive operation, in addition to the forces needed for the first strike, needed constant replenishment. It often seemed to the Fuhrer that, having delivered one crushing blow to the enemy, he could only continue to drive him and drive him to the desired point. An example is the fantastic plan for an offensive through the Caucasus to the Middle East and India, which Hitler wanted to carry out in 1943 with just one motorized corps. The Führer lacked a sense of proportion to determine what could and could not be achieved.

Adolf Hitler and Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Behind the Fuhrer to the right is the head of the press department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, Otto Dietrich.

There were completely opposite reviews about Hitler. Thus, Field Marshal Leeb believed that Hitler did not understand how millions of soldiers could be optimally led during a war, and his main operating principle, starting in December 1941, became “Not a step back!” “Such an idea and such a limited understanding of the essence of commanding a multimillion-dollar army during a war were absolutely insufficient, especially in such a complex theater of military operations as Russia,- Leeb thought. – He never had a clear idea of ​​reality, of what was possible and what could not be. About what was important or unimportant". Hitler constantly said: “The word “impossible” does not exist for me!”

General von Buttlar noted that “the lack of military education prevented him from understanding that a successful operational plan can be viable and feasible only when there are the necessary means for this, as well as the ability to supply troops, time, geographical and meteorological conditions that make it possible to create the basis for its implementation.” SS Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich stated: “When things went wrong, Hitler became inflexible and could not be brought to heed the voice of reason.” According to Guderian, the Fuhrer believed that only he was “ the only truly combat soldier in the guardhouse", and therefore most of his advisers were wrong in assessing the military situation, and only he was right. The head of the Luftwaffe High Command, General Köller, stated: "The Fuhrer was a politician who gradually began to consider himself a great commander."

General Manteuffel believed that the Fuehrer “had not the slightest idea about higher strategic and tactical combinations. He quickly grasped how one division moved and fought, but did not understand how the army operated.” He believed that Hitler had a strategic and tactical sense, but he allegedly lacked the technical knowledge to competently implement his ideas. General von Gersdorff also criticized the Führer's actions as Commander-in-Chief: “From the day Hitler became commander-in-chief of the ground forces in 1942, not a single important operation of German troops was carried out successfully in any theater of war, except for the capture of Sevastopol.”. And Halder generally called the Fuhrer a mystic who ignored the rules of strategy! His former vice-chancellor and then ambassador to Turkey, von Papen, also spoke critically of the boss after the war: “His strategic abilities, if any, were completely undeveloped, and he was incapable of making good decisions.”. General Westphal considered Hitler an amateur, “who was lucky at first, like any newbie”. He wrote: “He sees things not as they really are, but as he himself wants to see them, that is, wishful thinking... When an amateur is a person who holds absolute power in his hands, driven by demonic forces, then it is much worse "

Admiral Canaris, the chief of the Abwehr, did not particularly respect the Fuhrer either. He thought Hitler "an amateur who dreams of taking over the world". Canaris once said to his subordinate Admiral Brückner: “A war that is fought without basic ethics can never be won.”.

And some officers even considered Hitler an idiot. Thus, Field Marshal Milch already stated in March 1943 that the Fuhrer "mentally abnormal", without, however, giving any arguments in favor of this argument. Field Marshal von Kleist also spoke sharply on this matter: "I think Hitler was more of a psychiatrist's patient than a general." Moreover, for some reason this thought came to Kleist only after the war. “I knew his way of shouting, his habit of banging his fist on the table, his fits of anger, etc. I am not a psychiatrist, and I could not then see that Hitler really was not completely normal,”- he said later. General von Schweppenburg spoke in approximately the same spirit: “The German armed forces were led by a man who, in the opinion of even non-medical people, should definitely have been treated by a psychiatrist, at least from the beginning of 1942.” True, for some reason Schweppenburg’s “insight” came only in the summer of 1944, after he suffered defeats as commander of the West tank group in France.