Ribbentrop's plan: the tripartite pact and the USSR. Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan
75 years ago, in November 1940, negotiations took place in Berlin on the division of the world and the accession of the USSR to the Tripartite Pact. There is an idea in Western literature that this was the turning point of Hitler's policy, the point of his choice - whether to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union or defeat it. But such statements are just a manipulation of the facts. From the very beginning, Hitler's plans were a modification of the Schlieffen Plan, which was played out in the First World War. Crush Western opponents, and then transfer all forces to the east. But Schlieffen and Moltke based their plans on calculations of the timing of mobilization in different countries, bandwidth railways. Hitler found more reliable means- diplomatic deceptions. He spoke to those close to him about successive attacks, first to the west and then to the east, back in the early 1930s.
Before the start of the war with Poland, having signed an agreement with the USSR, he again explained at a meeting of military leaders: after the victory over the Western powers, Russia’s turn would come. Almost immediately after the surrender of France, on July 31, 1940, Hitler set the General Staff the task of developing an attack on the USSR with the aim of “destructing vitality Russia." The date of the operation was determined - spring 1941. Halder's diary testifies: for preparation new war German generals seized on with great enthusiasm. Already on August 9, 1940, the head of the OKW operational department, Warlimont, issued the first directive to prepare a strike against the USSR, codenamed “Construction in the East.” On August 14, Goering instructed the head of the OKW economic department, General Thomas, that supplies to Russia should only be considered until spring next year. On August 26, the transfer of divisions from France to the East began.
But the Nazi victories changed the situation throughout the world. European borders were shifting. The Soviet Union, taking advantage of the agreement with Germany, annexed Western Ukraine and Belarus, the Baltic republics, and Bessarabia. He defeated Finland and forced him to cede a number of regions. The Finns then sharply reoriented towards Berlin. And the difficulties and serious losses of the USSR in the war with the Finns played a cruel joke on the Germans. They concluded that the Russians were a weak enemy and would be easy to defeat. They themselves swallowed state after state. Not a single German military leader expressed fears about a war with the Soviet Union.
The situation in the Balkans has also become tense. When Russia returned Bessarabia, taken from it during Civil War, Hungary and Bulgaria became excited. After World War I, their regions were also given to Romania. Now they set out to fight, to recover their losses. In Berlin they were alarmed: what if the USSR intervenes and destroys all of Romania with its oil fields. On August 28, the crisis deepened so much that Hitler ordered five tank, three motorized divisions, and parachute units to be put on alert.
But still, the situation was resolved peacefully. Germany joined forces with Italy and set themselves up as the supreme arbiters. At negotiations in Vienna, they dictated a compromise solution to the three countries: Romania gives half of Transylvania to Hungary, Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria. The Romanians were forced to agree, but it cost their king Carol the throne. There was nationwide indignation, he abdicated in favor of his son Mihai, grabbed his mistress Magda Lupescu, 10 carriages of valuables and drove off to Switzerland. General Antonescu, who was very sympathetic to the Germans, became the real ruler. They immediately sent a military mission to prepare the Romanians “if war with Russia is imposed.” And Hungary and Bulgaria, having received generous handouts, entered the wake of German politics.
On top of everything else, the collapsed France and the broken England were gigantic colonial empires. Their possessions spread throughout to the globe. In Berlin they were aware that Germany itself was simply not able to “digest” such volumes. Here it was necessary to somehow share with the allies. Oh, they were willing to connect. Mussolini glanced with appetite at the French colonies in Africa, approached the Fuhrer, and begged. But in this case, Hitler refused. Italy showed itself disgustingly in the war and made no contribution to the victory. And the French government of Pétain-Laval became obedient puppets of Germany. It was unwise to alienate such useful slaves. Therefore, Hitler hinted to the Duce that the British had many rich colonies. If the Italians want it, let them conquer it themselves.
Well, Japan rolled its lips at French Indochina (it included Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). She turned to her German friends, and Hitler treated her more favorably than Italy. He reasoned that Japan needed to be tied more tightly to the alliance and drawn into a war with the Western powers. And Indochina is located a little far away, lest the local authorities turn to the British. It would be better if they were under supervision. German and Tokyo diplomats together approached the Vichy French government, and it did not dare to object. An agreement was signed - 6 thousand Japanese soldiers were allowed to be stationed in Vietnam. The official pretext was to protect the railway so that cargo for Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese troops would not be transported through Vietnam.
The Japanese sent more troops than agreed, took control not only railway, but also cities and ports. The Vichy government protested. However, the Japanese did not listen to him, and he could only come to terms with it. The commanders of the occupation units began to behave in much the same way in Vietnam as in Manchuria or China. French colonial officials were assigned their own advisers, whose instructions became mandatory.
These changes have inspired the neighboring kingdom, Thailand. IN late XIX centuries, the French took Laos and Cambodia from him. Now Thailand is also eager to take advantage of the defeat of the colonialists and regain its lands. Not so! The French in their homeland stood at attention in front of the Germans, in Vietnam in front of the Japanese, but the claims of the Thais were perceived as a national insult! The colonial command mobilized its units. Serious fighting broke out on the border. A squadron of French ships remaining in Vietnamese ports rushed at the Thais and sank their entire fleet - two old coastal defense battleships.
But... the peacekeepers intervened. None other than the Japanese. They pointed at both of them and ordered them to sit down at the negotiating table. And the results were determined by the Japanese themselves: they ordered to give Laos and Cambodia to the Thais. The French had nowhere to go, they gave it away. In Thailand, the first ever victory over a European power was celebrated magnificently. The local dictator Plek Pibunsongram was delighted to promote himself from major general to field marshal. And he paid for Japan’s support by entering into a secret alliance with it.
The Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) aroused even greater interest in Tokyo than Vietnam. There were oil fields there that Japan needed so much. The Netherlands no longer existed, why not take over their colony? But in this case the situation was different. The escaped Dutch queen and government sat in London, and the colonial administration continued to obey them. England became the patroness of the Dutch and their possessions. British colonies lay nearby: Singapore, Burma, and behind it huge India.
Now the British were in an unenviable position, gathering all their forces to defend their own islands. In Tokyo they thought it would be possible to thoroughly pluck them. But Japanese politicians were sure that in this case the United States would inevitably intervene. How will the Soviet Union behave? If you turn towards English and Dutch possessions, you will provide him with your rear.
In Japan, unlike Germany, they very respectfully assessed the combat power of the Red Army - they tried it on their own skin at Khasan and Khalkhin Gol. Therefore, they came to the conclusion: for the development of the “British inheritance”, the military resources of the USSR would come in handy. In the summer of 1940, at a meeting of the Japanese leadership - Prime Minister Konoe, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Tojo, Oikawa and others, a project was put forward that seemed to promise enormous gains. Attract Stalin to an alliance against England. And in order to interest him, allocate an independent sector of interests for the USSR.
On August 1, this project was transferred to the German Ambassador Ott. It proposed to “try to force the Soviet Union to extend its influence in a direction in which it would have the least direct impact on the interests of Japan, Germany and Italy, namely in the direction of the Persian Gulf (it may be necessary to agree to expansion if necessary Soviet Union towards India)". Another option explicitly provided for “recognizing India, for present purposes, as part of the living space of the Soviet Union.”
Berlin liked the project; it received the name “Ribbentrop Plan” in historical literature. Although they looked at it from a different angle than in Tokyo. The project was provided in a great way fool Stalin when the attack is being prepared. A wedge was being driven in that prevented a rapprochement between the USSR and Great Britain; they were pushed together. Soviet armies would have been transferred to Central Asia. They would be stuck in Afghanistan and India for a long time. Russian defenses in the west were weakening, which was what was required. In general, there were clear benefits on all sides.
On September 27, 1940, as part of the proposed redivision of the world between Germany, Japan and Italy, the Tripartite Pact was signed, providing for the creation of a “new order” in Europe and Asia. The Soviet Union was invited to join the pact. Moscow, in principle, did not object - but only on the condition that it would be an equal partner in the coalition. In addition, the Russians wanted to understand and clarify what the “new order” meant.
Meanwhile, new circumstances arose that complicated the relationship between our country and Germany. In October, the Germans entered into an agreement with Finland and sent their troops there. Stalin was alarmed and outraged by this. Through Molotov, he pointed out to Berlin the violation of previous agreements on spheres of influence and demanded the withdrawal of German contingents. And on October 28, Mussolini attacked Greece. True, the Italians were smashed to smithereens in just a week. But Hitler got involved, sent additional forces to Romania, and negotiations began with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia on the introduction of German units and a joint war with the Greeks. Hitler was increasingly exploring the Balkans, and the USSR also took this extremely painfully.
Finally, they agreed to meet to resolve the accumulated issues, and on November 12, 1940, a delegation led by Molotov arrived in Berlin. But on the same day, Hitler issued a secret directive to his generals. He informed them that “political negotiations have begun in order to clarify Russia’s position in the near future.” It was explained with utmost frankness: they must continue preparing the operation against the USSR regardless of the results of the negotiations!
And before Molotov, the Fuhrer unfolded the “Ribbentrop plan” to transform the “Pact of Three” into a “Pact of Four” with corresponding projects for the division of the “bankrupt estate” of Great Britain. A quadripartite treaty with Germany, Japan and Italy was proposed for a period of 10 years. The parties committed themselves not to join “any combination of powers” directed against any of them, and promised to provide each other with economic assistance. The agreement was accompanied by a secret protocol on spheres of influence. For Japan - East Asia south of the Japanese Islands, for Italy - North and North-East Africa, for Germany - Central Africa, for the USSR - “south of the national territory in the direction of the Indian Ocean”. And the final territorial redistribution of Europe was postponed until the end of the war.
Although the Soviet side was not flattered by the “pies in the sky”. Molotov again raised the issue of German troops in Finland and Romania. He stated that the Soviet Union had not yet received all the desired territorial concessions from the Romanians - in addition to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, he pointed to Southern Bukovina. Hitler and Ribbentrop tried to convince us that all these were “trifles” and had no significance compared to the global prospects that were opening up. But Molotov firmly stood his ground. He said that “the great problems of tomorrow cannot be separated from the problems of today and from the implementation of existing agreements.” They argued for a long time, repeatedly, and only agreed on the fact that Germany confirmed: Finland belongs to Russia’s zone of interests, the Fuhrer in this country will not interfere with Stalin’s policies (this agreement remained purely declarative, Hitler did not intend to implement it).
And the draft agreement on the division of the world was sent to Moscow for further study and approval. Stalin treated him extremely carefully. He realized that the German proposals smacked of a large-scale provocation. On his instructions, Molotov conveyed an evasive answer, without refusing or agreeing, and asked for additional time for work.
On November 26, through the German ambassador in Moscow, Schulenburg, the Soviet government submitted its counterproject. It was indicated that the USSR was ready to join the Tripartite Pact, but the conditions were proposed somewhat different. First of all, the immediate withdrawal of German troops from Finland was required. Bulgaria was recognized as a sphere of Russia’s interests; within a few months, the USSR was supposed to conclude a “mutual assistance pact” with it – with the right to station military units on its territory. In addition, the Soviet Union, on the basis of a long-term lease, was required to provide a base in the Bosporus and Dardanelles area. Japan had to give up its rights to oil and coal deposits Sakhalin. And the center of Soviet claims was supposed to be the regions south of Baku and Batumi and in the direction not of India, but of the Persian Gulf.
Pay attention to the fundamental differences between a project and a counterproject. If the German version was aimed at confronting the USSR and England, then in the Soviet version Stalin retained the ability to maneuver and avoided entering into a major war. At the same time, Joseph Vissarionovich returned to the geopolitical and strategic tasks that Russian empire tried to decide before the revolution. Bulgaria was being pulled from under German patronage to Russian. This would affect the situation in Romania, it would also begin to slide under the control of the Soviet Union, and our country would begin to play a dominant role in the Balkans. The base on the Bosphorus consolidated this position and opened the way to the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Japan's interests in Sakhalin were limited. And the strategic claims of the USSR shifted from India to Northern Iran, the eastern part of Turkey, Iraq, Syria - to the very direction in which the Russian Empire had previously extended its influence.
However, such conditions could not please Berlin. They had already included Romania and Bulgaria in their own “assets” and expected to soon establish themselves thoroughly there. They set their sights on Iran, Iraq and the Middle East themselves. Numerous pro-German organizations were already operating there, and agents were working widely. Negotiations were held with local leaders who were ready to cooperate with the Nazis, some were bribed, some were played on the ambitions of others, and they were promised help. And Turkey, at the expense of which Soviet interests should be satisfied, was diligently courted by Berlin. They cast bait about an alliance, but the Turkish government greeted them more than favorably and expressed its readiness for further rapprochement. Those around Hitler already considered her a de facto ally, they were sure that she would join Germany in the same way as in the First World War.
But the Soviet Union agreed to be an equal partner in the Tripartite Pact. If he is truly recognized as equal, let the other parties “make room”, sacrifice some interests for the sake of supposed friendship, Moscow’s consent to the implementation of other plans and its support. However, our government probably asked for “the maximum” - it believed that the usual diplomatic mechanisms would operate, the Germans and their allies would disagree with something, and there would be an opportunity to bargain.
Although Hitler saw things differently. If Stalin, annexing the fallen national outskirts and considering geopolitical demands, restored the former empire and its spheres of influence, then the Fuhrer set himself the same goals that the German Empire achieved in the First World War. Hegemony in Europe, colonization of the Balkans, drawing Turkey into the orbit, and with its help expansion in Asia. The same goals that once already led to a clash between Germany and Russia. However, the idea of “Lebensraum”, that is, “living space” in the East, in Russia, was common among the ideologists of the Kaiser’s Germany and the Nazis.
There was no response to the submitted project at all. But Moscow’s proposals actually did not interest Hitler too much. All that remained was to regret that it was not possible to fool the Soviet leadership and lead them by the nose. Now the Fuhrer used the Russian conditions in order to once again justify to his subordinates the need for a strike on the USSR. It was from this angle that he undertook to comment on the document: “Stalin is smart and cunning. He demands more and more. This is a cold-blooded blackmailer. The victory of Germany has become unbearable for Russia, so it is necessary to bring it to its knees as soon as possible.”
Well, the military, according to the Fuhrer’s directive, continued preparations for the coming war, regardless of any “Ribbentrop plans”, negotiations, or Soviet responses. In November 1940, General Paulus had already completed the development of a plan for an attack on our country. At the same time, Goering approved the plan for deploying the Air Force for the upcoming war. Hitler studied them and discussed them with his advisers. On December 18, 1940, he signed Directive No. 21, which received the symbol “Otto Plan”. Later they found it necessary to come up with a louder, as if historical name - the “Barbarossa” plan.
Valery Shambarov
of the year also known as Three Power Pact of 1940 or Tripartite Pact- an international treaty (pact) concluded on September 27, 1940 between representatives of the main countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact: Germany (Joachim von Ribbentrop), Italy (Galeazzo Ciano) and the Empire of Japan (Saburo Kurusu) for a period of 10 years.
The Berlin Pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the countries of the Nazi bloc (Axis countries) during the establishment of a new world order and mutual military assistance. Germany and Italy were destined for a leading role in Europe, and the Japanese Empire - in Asia. Thus, Japan received the formal right to annex French possessions in Asia, which it took advantage of by immediately invading French Indochina.
The German-dependent governments of Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940), and Bulgaria (March 1, 1941) also joined the Berlin Pact.
The Berlin Pact, according to Article 3, was initially anti-American, at the same time, in relation to the USSR, according to Article 5, it was a pact of favorable attitude towards the USSR. It also took into account the right of the Contracting Parties to have their own own relationships from the USSR. Germany considered it possible to draw the attention and interests of the USSR to India in order to pit it against the British Empire. Japan, bogged down in the “endless war in China,” guaranteed its neutrality towards the USSR Far East, in exchange for the USSR’s refusal to support China. As a result, the USSR stopped supporting the legitimate government of China, but, while continuing to support the Chinese communists, made full use of the safe Pacific route to receive supplies from the United States through Len-Lease, transporting 48% of all cargo along it.
On November 12, 1940, Soviet-German negotiations took place in Berlin; German diplomats invited the USSR to join this pact. The Soviet government agreed to join the Axis countries on the condition that Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey were included in the sphere of interests of the USSR. However, such demands were frankly excessive. The desire to establish a de facto Soviet protectorate over de jure independent European countries confirmed the correctness and necessity of creating the Anti-Comintern Pact, the Soviet Union confirmed its loyalty to the ideas of the Comintern on the need for communist expansion.
On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government of Dragis Cvetkovic joined the Berlin Pact, but on March 27 it was overthrown as a result of a coup committed by agents of the British and Soviet intelligence services. The new government of Dusan Simović did not approve the act of accession to the Treaty, but concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR and took an openly anti-German position. This provoked the Wehrmacht's invasion of Yugoslavia, which led to its defeat and disappearance from the map of Europe.
The pact was later joined by Spain, Thailand, the puppet governments of Croatia, Manchukuo and the government of Wang Jingwei in China. Finland provoked by bombing Soviet aviation its territory on June 25, 1941, entered the war against the USSR, but considered itself independent party conflict. As soon as the scales began to finally tip in favor of the Allies, especially after the Normandy landings in the west and Operation Bagration in the east, Finland decided to play the political card in order to go over to the winning side. To this end, President Ryti sent a letter to Germany on June 26, 1944, in which he promised to enter into the Tripartite Pact. In it, Finland guaranteed military assistance to Germany and the refusal of separate negotiations in exchange for food supplies. However, following Ryti's resignation on July 31, 1944, Finland denounced this letter in exchange for concessions in negotiations on a separate peace with the USSR and a promise to intern German military units located on Finnish territory. The USSR, faced with the staunch Finnish defense on the Salpa Line in July 1944, happily agreed to an agreement with Finland.
The defeat of the Axis Powers in World War II led to the dissolution of the pact.
Bibliography:
1. No. 172. Conversation between the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V.M. Molotov with the Reich Chancellor of Germany A. Hitler in Berlin on November 12, 1940.
Galeazzo Ciano
Saburo Kurusu
Japanese embassy in Berlin with Axis flags during the signing of the Tripartite Pact
Japanese poster dedicated to the signing of the Tripartite Pact
Berlin Pact of 1940, also known as Three Power Pact of 1940 or Tripartite Pact(German Dreimächtepakt, Italian Patto Tripartito, Japanese 日独伊三国同盟) - an international treaty (pact) concluded on September 27, 1940 between the main Axis powers - the countries participating in the Anti-Comintern Pact: Germany (Joachim von Ribbentrop), Italy ( Galeazzo Ciano) and Japan (Saburo Kurusu) for a period of 10 years.
The essence of the agreement
The parties agreed on the following:
“The Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy, recognizing as preliminary and a necessary condition long-term peace, providing each state with the opportunity to take its place in the world, consider the creation and maintenance of a new order necessary for the peoples in the regions of the Great East Asia and Europe can reap the benefits of coexistence and mutual prosperity of all interested nations, express their determination to mutually cooperate and take concerted action in the said areas in relation to efforts based on these intentions. The Governments of the Three Powers, eager to co-operate with all nations making similar efforts throughout the world, are eager to demonstrate their unyielding will for world peace, for which purpose the Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy have entered into the following agreement.
Article 1 Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe.
Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.
Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to carry out mutual cooperation based on the stated policy that if one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by any power not presently participating in the European war and in the Sino-Japanese conflict, then the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance by all political, economic and military means at their disposal.
Article 4. For the purpose of implementing the present pact, a mixed commission appointed by the Government of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy shall be established without delay.
Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles do not in any way affect the policy currently existing between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union.
Article 6. This pact comes into force from the moment of its signature. The duration of the pact is ten years from the date of entry into force. The Contracting Parties, at the request of one of the powers that have concluded the pact, will discuss the question of revising this treaty at any time before the expiration of this period."
The Berlin Pact provided for the delimitation of zones of influence between the Axis countries during the establishment of a new world order and mutual military assistance. Germany and Italy were destined for a leading role in Europe, and the Japanese Empire - in Asia. Thus, Japan received the formal right to annex French possessions in Asia, which it took advantage of by immediately invading French Indochina.
The Pact also took into account the right of the contracting parties to have their own relations with the Soviet Union, with which Germany already had serious economic and military-technical cooperation and a Non-Aggression Pact, and Japan later concluded and adhered to the Neutrality Pact.
At the end of September 1940, Hitler sent a message to Stalin, informing him of the upcoming signing of the Berlin Pact, and later invited him to take part in the division of the “British inheritance” in Iran and India. On October 13, Stalin received a letter from German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, which contained an invitation to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Molotov, to come on a visit to Berlin. In this letter, Ribbentrop also emphasized that “...Germany is determined to wage war against England and her empire until Britain is completely broken...”
On November 12-13, negotiations between Ribbentrop and Molotov took place in Berlin, at which the Soviet leadership was again invited to join the Tripartite Pact and engage in “dividing the inheritance of England,” thus convincing the USSR that a war with England is the primary task for Germany in the coming years The meaning of these proposals was to encourage the USSR to shift the center of gravity of its foreign policy from Europe to South Asia and to the Middle East, where it would clash with British interests. Molotov responded that “the Soviet Union can take part in a broad agreement between the four powers, but only as a partner, and not as an object (and yet the USSR is mentioned only as such an object in the tripartite pact).” At the end of the negotiations, an official statement was published in the press that “... the exchange of views took place in an atmosphere of mutual trust and established mutual understanding on all the most important issues of interest to the USSR and Germany.” In fact, the positions of the parties clearly did not coincide. The Soviet delegation, not wanting to be drawn into a conflict with England, limited its task to clarifying German intentions regarding European security and problems directly affecting the USSR, and insisted on Germany's implementation of previously signed agreements. In addition, the Soviet delegation insisted on discussing the situation in Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Greece and Poland.
During the negotiations, Molotov did not give any definite answer to the proposals received. The USSR's response was conveyed to the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Schulenburg, on November 25. Formally, readiness was expressed “to accept the draft pact of the four powers on political cooperation and mutual economic assistance,” but at the same time a number of conditions were put forward that essentially excluded the USSR from joining the Tripartite Pact, since these conditions affected the interests of Germany and Japan. Thus, the Soviet Union demanded assistance in concluding a Soviet-Bulgarian mutual assistance agreement, creating a favorable regime for the USSR in the Black Sea straits, and for this, providing guarantees for the creation of a Soviet military and naval base in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles area on a long-term lease. Further, it was required to recognize “the zone south of Batumi and Baku in the general direction towards the Persian Gulf” as “the center of the territorial aspirations of the USSR.” The USSR also demanded the immediate withdrawal German troops from Finland and influence Japan to give up its concessions in Northern Sakhalin. The Soviet leadership thus made it clear that it intended to strengthen its positions in the Balkans and in the Black Sea straits. In addition, the conditions put forward blocked Hitler’s path to the oil-bearing regions of the Middle East, preventing him from using both these areas and the territories included in the Soviet “sphere of interests” against the USSR itself. Both the response of the Soviet leadership and the course of negotiations in Berlin meant that the Soviet Union refused to accept Germany's proposals and intended to defend its interests in European politics. There was no response to the Soviet conditions, but Hitler gave the order to speed up preparations for war against the USSR.
The pact was not a treaty of alliance in full meaning of these words. As part of its global strategy, Japan sought to achieve a leading position in the Pacific, in South-East Asia, in the eastern Indian Ocean. However, it provided itself with complete freedom of action and the possibility of starting a war against both the USA and the USSR.
Other participants
The German-dependent governments of Hungary (November 20, 1940), Romania (November 23, 1940), Slovakia (November 24, 1940), and Bulgaria (March 1, 1941) also joined the Berlin Pact.
The defeat of the Axis countries in World War II led to the liquidation of the Tripartite Pact.
see also
Notes
- Bogusław Wołoszański. Tajna wojna Stalina, wyd. 1999, str. 263-300.
- Lota V.I. Cover operation "Barbarossa" // Website of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
- Great Patriotic War 1941-1945. T. 1. (unavailable link)- M.:
To continue its expansion, Germany needed strong cooperation with the Allies. The Anti-Comintern Pact did not provide it sufficiently. Firstly, it did not provide for mandatory mutual military assistance of the participating countries or other joint actions. Secondly, in the conditions of the existence of the Soviet-German bloc, Stalin, in particular, raised questions about its direction. Thirdly, Japan, being one of the initiators of the “Anti-Comintern Pact,” was interested in supporting Germany both against the Soviet Union and against the United States. But it was difficult for her to count on the first because of the Soviet-German alliance, and the “anti-Comintern Pact” did not imply cooperation against the United States.
The idea of supporting Japan in Asia, at least against the United States, in the fall of 1940, when it was clear that the United States would actively help Great Britain, seemed expedient to Berlin. As already noted, Germany could not exclude a future clash with the Soviet Union, but at that moment such a prospect was viewed more vaguely than the fight with the already emerging bloc of the United States and Britain. The primary goal of German diplomacy was to unite all totalitarian states, including the Soviet Union, on the basis of confrontation with Great Britain and the United States. But combining the USSR and Japan with their multiple geopolitical contradictions in Mongolia, Manchuria and China in one bloc structure was extremely difficult. Moreover, Germany felt confident enough to speak more firmly to Moscow than it had done in the summer and autumn of 1939. The alliance with Stalin still seemed important, but not prerequisite implementation of German plans for world reconstruction. Therefore, since the summer of 1940, a new feature has appeared in German tactics - the desire to maintain mutual understanding with the USSR while simultaneously increasing political pressure on it. Due to Latest Japan could be of great interest to Germany.
Therefore, German diplomacy began to reorganize the network of its diplomatic alliances gradually. On September 27, 1940, the Tripartite Pact of Germany, Italy and Japan was signed in Berlin for a period of 10 years, which provided for comprehensive mutual support of the participating countries in the event that one of them finds itself in a state of conflict with a third power that did not participate in the European Union at the time of signing. war or the Sino-Japanese conflict. That is, Japan was not obliged to immediately go to war against Britain, but Germany and Italy were obliged to support Japan in the event of a war with the United States. In addition, Berlin and Rome recognized Japan’s “leadership” in establishing a “new order” in the “great East Asian space,” which meant Germany’s renunciation of claims to the colonial possessions of France (Indochina) and Holland (Indonesia) it had defeated. For this, Japan agreed to include Art. 5, which specifically stipulated that the new alliance was not directed against the USSR. In addition, purely formally, Tokyo recorded its recognition of the hegemony of Germany and Italy in Europe.
The Soviet leadership was informed by Germany about the upcoming signing of the Tripartite Pact. However, this was done just a day before the official announcement of it in the press. Stalin’s wish, in accordance with his understanding of the points of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact, to familiarize Soviet representatives with the text of the treaty before signing it, was also not satisfied.
The message about the military alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan came against the backdrop of information about the impending landing of German troops in the ports of Finland for the purpose of their redeployment by rail to Norway through Finnish territory. Through diplomatic channels, Berlin also generally informed Moscow about the impending action several days before it began. But even in this case, the Soviet side was refused a request to familiarize it with the text of the corresponding German-Finnish agreement of September 22, 1940. The transfer of German troops to Norway through Finland could be explained by military necessity arising from Germany’s desire to maintain control over the northern part of the Norwegian coast , near which the British fleet operated. But there was no doubt about the anti-Soviet sentiments of the Finnish government, which was now formally included in the partnership with Germany.
Finally, in September 1940, reports appeared in the European press about the arrival of limited contingents (3-4 echelons) of German troops on Romanian territory. In Berlin, this fact was interpreted as the sending of military advisers and instructors to Romania to retrain the Romanian army, although in fact the German troops were supposed to ensure the security of the Romanian oil fields. The question of their protection was indeed very pressing in the summer of 1940.
It was a matter of territorial disputes between Romania not only with the USSR, but also with Bulgaria and Hungary. The “Greater Romania” that was formed as a result of the Versailles settlement actually included heterogeneous territories. Bulgaria had long sought Southern Dobruja, captured from it during the Balkan War of 1912, and Hungary sought Transylvania, where a mixed Hungarian-Romanian population lived with a predominance of Hungarian in a number of areas. Taking advantage of the collapse of the British and French guarantees received in April 1939 and now losing their real meaning (Bucharest formally abandoned them in July 1940), small countries presented their demands. The Romanian government, which traditionally gravitated toward partnership with France and Britain, did not have to count on anyone’s diplomatic support. After negotiations with Bulgaria on August 19-21, 1940, Romania returned Southern Dobruja to Bulgaria.
However, negotiations with Hungary were very tense, and the threat of military conflict arose. Romania had no choice but to accept the mediation of Italy and Germany in resolving the crisis. On August 30 in Vienna, at a meeting of representatives of four countries, Romania agreed to return Northern Transylvania with a predominant Hungarian population to Hungary. In return, Germany guaranteed the security of Romania. This act was carried out without consultation with the USSR and was regarded in Moscow as unfriendly. With the “Vienna Arbitration” of 1940 and the subsequent coming to power of the regime of General Ion Antonescu, Germany actually acquired a decisive influence on foreign and domestic policy Romania.
The Soviet leadership's distrust of Germany grew. A “crisis of mutual understanding” has matured in Soviet-German relations. To resolve it, the German leadership achieved the arrival of the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, V.M. Molotov, in Berlin in November 1940 on an official visit.
The point of the negotiations for Germany was to find out the chances of attracting the USSR to truly close and active military-political cooperation with Germany against Great Britain and, if necessary, the USA; or, at a minimum, completely eliminate the possibility of the Soviet Union going over to the side of Germany's opponents. Hitler proposed to Stalin a full-scale union based on division into spheres of influence, now no longer of Eastern Europe, and all of Eurasia. The talk was about the USSR joining the Tripartite Pact and immediately joining the “liquidation of the British Empire.” Italy and Japan already had agreement in principle on this.
The Soviet side, as far as one can judge from the documents, vacillated between fear of Germany and the desire not to sell things short. Molotov’s task was not simply to discuss the conditions for transferring Soviet-German relations to the stage of active military-political cooperation, as Berlin insisted on this. It was more important, in principle, to understand whether the Soviet Union should join the Tripartite Pact, and if not, how dangerous it was or could be for the USSR. This determined the tactics of the Soviet delegation. At negotiations with Ribbentrop and Hitler on November 12-13, Molotov persistently sought clarification of the meaning individual provisions treaties, especially those related to the recognition of Japanese leadership in the “great East Asian space,” which could imply both the Far Eastern territories of the USSR and those areas in which the Soviet Union claimed dominance (Mongolia, Xinjiang).
The idea of German diplomacy was to attract the Soviet Union with the prospects of dividing the “British inheritance” in the East. To begin with, Moscow was proposed to acquire access to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The potential zone of Soviet advance was drawn along the line: Iran, Afghanistan, India. It was meant that all four powers - Germany, the USSR, Italy and Japan - would expand their advance in a southern direction. It was noted that Japan had already channeled its activity towards the South Seas, without encroaching on territories where its interests could collide with Soviet ones. Italy planned to acquire new possessions in North and East Africa, and Germany, after the final consolidation of the new order in Western Europe intended to regain the lost Central African colonies.
German promises to Molotov in general included those that were similar to the July proposals of the British Ambassador Cripps: it was supposed to assist the USSR in changing the regime of the Black Sea Straits, closing the Black Sea to warships of non-Black Sea countries and simplifying the conditions for the entry of the Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean Sea.
At the same time, outlining schematic diagram possible partnership, the German side avoided discussing specific issues. She avoided explaining the geographical limits of the “great East Asian space,” pointing out that this could be the subject of Soviet-Japanese negotiations through German mediation. Berlin also avoided specifying the conditions, timing and mechanism for solving the problem of revising the regime of the Black Sea Straits, citing the fact that the establishment of a general framework for cooperation between the USSR and the Triple Alliance would open up favorable opportunities for influencing Turkey.
For his part, Hitler clearly indicated his desire to gain a foothold in Romania, to strengthen his position in the Balkans as a whole and, above all, in Greece, where one could expect the appearance of a base for British aviation in Thessaloniki, convenient for bombing oil wells in Romania. At the same time, he refused to outline his intentions regarding Greece and Yugoslavia more specifically.
The counter wishes of the USSR were actually completely rejected by him. The discussion of the issue of Finland turned out to be the most painful. It took up most of Molotov's negotiations with Hitler. The Soviet side tried to achieve clear German consent to the implementation of the 1939 agreements in relation to Finland, which, as is known, was classified in them as a sphere of Soviet interests. It was understood that the scenario for the development of Soviet-Finnish relations could, in general terms, develop along the lines of how the issue of the Baltic countries was resolved. It was with this in mind that back in March 1940, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR transformed the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic into the Karelo-Finnish Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and raised its status to the level of a union republic.
However, citing the wartime situation and its dependence on economic relations with the countries of the Baltic basin, primarily Finland and Sweden, from which it received valuable raw materials and supplies, the German side firmly spoke out against the USSR’s military actions in this area. Molotov was pointed out the danger of involving Sweden, and possibly the United States, in a new Soviet-Finnish conflict. Objecting to the Soviet side, Hitler also noted that the USSR was the first to violate secret agreements with Germany, refusing to transfer to it the agreed strip of Lithuanian territory, and achieved the transfer of Northern Bukovina to it, which was not initially envisaged.
Molotov’s attempt to “compensate” for the impossibility of Finland’s annexation by transferring Southern Bukovina to the Soviet Union and Germany’s consent to establish a regime of Soviet guarantees for Bulgaria were also decisively rejected by Berlin. Thus, no progress was made on any of the specific issues of the negotiations.
Nevertheless, the Soviet side generally agreed with the idea of its entry into the Tripartite Pact and accepted for discussion the draft treaty proposed by Germany on the accession of the USSR to it with secret protocols on delimiting spheres of interest and changing the status of the Black Sea straits. This concluded the negotiations in Berlin.
Immediately after the end of negotiations with the USSR, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia joined the Tripartite Pact (November 20, 23 and 24, 1940). The USSR found itself in the west surrounded by Germany's allies.
On November 25, 1940, the USSR officially informed the German side about the conditions of its accession to the Tripartite Pact. Germany was to immediately withdraw its troops from Finland, relying on Soviet guarantees for the protection of all its economic interests in this country, including supplies of timber and nickel (1). Within a few months, the USSR was supposed to sign a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria and lease territory for the construction of a naval base in the Bosphorus and Dardanelles region (2). The focus of the USSR's territorial aspirations was shifting in such a way that its spearhead was directed south of Batumi and Baku towards Turkey and the Persian Gulf, rather than Afghanistan and India (3). Japan had to give up coal and oil concessions in Northern Sakhalin (4). On the same day, without waiting for a German reaction, the USSR invited the Bulgarian government to conclude a mutual assistance pact. The Soviet proposal was rejected.
Three weeks later, on December 18, 1940, Hitler approved the secret directive? 21, which contained a plan for an attack on the USSR (“Barbarossa option”).
In addition to military-strategic considerations, Berlin was also guided by the point of view that Germany’s war economy was unable to pay for its urgently needed imports of food and raw materials from the USSR for too long. Under these conditions, the Nazi leadership preferred to establish direct control over Soviet resources.
Information about the “Barbarossa Plan” was soon received by British and American intelligence and was brought to the attention of the USSR. But, realizing that the United States and Great Britain were extremely interested in the Soviet-German conflict, the Soviet leadership did not trust such reports. For its part, German diplomacy tried not to arouse unnecessary suspicion in Moscow. In January 1941, Berlin agreed with the Soviet version of resolving the issue of the strip of Lithuanian territory that the USSR retained in violation of the secret agreements of 1939. The USSR undertook to compensate for German losses with supplies of raw materials. At the same time, a general economic agreement was concluded between the USSR and Germany, which provided for a significant expansion of bilateral economic ties. German diplomacy did not abandon its promise to assist in delimiting the spheres of interest of the USSR and Japan. Hitler did not trust the Japanese allies and did not initiate them into many of his plans regarding the USSR. For tactical reasons, Berlin did not oppose contacts between the USSR and Japan in connection with the possible conclusion between them of one or another version of a general agreement on relations. At the same time, Germany did not give any response to the Soviet demands of November 25, 1940. But her actions spoke for themselves.
German troops continued to concentrate in Romania, intended to pass through the territory of Bulgaria to Greece, where by this time the British expeditionary force had already been stationed. In February 1941, the number of German troops in Romania amounted to 680 thousand people. Almost weekly, through diplomatic channels, the Soviet Union tried to draw the attention of the German leadership to the fact that it considered Bulgaria and the Straits region to be within its security zone and was extremely concerned about what was happening in the Balkans. German representatives reacted to Moscow's signals in the same way - persistently repeating that all German actions in the Balkans were directed exclusively against Britain and its desire to strike Germany from the south. On March 1, Bulgaria officially joined the Triple Alliance, counting on new territorial acquisitions, including at the expense of Yugoslavia, relying on the support of Berlin. On the same day, German troops entered it. Germany's intention to include Greece and Yugoslavia in its sphere of influence was beyond doubt.
On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav government, under strong diplomatic pressure from Berlin and Rome, signed an act of accession to the Tripartite Pact, securing Germany's promise to guarantee its territorial integrity and not to send German troops into Yugoslav territory. However, on March 27, this government was overthrown, and a new one concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression with the Soviet Union on April 5, 1941. But this agreement did not come into force, since on April 6 Yugoslavia was occupied by German, Italian and Hungarian troops. On the morning of the start of hostilities against Yugoslavia, the German government officially informed Moscow about this. There was no formal protest from the USSR. Molotov limited himself to expressing regret in a conversation with the German ambassador that “despite all efforts, the expansion of the war thus turned out to be inevitable.”
The unified Yugoslav state was destroyed, and its territory was divided as follows. The northeastern regions of Slovenia were included in Germany. An independent Croatia was created in the north-west, which also included part of the lands of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This state immediately joined the Tripartite Pact and remained an ally of Germany and Italy until the end of World War II. Italy received part of Montenegro and the coastal regions of Slovenia and Dalmatia. Hungary - Baczku and Vojvodina, which belonged to it before the Versailles settlement. Bulgaria is part of Macedonia. On the remaining lands as a result of this transfer, the “state of Serbia” was carved out, which came under the unlimited influence of Germany.
At the same time as Yugoslavia, troops from Germany, Italy and Hungary occupied Greek territory. Bulgaria also declared war on Greece. Parts of the British troops stationed on Greek territory were evacuated to Cyprus in great haste by sea and air. The Greek army capitulated and the royal government fled to Egypt. The territorial division also affected Greece. The part of Macedonia and Western Thrace that belonged to it was annexed by Bulgaria. Ionian Islands - Italy. All Greek territory was occupied by Italian troops. The capture of the Balkans and the expulsion of British troops from Greece consolidated the strategic and positional dominance of the German-Italian bloc in Europe. Germany was in an exceptionally favorable position to strike the USSR.
German diplomacy looked at the situation in Asia through the prism of the US ability to fight a war on two fronts - in Europe, helping Britain, and in the Pacific, confronting Japan. With this approach, the stabilization of Soviet-Japanese relations, which would allow Tokyo to act more freely against the United States, was in German interests. It was also important for Berlin to distract Moscow through negotiations with Japan from the growing threat to the Soviet Union from Germany. At the same time, Hitler did not attach much importance to Japan's military assistance against the USSR, relying on the power of the German military machine and its ability to ensure a quick military defeat of the USSR in Europe on its own.
In addition, German diplomats were thoroughly aware of the content of the Soviet-Japanese negotiations, receiving information from both the Soviet and Japanese sides, and did not overestimate the severity of possible mutual obligations between Moscow and Tokyo. Berlin knew that the USSR had abandoned the idea of a non-aggression pact, which it had put forward back in 1931. Now Moscow considered it possible to limit itself to a less binding neutrality treaty. For its part, the Japanese side, while insisting on a non-aggression pact, did not at the same time object to the neutrality treaty.
To understand the policy of the Soviet Union in the spring of 1941, it is important to keep in mind that in fact Moscow found itself in conditions of severe diplomatic isolation in the face of the German danger. Relations between the USSR and Britain and the USA were strained. The few remaining neutral states in Europe were afraid of Germany; they did not want, and could not, intervene in the Soviet-German confrontation.
Stalin received information about Hitler's plans to attack the USSR. This confrontation itself was obvious to all foreign observers and a very wide layer of the Soviet party, state and military elite in the USSR. But Stalin did not trust the former, and the latter, intimidated by the terror of the previous decade, remained silent, saving their lives. The question of choosing a line in relation to Germany was entirely in the hands of Stalin himself. This choice was to “not provoke” Hitler and to prepare for a military rebuff to him. However, military preparations had to be deployed in such forms, pace and scale as to again not give Berlin a reason to bring the decisive day closer.
Diplomatic correspondence suggests that in April 1941 and even later, Stalin did not rule out the possibility of, if not an agreement in principle, then at least a partial compromise with Germany, which would at least provide the USSR with a reprieve to prepare for war. The agreement with Japan in this sense provided some opportunities. Moscow tried to politically play up the fact of concluding an agreement with Tokyo as evidence of indirect participation in cooperation based on the Tripartite Pact.
The neutrality treaty was concluded in Moscow on April 13, 1941. In one package with it, a Soviet-Japanese declaration on mutual respect and territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Mongolia and Manchukuo was signed, which, in essence, recorded a partial division of the spheres of influence of the USSR and Japan on Far East in such a way that Mongolia belonged to the Soviet sphere, and Manchukuo to the Japanese. The treaty was designed for five years (until April 1946) with the possibility of automatic extension for the next five years unless one of the parties announced its intention to denounce it a year before the expiration of the treaty. Simultaneously with the signing of the Soviet-Japanese documents, letters were exchanged, which contained Japan's obligation to liquidate all concessions remaining in its hands in Northern Sakhalin.
The Soviet-Japanese agreements confirmed the status quo in the Far East, but did not strengthen it. They did not limit Japan's intervention in China in the same way as they did the USSR's activities in support of the Chinese communists in the areas they controlled and the national separatists in Xinjiang.
At the same time, the agreement with Japan gave the Soviet Union certain benefits, since it reduced the likelihood of a war on two fronts and made it possible to free up forces to concentrate them for possible military operations in the European theater.
The very first and most important event that was carried out on the basis of the “Program of Measures in accordance with the Change in the International Situation” was the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy. This pact was a further development of the Japanese-German agreement of 1936.
In resolving this issue, the main driving force was the army. Since its traditional mission was to ensure the protection of the northern borders, it was naturally most anxious to ensure that the forces of the Soviet Union were distracted by the actions of German forces. In this case, both states - Japan and Germany - in the face of the strengthening of Soviet power in the east and west, entered into mutually beneficial relations.
Subsequently, after the occurrence of the Chinese incident and especially after it became protracted, the need to strengthen international situation Japan, its position in relation to the USA and England. All this along with the situation on the European fronts, with the demands determined by the desire to resolve the problem of the southern directions, significantly accelerated the signing of the pact. This set the course from joint defense to a military alliance.
On September 7, Special German Ambassador Stammer met with Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Tokyo. During the meeting, the goals of the proposed military alliance were defined. In that important point On September 3, Naval Minister Yoshida was hospitalized due to heart disease and resigned from his post. Admiral Oikawa Koshiro was appointed in his place.
Negotiations on the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were successfully completed. On September 16, the Cabinet of Ministers and on September 19
In September, a meeting in the presence of the emperor decided to conclude a pact. The tripartite pact was signed in Berlin at 20:00. 15 minutes. September 27, 1940. The following is the text of the pact:
“The Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy, recognizing as a preliminary and necessary condition for long-term peace the provision of each state with the opportunity to take its place in the world, consider as the main principle the creation and maintenance of a new order necessary for in order that the peoples in the areas of Greater East Asia and Europe may reap the benefits of coexistence and mutual prosperity of all nations concerned, express their determination to mutually cooperate and take concerted action in the said areas regarding efforts based on these intentions1.
The Governments of the three powers, eager to co-operate with all nations that are making similar efforts throughout the world, are eager to demonstrate their unyielding will for world peace, for which purpose the Government of the Great Empire of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy have entered into the following agreement:
Article 1 Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in establishing a new order in Europe.
Article 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's leadership in establishing a new order in Greater East Asia.
Article 3. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to enter into mutual cooperation based on the stated course if one of the three contracting parties should be attacked by any power not presently participating.
1 These provisions at the very beginning of the pact determined the aggressive nature of the coalition. Here the term “new order” was officially introduced, meaning the claim of these states to the forcible subjugation of the peoples of the world.
not in the European war and in the Sino-Japanese conflict, the three countries undertake to provide mutual assistance with all political, economic and military means at their disposal1.
Article 4. For the purpose of implementing the present pact, a mixed commission appointed by the Government of Japan, the Government of Germany and the Government of Italy shall be established without delay.
Article 5. Japan, Germany and Italy confirm that the above articles do not in any way affect political status, currently existing between each of the three parties to the pact and the Soviet Union2.
Article 6. This pact comes into force from the moment of its signature. The validity period of the pact is ten years from the date of entry into force. The contracting parties, at the request of one of the powers that have concluded the pact, will discuss the question of revising this treaty at any time before the expiration of this period.”
