• Interior
• Garden
• Furniture
• building materials
• Roof

Fascist commanders. How the Nazi Establishment Ended Her Life: The Last Conspiracy

This is the general of the Nazi army - Guderian, one of the participants in the inhuman fascist regime in Germany and a Nazi criminal. But like any person, he has his own story. I found her quite interesting.

The Germans didn't invent the tank. But they were the first to organize effective tank troops, came up with the theory of their use and applied them. The most famous theorist and practitioner of the use of tanks was Heinz Wilhelm Guderian, who was called "fast Heinz" and "Heinz the hurricane."

Heinz Wilhelm Guderian was born on June 17, 1888 in the city of Chelm on the banks of the Vistula (At that time it was a region of West Prussia bordering Germany. Now it is a town called Shelmno in Poland.) in the family of a career Prussian officer, which predetermined his career. After graduating from the cadet corps in 1907, he began military service in the Jaeger battalion, commanded by his father. He received the rank of lieutenant in 1908.

In 1911, Guderian began an affair with Margaret Gerne, but his father felt that Heinz was still too young to marry and sent his son with special instructions to the third telegraph battalion. After completing the course, Guderian married Margaret. They had two sons, both of whom fought in the Second World War in the German tank units. The younger, Heinz Günther, later rose to the rank of Major General in the Bundeswehr.

Prior to the First World War, Guderian was seconded to the Berlin Military Academy for training as a staff officer, as he showed outstanding ability. In November 1914, he became first lieutenant, and a year later - captain.

During the First World War, Guderian held various positions and participated in many battles: the failure at the Marne, the massacre at Verdun, although he himself did not command combat units. However, he was awarded the Iron Crosses 2nd and 1st Class. In early 1918, Guderian passed a special "Sedan" test, during which he showed his ability to solve tactical problems in unusual situations, which made a great impression on his instructors. He successfully passed the exams for the rank of officer of the Headquarters of the High Command (he became the youngest staff officer). After the war, he was admitted to the Reichswehr, which then, due to the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, numbered only 100,000 people, and only the best could get there. Guderian began writing regulations for motorized units, and was commander of various motorized units. These were just supply units equipped with trucks and motorcycles.

After the defeat of Germany in the First World War, the fate of a career officer was very successful. As an excellent specialist, he was among the four thousand German officers selected to create a new German army. The rest of the German officers, according to the Versailles Peace Agreement, were subject to demobilization.

In the 1920s, interest arose in Guderian in methods of mechanized warfare. It cannot be said that it was Guderian who was the creator of the Panzerwaffe, but it was he who had the greatest influence on the development of the German tank forces. He became interested in the works of Liddell-Hart and Fuller and even translated some of them into German. However, Guderian's superiors did not share his views on the future of the tank forces.

Since 1922, Guderian has associated his service with motorized troops. At first he served in the automobile units, then in the tank units in various staff positions. During this time, Guderian collaborated with Colonel Lutz of the Motorized Troops Inspectorate and worked there for three years as an instructor. The officer used his official position to promote the concept of "tank war", without which he did not see the military power of Germany in the future. Gradually, Guderian took shape as a military theorist.

Guderian always tried to find as much material as possible on the use of motorized units in military operations. He talked with knowledgeable French and English officers, translated the works of Captain Liddell Hart (who later became an excellent historian) and Major General Fuller. When Guderian installed wooden turrets armed with guns on some of his trucks and successfully maneuvered such pseudo-tanks in exercises, his superiors initially forbade him from doing so. In 1927 he was promoted to the rank of Major.
In 1929 Guderian traveled to Sweden to visit the Swedish tank battalions equipped with the m/21 and m/21-29 STRV tanks (Swedish versions of the German LK II tank). He also visited a secret tank test site in Kazan, in the USSR (at the time, under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was forbidden to develop its own tanks), where he met some Soviet officers who would later become his mortal enemies. At that time, Guderian was the commander-inspector of all motorized units of the Reichswehr, and also taught the tactics of motorized units in Berlin. In February 1931, Guderian was promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel (lieutenant colonel), and two years later to colonel. He completed the drafting of the charter for motorized combat units and assisted in solving technical problems on the first tanks built.

The attitude towards armored forces in Germany changed after the Nazis came to power in 1933.

When Adolf Hitler came to power, he attended military maneuvers and saw several of Guderian's small Panzer Is on the "battlefield". Hitler was delighted. Officially ignoring the Treaty of Versailles and establishing conscription, in 1934 Hitler ordered the formation of three tank divisions. The professional training of German tankers began, some of them studied in the Soviet Union, in particular at the Kazan Tank School.

Guderian, who then had excellent relations with Hitler, was appointed commander of the 2nd Panzer Division and, a short time later, was promoted to major general. Not later than a year and a half later, Guderian becomes a lieutenant general and receives the 16th Army Corps under his command.

In 1935, the first three tank divisions were formed. Guderian received the post of commander of the 2nd Panzer Division and the rank of major general. In 1938, General Lutz was “resigned”, and Guderian was appointed in his place, who by that time was already wearing lieutenant general epaulettes. For the first time under his command was an army corps.

In the Polish campaign, Guderian took part as commander of the XIX Corps, a mechanized formation that swept uncontrollably across Poland from the western border to Brest-Litovsk. For the excellent conduct of the campaign, Guderian was one of the first to receive the Knight's Cross. During the invasion of Poland, Guderian commanded the 19th Army Corps and was again awarded the Iron Crosses of the second and first classes, and then the Knight's Cross. During the invasion of France, Guderian made the blitzkrieg strategy a reality. Completely disobeying the orders of the headquarters, he inexorably pushed his tanks forward and forward, while the crews had enough fuel and strength, wreaking havoc far beyond the expected front line, blocking communications, capturing entire French headquarters, who naively believed that the German troops were still are located on the western bank of the Meuse River, thus leaving the French units without command.

BREST - LITOVSK SEPTEMBER 22, 1939. Joint parade with units of the Red Army

Then the troops under the command of Guderian were transferred to the West, where preparations were underway for an attack on France.

The defeat of the French army was not due solely to the superiority of the German tanks. Only one type of German tank, the Panzer IV, armed with a 75mm gun, could compete with the French Char B heavy tanks, while the rest of the Panzer I, II and III were either outdated or underpowered. There were several other reasons for the success of German tank weapons, for example, each German tank was equipped with a walkie-talkie, which in combat conditions helped in coordinating hostilities and made it possible to quickly and easily send tank forces to where they were most needed at that moment. In addition, all tanks participated in the fighting as part of complete independent units and were not assigned to infantry units. Last but not least, all tank units were under the command of officers who had been educated and trained by the creator of the German armored forces - Heinz Wilhelm Guderian. After reaching the English Channel, Guderian's tank group was formed, which penetrated deep into French territory, breaking through the giant Maginot Line. Since that time, each piece of equipment included in the Guderian tank group had a special identification mark - a large letter "G".

During the "Strange War" was taken into account the experience of fighting in Poland. By May 1940, Guderian commanded a formation of three tank divisions. In June 1940, Guderian was appointed commander of the 2nd Panzer Group, aimed at France. Having quickly passed Belgium and crossed the Marne River, German tanks suddenly attacked the French troops, who did not have time to prepare for the enemy's invasion. Defeated, the French abandoned the well-fortified Maginot Line.

Acting in close contact with "flying artillery" - diving aircraft, and sometimes passing orders to stop the offensive, Guderian achieved stunning success and fell into the ranks of one of the best tank commanders. Guderian ended the French campaign at the very Swiss border.

After the victory in France, Guderian was promoted to colonel general, however, until 1941 he remained aloof from big things, training new tankers. As he wrote in his memoirs, it seemed to him that there was no new "war in sight."

When the general became aware of the preparations for an attack on the USSR, Guderian became very worried. He was little worried about the moral aspects of this operation - Guderian was worried about the military impracticability of the plans being developed. Nevertheless, Guderian took command of the 2nd Panzer Group, which consisted of five armored and three motorized infantry divisions, united in two corps. In June 1941, Guderian's tank columns marched in the first echelon of the German army, breaking into the defenses of the Soviet troops in the main directions.

In the summer and autumn, Guderian managed to achieve excellent results. Only 15 days after the start of the war, units of the 2nd Panzer Group crossed the Dnieper and were aimed at Moscow. Guderian believed that the capital of the Soviet Union should be taken on the move, but he was not supported.

In early September, Guderian's army, deployed to reinforce Army Group South, took part in the encirclement of Kyiv, in the area where four Soviet armies were defending. The tank wedge of the 2nd Army was advancing on the city of Nizhyn, going to join the tank forces of Colonel General E. von Kleist. However, there was no brilliant tank "blitzkrieg" near Kyiv, and the Germans achieved only great tactical success here, which delayed their advance on Moscow.

Kyiv fell on September 19, and to the south of the city, in the bend of the Dnieper, more than 600,000 Soviet troops found themselves in a “cauldron”.

In October of the same year, with the rank of colonel general, he commanded the 2nd Panzer Army on the Soviet-German front, which was part of Field Marshal von Bock's Army Group Center. This army group was to advance through Smolensk to Moscow. Guderian's tank army participated in the encirclement of Soviet troops near Smolensk and in the Lokhvina region.

After that, the tank wedges of the 2nd Panzer Army set their sights on Moscow. However, the resistance of the Red Army was growing, and in the conditions of the onset of winter, the advance of tank columns slowed down significantly. Guderian told Hitler that the German army was not prepared for the winter, that it was necessary to withdraw to more suitable positions, but the Fuhrer did not heed his words.

As you know, at the beginning of December 1941, the advance detachments of the Germans reached the suburbs of Moscow. Guderian's biggest success in this winter offensive against Moscow was the capture of the city of Kaluga, thanks to the successful bypass of the Mozhaisk line of defense of the Soviet troops from the south.

A battle began near Moscow, which ended in the complete defeat of the Germans. During the counter-offensive of the Soviet troops under the general command of G.K. Zhukov, the German armies of the Center group were driven back far from the Soviet capital. Moreover, in the course of defensive battles and during the counteroffensive, Soviet tank troops demonstrated the high art of fighting enemy tanks.

It looked like the star of the German "tank war" ideologue was fading. In December 1941, after a heavy defeat near Moscow, Guderian quarreled with his superior, von Kluge, and was removed from command of the troops and sent to the reserve.

More than a year Guderian was out of work. Only in March 1943, he was appointed to the post of inspector general of tank troops. In the new place, Guderian had to meet with Hitler often due to official necessity. Never once did the Fuhrer manage to convince Guderian to agree with his plans, however, Guderian also rarely managed to convince the Fuhrer that he was right. His lively mind was constantly in search of strategic solutions.

An unsuccessful attempt on the Fuhrer's life in July 1944 took Guderian by surprise - he knew nothing about the impending conspiracy. Guderian was soon introduced to the military tribunal that tried the rebellious generals, and then, in June 1944, he was appointed to the post of chief of the general staff of the ground forces. However, even Guderian's great abilities could not correct the catastrophic situation on the fronts.

Guderian was one of the few German generals who dared to argue with the Fuhrer and defend his opinion. One of the reasons for the disagreement between them was the efforts of the colonel-general to save Army Group North, surrounded in Latvia. However, Hitler delayed decisions for too long, and the encircled German armies received no help.

In March 1945, Heinz Guderian began to insist on an immediate peace with the enemy, for which he was immediately transferred to the reserve and never returned to the Nazi army.

Guderian left for the Austrian Tyrol, where in May 1945 he was taken prisoner by the Americans, but they soon released the retired German commander. Although Guderian was officially detained as a war criminal, no charges were brought against him for his actions in Poland, France, and the Soviet Union. Throughout the war, Guderian managed not to tarnish the honor of the uniform with war crimes.

The creator of the German tank forces had many reasons to especially fear for his fate. Many considered him one of the most pro-Nazi generals. In addition, Poland demanded the extradition of Guderian as a war criminal: he was considered responsible for the actions of the German armed forces that suppressed the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. However, the Cold War helped Guderian: the Americans could not let a military specialist of this level go to Stalin's zone of influence. He was sent to Nuremberg, but was not on trial. In 1946, Guderian was placed in a prison in Allendorf, and then in Neustadt. But in 1948 he was released.

In the post-war years, Guderian wrote memoirs in which he tried to rehabilitate the fascist generals and lay all responsibility for the defeat of Germany in World War II on Adolf Hitler. However, this is typical for most of the memoirs that came out from under the pen of the Nazi generals.

Heinz Guderian actively campaigned for the restoration of pre-war European borders and the military strength of post-war Germany. In the last years of his life, he was one of the leaders of the extreme right forces of the Federal Republic of Germany. But his revanchist positions were condemned by the entire democratic community of the country.

Guderian died on May 14, 1954 in Schwangau, Bavaria, exactly 14 years after his decisive crossing of the Meuse near Sedan.

sources
http://www.nazireich.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=169&Itemid=41
http://militera.lib.ru/memo/german/guderian/index.html
http://velikvoy.narod.ru

At the beginning of the war, the Nazis were confident in their superiority. For them it was obvious. If the whole of "civilized Europe" quickly and without resistance fell under the German machine, then there is no need to talk about "eastern barbarians".
« We have the greatest army, led by the greatest military genius of all time." "We are the smashing sword of the new Germany!»
Haape G. The grin of death. 1941 on the Eastern Front. M., 2009. S.86, 94, 125.

Already a month after the start of the Great Patriotic War - July 24, 1941 in the diary of the Chief of the General Staff of the German Land Forces, General Halder an entry appeared from the appeal of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, Field Marshal General von Brauchitsch to the participants of the meeting, which was then held:
"The peculiarity of the country and the originality of the character of the Russians gives the campaign a special specificity. First serious adversary " .

Quotes from diaries and memoirs of German soldiers, German generals and other military officials of the Wehrmacht.
***
First - Joseph Goebbels.
A serious evolution of Goebbels' attitude towards the Soviet army from 1939 to 1945 is noticeable.
By 1945, Goebbels generally comes to the idea that repression in the German army was needed back in 1934.
**
Entry dated November 11, 1939
"The Russian army has no great value. It is poorly led and even worse equipped and armed."
dated June 29, 1941
"The Russians defend themselves bravely. Their command operates operationally better than in the first days" ...

The last notes.
March 5, 1945
"The Führer again sharply criticizes the General Staff.<...>The Fuhrer is right when he says<...>what Stalin promptly carried out this [Purge of the command staff of the Red Army] reform and therefore now enjoys its benefits.If such a reform is forced upon us today by our defeats, then it is too late for final success.

March 16, 1945
"The General Staff provides me with a book with biographical data and portraits of Soviet generals and marshals. From this book it is not difficult to draw various information about what mistakes we have made in the past years. These marshals and generals are exceptionally young on average, almost none of them are older than 50 years .They are<...>extremely energetic people, and one can read on their faces that they have a good folk leaven... In short, I am forced to draw the unpleasant conclusion that the leaders of the Soviet Union come from better popular strata than our own.<...>I inform the Führer about the book of the General Staff on Soviet marshals and generals, which was given to me for viewing, adding that I have the impression that we are not in a position to compete with such leaders at all. The Fuehrer fully shares my opinion. Our generals are too old, outdated<...>, which speaks of the colossal superiority of the Soviet generals.

March 26, 1945
"Luftwaffe. A radical reform is needed - from top to bottom."
J. Goebbels. Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels. Sämtliche Fragmente. 1987. Munich
***
Next - Manstein.
Part of the troops of the Crimean Front in the amount of five thousand heroes from the second half of May until the end of October 1942 held the defense against the German troops in the Adzhimushkay quarries, withstanding shelling, explosions and gases.
On May 24, they sent a radiogram from the dungeon: " To all the peoples of the Soviet Union! We, the defenders of the defense of Kerch, are choking on gas, dying, but not giving up!" (Ionina N.A. Quarry Adzhimushkay)
Manstein wrote:
"Dense mass,leading individual soldiers by the arms so that no one could fall behind, they rushed to our lines. Often, women and girls of the Komsomol were ahead of everyone, who, also with weapons in their hands, inspired the fighters.
Manstein E. "Lost Victories". M.1999. pp.294-295.

"On the Eastern Front: hostilities continue. Strengthened and desperate resistance of the enemy ... The enemy has many dead, few wounded and captured ... In general, very difficult battles are taking place. There can be no talk of a "walk".The red regime mobilized the people. Added to this is the fabulous stubbornness of the Russians. Our soldiers can hardly cope. But so far everything is going according to plan. The situation is not critical, but serious and requires every effort."
From the diary of the Minister of Propaganda Goebbels (Revelations and confessions. S. 321; Rzhevskaya E. M. Goebbels ... S. 283.)

"The Russians have proven themselves to be skillful, hardy and fearless soldiers, smashing to smithereens our old prejudices about racial superiority".
Metelman G. Through hell ... S.288, 294.

" Those damn peasants fought like hell..."
Zenger F. Neither Fear nor Hope... P.67; Haape G. The grin of death... S.125, 129.

" The new generation in Russia had strength and courage... They often acted mechanically, like robots ... These people believed in their authority and obeyed it."
Wolfzanger V. Merciless slaughter... S.99, 100.

" Russians from the very beginning showed themselves as first-class warriors, and our successes in the first months of the war were due simply to better preparation. Having gained combat experience, they became first-class soldiers. They fought with exceptional tenacity, had amazing endurance and could withstand the most intense battles.
Colonel-General von Kleist. (B. Liddel-Gart. They know how to defend themselves and stand to the death ... // Another war, 1939-1945. - M .: Russian State University for the Humanities, 1996. - S. 379; Liddel-Gart B The battles of the Third Reich ... S. 265.)

“Already the battles of June 1941 showed us what the new Soviet army is like,” recalled General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army, advancing in Belarus. - We lost up to fifty percent of our personnel in battles. Border guards and women defended the old fortress in Brest over a week, fighting to the last limit, despite the shelling of our heaviest guns and air bombing. Our troops soon learned what it means to fight against the Russians..."
Liddell-Gart B. They know how to defend themselves... S. 382; Liddell-Gart B. Battles of the Third Reich ... S. 271-272.

"Information from the front confirmsthat the Russians are fighting everywhere to the last man ... It is striking that during the capture of artillery batteries, etc. Few are taken prisoner. Some of the Russians fight until they are killed, others run, throw off their uniforms and try to get out of the encirclement under the guise of peasants"
Chief of the General Staff of the Ground Forces, Colonel-General Halder F. Military Diary. T. 3. S. 53

"The battles with the Russians are extremely stubborn. Only a small number of prisoners were captured"
ibid., p. 84.

"Russian soldiers and junior commanders are very brave in battle, even a separate small part always takes the attack. In this regard, human relations with prisoners should not be allowed. The destruction of the enemy by fire or cold weapons must continue until the enemy is safe...
Fanaticism and contempt for death make the Russians opponents, the destruction of which is obligatory ... ".
From the order of the command of the 60th motorized infantry division (RAVO. T. 24 (13). Book 2. S. 42.)

The Soviet government behind enemy lines organized the struggle of 6,200 partisan detachments with up to 1 million people. "The fight against partisan detachments was a monstrous reality ... in July 1943, 1560 railways were blown up in Russia, in September - 2600. That is, 90 - a day."
Just G. Alfred Jodl is a soldier without fear or reproach. The battle path of the head of the OKW of Germany. M., 2007. P.97.

“The Party and its organs have enormous influence in the Red Army. Almost all commissars are urban dwellers and come from working class backgrounds. Their courage borders on recklessness; These people are very smart and determined. They managed to create in the Russian army what it lacked in the First World War - iron discipline.Such unrelenting military discipline - which, I am sure, no other army could have endured - turned the disorganized mob into an unusually powerful weapon of war. Discipline is the main trump card of communism, the driving force of the army. It was also a decisive factor in the achievement of Stalin's enormous political and military successes. ...

The Russian remains a good soldier everywhere and in all conditions...
The field kitchen, almost a shrine in the eyes of the soldiers of other armies, is just a pleasant surprise for the Russians, and they can do without it for days and weeks.The Russian soldier is quite satisfied with a handful of millet or rice, adding to them what nature gives him. Such closeness to nature explains the ability of the Russian to become, as it were, a part of the earth, literally to dissolve in it. A soldier of the Russian army is an unsurpassed master of camouflage and self-digging, as well as field fortification...

The industrialization of the Soviet Union, carried out persistently and ruthlessly, gave the Red Army new equipment and a large number of highly qualified specialists. R The Russians quickly learned to use new types of weapons and, oddly enough, proved themselves capable of conducting combat operations using sophisticated military equipment.Carefully selected specialists helped the rank and file to master modern military equipment, and it must be said that the Russians achieved serious success, especially in the signal troops. The longer the war dragged on, the better the Russian signalmen worked, the more skillfully they used radio interception, created interference and transmitted false messages ...

The skillful and persistent work of the Communists has led to the fact that since 1917 Russia has changed in the most amazing way.There can be no doubt that the Russian is increasingly developing the skill of independent action, and the level of his education is constantly growing. It is quite possible that over a long period of training in peaceful conditions, he will also develop a personal initiative ...

The conduct of hostilities by the Russians, especially in the offensive, is characterized by the use of a large amount of manpower and equipment, which the command often brings into battle recklessly and stubbornly, but succeeds. Russians have always been famous for their contempt for death; the communist regime has further developed this quality, and now massive Russian attacks are more effective than ever before.An attack made twice will be repeated a third and fourth time, regardless of the losses incurred, andand the third and fourth attacks will be carried out with the same stubbornness and composure...

The Russian divisions, which had a very numerous composition, attacked, as a rule, on a narrow front. The area in front of the defending front was suddenly filled with Russians in the blink of an eye.They appeared as if from under the ground, and it seemed impossible to contain the impending avalanche.Huge gaps from our fire were immediately filled; waves of infantry rolled in one after another, and only when the manpower was exhausted could they roll back. Infrequently they did not retreat, but rushed forward uncontrollably. Repelling this kind of attack depends not so much on the availability of technology, but on whether the nerves can withstand it.

Only battle-hardened soldiers were able to overcome the fear that gripped everyone. Only a soldier who is aware of his duty and believes in his strength, only he who has learned to act, relying on himself, will be able to withstand the terrible tension of the Russian massive attack...

The strength of the Russian soldier is explained by his extreme closeness to nature. For him, there are simply no natural obstacles: in the impenetrable forest, swamps and swamps, in the roadless steppe, he feels at home everywhere.He crosses wide rivers with the most elementary means at hand, he can lay roads everywhere. In a few days, the Russians build many kilometers of gati through impenetrable swamps.
From the book of General Friedrich von Mellenthin "Tank battles: 1939-1945"

"Many [German] soldiers have no trace of their former upsurge, of the belief in victory that inspired them in the first year of the war." "At the forefront of hell. I have not seen anything like this in this war. And I participated in it from the very beginning.Ivan doesn't back down. The path to the Russian positions is strewn with their corpses, but many of ours will die sooner. In fact, there are no real positions here. They fight for every ruin, for every stone... In Stalingrad, we have forgotten how to laugh.The worst is the night fights. The Russians use every hillock for defense and do not give up a single inch without a fight."
Vider I., Adam V. Stalingrad nightmare. Behind the scenes of the battle. M., 2007. S.25, 100, 113.

In 1943, the defeats of the Wehrmacht were served as victories. The "cemeteries" of Soviet tanks, motor vehicles, dead and prisoners were shown. In the newsreel, after several shots, the Russians fled. But in the cinema halls, where the wounded German front-line soldiers were sitting, the whistle rose, the screams were lies! "Not a single soldier or officer now speaks disparagingly about Ivan, although until recently they said so all the time. A soldier of the Red Army is increasingly acting every day as a master of close combat, street battles and skillful disguise"
ibid., pp. 122, 126, 127.

"All equally unwashed, unshaven, lice and sick,mentally depressed. The soldier became not a thinking person, but just a container of blood, entrails and bones.Our camaraderie arose from the dependence on each other of people gathered in one closed space, our humor ... was the humor of hangmen, satyrs, filled with a collection of obscenities. Rage and play with death. The soldiers, covered with lice, pus and excrement, did not try to strain their brains. No one considered it necessary to put the littered bunker in order. ... We no longer believed in anything. ...The fact that we were soldiers served as an excuse for our crimes and loss of humanity .... Our ideals were limited to tobacco, food, sleep and French prostitutes".
Schmitz S. "We lived by destroying our soul." Contact with evil and a sense of duty // Wolfzanger V. Merciless slaughter ... P.265

" The Russians lagged behind other European nations in general historical development for a good thousand years. Stalin set the task of overcoming the millennial abyss in 20 years, and in many respects achieved its fulfillment. He became like God."
Haape G. The grin of death... S. 177.

“Having stayed here, in this country for so long, I could not help but admire the strength of the spirit of this people, whom it seemed that nothing could break - neither sacrifice nor suffering. Two young fanatical Russian students proudly admitted that they belonged to the great communist movement - they themselves threw nooses around their necks and jumped off the bench without waiting for the executioner to knock them out from under their feet. It's hard not to admire that kind of courage."
Hoffman I. Stalin's war of extermination...

General G. Blumentritt wrote: "we were confronted by an army far superior in fighting qualities to all other armies we had ever encountered on the battlefield."

"The Red Army of 1941-1945 was a much stronger enemy than the tsarist army, because it selflessly fought for the idea. This strengthened the stamina of the Soviet soldiers. Discipline in the Red Army was also observed more clearly than in the tsarist army. They know how to defend themselves and stand to death. Attempts to defeat them cost a lot of blood."
General Blumentritt, Chief of Staff of the 4th Army. (Liddell-Gart B. They know how to defend themselves ... S. 382.)

"Until now, stubbornness in battle was explained by fear of the pistol of the commissar and political officer. Sometimes complete indifference to life was interpreted on the basis of the animal traits inherent in people in the East. However, again and again there was a suspicion that naked violence was not enough to cause actions reaching the neglect of life in battle...Bolshevism ... instilled in a large part of the Russian population an unshakable determination."
From a memo to SD. ("Source". - 1995. - No. 3. - S. 89.)

" The Russians held out with unexpected firmness and stubbornness, even when they were bypassed and surrounded.By doing this, they bought time and pulled together more and more reserves for counterattacks from the depths of the country, which, moreover, were stronger than expected ... the enemy showed an absolutely incredible ability to resist.
General Kurt Tippelskirch

“The widely and skillfully conceived operations of the Red Army led to numerous encirclements of German units and the destruction of those of them that resisted.
... The Russian command well developed and perfectly carried out this operation. We lost a 100,000th army under Koenigsberg..."
General O. von Lasch

"... In the Second World War it became obvious that the Soviet high command has a high ability in the field of strategy ...
Russian generals and soldiers are characterized by obedience. They aredid not lose their presence of mind even in the most difficult situation of 1941 ..."
Oberst General G. Guderian

"... During the war, I watched the Soviet command become more and more experienced ...
... It is quite true that the Soviet high command, starting from Stalingrad, often exceeded all our expectations. It skillfully carried out a quick maneuver and the transfer of troops, shifting the direction of the main attack, showed skill in creating bridgeheads and equipping starting positions on them for the subsequent transition to the offensive ... "
Oberst General G. Frisner, Commander of Army Group "Southern Ukraine"

Their commanders instantly learned the lessons of the first defeats and in a short time began to act surprisingly effectively. .
Field Marshal G. von Kleist

The fact that the soldiers of the Red Army continued to fight in the most hopeless situations, with absolutely no concern for their own lives, can be largely attributed to the brave behavior of the commissars.
The difference between the Russian Imperial Army during WWI and the Red Army, even in the very first days of the German invasion, was simply colossal. If in the last war the Russian army fought as a more or less amorphous mass, inactive, devoid of individuality, the spiritual upsurge caused by the ideas of communism began to show itself already in the summer of 1941.
General Erich Raus

" The behavior of the Russian troops, even in this first battle (for Minsk), was strikingly different from the behavior of the Poles and the troops of the Western Allies in the conditions of defeat.Even being surrounded, the Russians did not retreat from their lines."
General Blumentritt

P.S. The feat of Alexander Matrosov was repeated by more than 215 soldiers and partisans. The mass self-sacrifice of the soldiers of the world's first socialist Fatherland has no analogues in the world.

German generals about Hitler

After the war, most German generals tried to portray the Fuhrer as a mediocre commander and blame him for all the defeats and collapses. And General Kurt Tippelskirch, generally admiring the military successes of the Wehrmacht, said that it was headed by "a demon lusting for power and destruction". There were those who continued to praise him immensely. Von Senger wrote: “The art of a strategist is given from birth, and then very rarely. It requires a good understanding of the human race and a knowledge of history.". At the same time, he probably did not classify the Fuhrer as such.

One gets the impression that between Hitler and the bulk of the generals there was a kind of abyss that neither one nor the other either could or did not want to overcome. The Fuhrer's incomprehension of the technical issues that were obvious to them irritated them so much that they rejected in advance the possible value of his ideas. Hitler, on the other hand, was furious at the unwillingness of the old generals to accept new ideas.

It is important to understand that the blame for the fact that Hitler eventually imagined himself a military genius lies primarily with his entourage. Even Minister of War von Blomberg, who held this position until 1938, repeatedly stated publicly that "The Fuhrer has an outstanding military talent". And this was long before the grandiose successes of the Wehrmacht in 1939-1941. During the first military campaigns, the number of rave reviews increased dramatically. Any person who continuously hears only praise addressed to him, after a while, will become unable to adequately assess his capabilities.

German propaganda made a great contribution to the creation of the image of a brilliant military leader. After the Polish campaign, party workers and the Ministry of Propaganda felt that the army was in every possible way exaggerating its role in the defeat of the eastern neighbor at the cost of belittling the Fuhrer's military genius and his organizational talents. The Nazi leadership especially did not like the documentary film "Polish Campaign", in which the role of the leader and his party was covered very modestly, and the command of the Wehrmacht and the General Staff of the OKH were brought to the fore. Hitler's personal photographer, Heinrich Hoffmann, was urgently assigned to compile albums of the Fuhrer's front-line photographs. Soon, the photo album “With Hitler in Poland” was printed in a huge circulation, where Hitler personally stood on the crest of all events. This almanac was sold in all kiosks and bookstores in Germany and was in great demand. Hoffmann himself quickly made a fortune in his photographs. During all subsequent campaigns, Goebbels and the party already carefully controlled the flow of information and the content of military newsreels.

After the defeat of France, Joseph Goebbels publicly announced the Fuhrer "the greatest general of all time" and further this thesis was invariably supported until 1945. According to the well-known German military historian Jacobsen, after Hitler's French campaign “the crazy idea of ​​​​being a “commander” who, thanks to his unerring intuition, can do the same thing as highly qualified generals and general staff officers, has become more and more overwhelmed”. From now on, the Fuhrer saw in the generals only a background for his own decisions, although he still depended on his military advisers, primarily Jodl. Frisner later recalled: "He felt like a 'chosen one of Providence', and this feeling was strengthened in him after the sudden successes at the beginning of the war." After the successful completion of the main phase of Operation Barbarossa in October 1941, Hitler began to compare himself with the Prussian Field Marshal Moltke. He told his entourage: I became a commander against my will, I deal with military problems only because at the moment there is no one who could do it better than me. If we had a commander of the Moltke level today, I would give him complete freedom of action.. However, this was not much of an exaggeration. In terms of the number of successes achieved, the Fuhrer greatly surpassed the Prussian commander of the 19th century.

However, their vision of the strategy differed. Moltke believed that if the war had already begun, then " politics should not interfere in the conduct of operations, because for the course of the war, first of all, military considerations are decisive, and political considerations only insofar as they do not require anything unacceptable from a military point of view.. He also believed that the strategist should concentrate entirely on military tasks, forgetting political intuition. Hitler often did the opposite. It was precisely political motives that were put in the first place, as a result of which the military never had freedom of action.

One of Hitler's main apologists for a long time was Keitel. For many years he did not spare laudatory words addressed to his boss: “I think he was a genius. Many times he showed his brilliant mind ... He had an amazing memory ”. The field marshal even explained what a genius is in his understanding: “For me, a genius is a person with a great ability to predict the future, with the ability to feel things, with great knowledge of historical and military events”. Commenting on the brilliant campaign in the West in 1940, he said: “Hitler exercised his personal influence as a general. He himself exercised military leadership and was responsible for it. After the war, while in prison in Nuremberg, Keitel continued to praise his boss: “... I, in any case, believed in his genius. We followed him even in those cases when an objective study and use of our own experience of the war demanded resistance from us.. He also admitted that, among other things, the Fuhrer “he was so aware of the organization, armament, leadership and equipment of armies and navies throughout the world that it was impossible to notice even one mistake in him". Keitel argued that " even in the simple day-to-day organizational issues of the Wehrmacht's weapons and related areas, I was a student, not a teacher.

However, according to the field marshal, the Fuhrer also had shortcomings. He considered Hitler "demonic man", obsessed with unlimited power, who brought to the end all, even crazy, ideas. According to Keitel, "this demon went forward to its goals and succeeded." As for the art of war, he believed that the Fuhrer was able to find the right solutions to operational problems and intuitively navigated in complicated situations, as a rule, finding a way out of them. However, he often lacked practical knowledge in planning operations. “This led to the fact that he either made a decision too late, or could not realistically assess the damage that we suffered from his decision,” Keitel recalled.

Other representatives of the generals, for example, General Jodl and Field Marshal von Kluge, joined the Fuhrer's positive assessments as commander-in-chief of the Wehrmacht. The latter, even in his farewell letter, which he sent to Hitler before his suicide, wrote about " Fuhrer's geniuses. Jodl during the Nuremberg trials sang of the chef: “Hitler was a leader of extraordinary proportions. His knowledge and intellect, rhetoric and will have triumphed in recent years in any intellectual plane..

General Frisner considered Hitler to be a very outstanding person, who knew history well and had an amazing ability to understand weapons issues. He also highly appreciated many of the Fuhrer's operational ideas. However, he noted that he "there was not enough scale and breadth of views of the specialist necessary for the implementation of these ideas."

The Chief of Staff of the 6th Army, General Schmidt, recalled after the war that Hitler's decision to launch a counterattack on the Barvenkovsky ledge in May 1942 convinced the commander of the 6th Army, Paulus, of the Fuhrer's genius, which he repeatedly and publicly spoke about.

Hitler's official historiographer, Major General Walter Scherf, who was entrusted with keeping a war diary, saw in the Fuhrer "the greatest commander and state leader of all time", as well as "a strategist and a man of invincible trust". He was echoed by the official historian of the Wehrmacht, Schramm, who argued that although after serving in the General Staff, senior officers ceased to sympathize with Hitler's way of thinking, they obeyed him. "not just out of obedience to the supreme commander and head of state, but because they respected Hitler as a man who, despite all his mistakes and blunders, had more talent than themselves".

Luftwaffe adjutant Oberst von Below also had quite a few occasions to appreciate the Fuhrer's incredibly subtle instinct and sharpness of logic in assessing the military situation, in particular during the Polish campaign. Belov wrote: He was able to mentally put himself in the place of his opponents and anticipate their military decisions and actions. His assessments of the military situation corresponded to reality.. The press chief Otto Dietrich described the Fuhrer of the Third Reich as follows: “Persistence and motivating energy were the great features of Hitler as a military leader. He was the bearer of the revolutionary spirit of the German Wehrmacht, its driving force. He inspired his organizational machine". According to Dietrich, the Fuhrer rightly reproached many German officers for the lack of a spirit of improvisation.

Manstein also rated his commander-in-chief quite highly: He was an outstanding personality. He had an incredible mind and exceptional willpower ... He always got his way ”. However, the field marshal was still more restrained in his assessments. In his opinion, Hitler had the ability to analyze operational capabilities, but at the same time he was often not able to "to judge the prerequisites and possibilities for the implementation of a particular operational idea". In addition, the Fuhrer had no understanding of the relationship in which any operational tasks and the spatial factors associated with it should be. He often did not take into account the possibilities of logistics and the need for forces and time. Hitler, according to Manstein, did not understand that a major offensive operation, in addition to the forces needed for the first strike, needed constant replenishment. It often seemed to the Fuhrer that, having inflicted one crushing blow on the enemy, further one could only drive and drive him to the desired line. An example is the fantastic plan of an offensive through the Caucasus to the Middle East and India, which Hitler wanted to carry out in 1943 with just one motorized corps. The Führer lacked a sense of proportion to determine what could and could not be achieved.

Adolf Hitler and Reich Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop. Behind the right of the Fuhrer is the head of the press department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda Otto Dietrich

There were completely opposite reviews about Hitler. Thus, Field Marshal Leeb believed that Hitler did not understand how during the war it was possible to optimally lead millions of soldiers, and his main operational principle, starting from December 1941, was "Not one step back!" “Such an idea and such a limited understanding of the essence of commanding a multi-million army in a war were absolutely insufficient, especially in such a complex theater of operations as Russia, Leeb thought. - He never had a clear idea of ​​reality, of what was possible and what could not be. About what was important or unimportant". Hitler kept saying: “The word “impossible” does not exist for me!”

General von Butlar noted that "The lack of military education prevented him from understanding that a successful operational plan can be viable and feasible only when the necessary means are available for this, as well as the possibilities for supplying troops, the time, geographical and meteorological conditions that make it possible to create a basis for its implementation." SS Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich pointed out: "When things went wrong, Hitler became adamant and it was impossible to make him listen to the voice of reason." According to Guderian, the Fuhrer believed that only he was " the only truly combat soldier in the guardhouse", and therefore most of his advisers were wrong in assessing the military situation, and only he was right. The head of the main command of the Luftwaffe, General Köller, pointed out: "The Führer was a politician who gradually began to consider himself a great general."

General Manteuffel believed that the Fuhrer “did not have the slightest idea of ​​higher strategic and tactical combinations. He quickly caught how one division moved and fought, but did not understand how the army operated. He believed that Hitler had a strategic and tactical sense, but he allegedly lacked the technical knowledge to competently translate his ideas. General von Gersdorff also criticized the actions of the Führer as commander in chief: “Since the day Hitler became commander-in-chief of the ground forces in 1942, not a single important operation of the German troops has been successfully carried out in any theater of operations, except for the capture of Sevastopol”. And Halder generally called the Fuhrer a mystic who ignored the rules of strategy! Criticized about the boss after the war and his former vice-chancellor, and then ambassador to Turkey von Papen: "His strategic abilities, if any, were completely undeveloped, and he was not able to make the right decisions". General Westphal considered Hitler an amateur, "who was lucky at first, like any newcomer". He wrote: “He sees things not as they really are, but as he wants to see them, that is, he takes wishful thinking ... When an amateur is a person who holds absolute power in his hands, driven by demonic forces, then it is much worse ".

The Fuhrer and chief of the Abwehr, Admiral Canaris, did not particularly revere. He considered Hitler "an amateur who dreams of taking over the world". Canaris once said to his subordinate Admiral Bruckner: "A war fought without respect for elementary ethics can never be won".

And some officers even considered Hitler an idiot. So, Field Marshal Milch already in March 1943 stated that the Fuhrer "mentally deranged" without presenting, however, any arguments in favor of this argument. Field Marshal von Kleist also spoke sharply about this: "I think Hitler was more of a psychiatrist's patient than a general." Moreover, for some reason this thought visited Kleist only after the war. “I knew his manner of screaming, his habit of banging his fist on the table, his fits of anger, etc. I am not a psychiatrist, and I could not then see that Hitler really was not quite normal,” he said later. General von Schweppenburg spoke in approximately the same spirit: “The German armed forces were led by a man who, according to even people far from medicine, should definitely have been treated by a psychiatrist, at least from the beginning of 1942.” True, this "enlightenment" at Schweppenburg for some reason came only in the summer of 1944, after he suffered defeats in the status of commander of the West tank group in France.