Ships of the Russian-Japanese War 1904 1905. Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese War 1905
Actions of destroyers of the First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet during the Russian- Japanese war 1904-1905, being one of the components of the actions of the entire fleet, was largely determined by the general state of the naval forces of Russia and Japan on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities, therefore, to analyze them it is necessary to consider the following aspects: 1) the state of the Russian navy and Japan on the eve of the war; 2) mine fleets of Russia and Japan at the beginning of hostilities.
For comparative analysis the state of the naval forces of Russia and Japan on the eve of hostilities, it is necessary to study the following issues: 1) the numerical composition of the fleets of both opposing powers in the Pacific Ocean; 2) tactical and technical characteristics of ships of all classes in the fleets of Russia and Japan; 3) the system of basing the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Pacific Ocean.
By the beginning of hostilities, the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean consisted of the Pacific Ocean Squadron and the Siberian Military Flotilla. From April 17, 1904, Order No. 81 of the Naval Department ordered the squadron located in the waters of the Far East to henceforth be called the “First Squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”
The Japanese Combined Fleet included three squadrons: the 1st under the command of Vice Admiral Togo, the 2nd under Vice Admiral Kamimura and the 3rd, commanded by Vice Admiral Kataoka. Naval agent in Japan, captain 2nd rank A.I. Before the war, Rusin compiled characteristics of Japanese admirals. Admiral Togo received a very low rating: “Vice Admiral Togo has little knowledge of tactics and strategy. The permanent squadron under his command maneuvered poorly.” Kamimura, on the contrary, received high praise: “Admiral Kamimura knows a modern warship well and will no doubt be a good squadron leader.” Rear Admiral Deva received the highest rating from Rusin, who in the Russian-Japanese War of 1904-1905. commanded a detachment of cruisers: “In terms of his talents, knowledge of maritime affairs and experience acquired during his voyages, Admiral Deva occupies one of the first places among admirals Japanese fleet and in the future war of Japan he will be an outstanding figure.”
The numerical composition of the fleets of both opposing powers in the Pacific Ocean by January 26, 1904 is shown in the table. This list does not include obsolete ships whose combat value was small. In addition, the Japanese also had the coastal defense battleship Chin-yen and the small armored cruiser Chiyoda. Two newest armored cruisers, Nisshin and Kassuga, were purchased by Japan from Italy and became part of the active fleet on April 11, 1904. In addition, after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese fleet included two light cruisers and three destroyers. From these data it is clear that in terms of the number of squadron battleships and armored cruisers, which represented the main striking power of the fleet, the Japanese had an advantage in numbers - 14 versus 11.
It must be said that after the victory over China in the war of 1894-1895. Japan began to intensively build up its naval forces. In Russia, this did not go unnoticed, and in November 1895, by order of Nicholas II, a Special Meeting was formed, which came to the following conclusions: 1) Japan is pushing the end of its shipbuilding program to the year the Siberian Route ends, which indicates the possibility of an armed conflict in 1903-1906. 2) Russia must now, without missing a beat, develop a shipbuilding program for the Far East in such a way that by the end of Japan’s shipbuilding program our fleet will be Far East significantly exceeded the Japanese one.
By the end of 1897 Naval Ministry developed a new military shipbuilding program, with the goal of building a fleet specifically for the Pacific Ocean. In 1898, this program was approved by the Tsar. According to this program, it was planned to build (in addition to those already planned by the 1895 program): 5 battleships of 12,000 tons, 6 cruisers of 6,000 tons, 10 cruisers of 2,500 tons, 2 minelayers of 2,700 tons and 30 destroyers (they were then called fighters) according to 350 tons. They decided to order some of the ships abroad, since domestic shipyards were overloaded. In the same year, construction of the planned ships began. But in our 1898 program we made one mistake that became fatal: its completion was envisaged during 1905, while Japan was finishing the creation of its fleet intended to fight Russia in 1903.
This mistake was made due to the position of the Minister of Finance S.Yu. Witte, who at that time had great influence on Nicholas II. He insisted on reducing allocations for the new shipbuilding program, and when this failed, he achieved installments of these allocations until 1905 (the Navy Ministry considered it necessary to complete the construction of ships under the new program in 1903). S.Yu. Witte believed that it was impossible for Russia to spend the amount required by the shipbuilding program (200 million rubles) within 5 years (from 1898 to 1903). In addition, he believed that Japan, due to its difficult financial situation, would not be able to complete the creation of its fleet before 1906. This delusion of the all-powerful Minister of Finance would cost Russia dearly.
In his memoirs, S.Yu. Witte modestly keeps silent about this, at the same time emphasizing that at that time he was well aware of the need to strengthen the fleet: “It was absolutely clear to me that since we got into the Kwantung region, we need to have our own fleet in the Far East” and all from He did everything in his power to achieve this. Of course, S.Yu. Witte was, without a doubt, a talented statesman who did a lot, in particular, for the development of heavy industry and the railway network in Russia. But it is common for any person to make mistakes, and the higher the post held by a statesman, the more severe the payment for his mistakes becomes for the entire country. Unfortunately, in his memoirs S.Yu. Witte is not always self-critical. In addition, in his “Memoirs,” which undoubtedly contain enormous factual material and are a valuable historical source, S.Yu. Witte sometimes comes into conflict with real facts. For example, he places responsibility for the breakdown of negotiations with Japan (they continued until mid-January 1904) only on the Russian side.
In fact, in response to the Japanese ultimatum of December 31, 1903, a Special Meeting was convened on January 15, 1904, chaired by Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich, at which it was decided to satisfy all Japanese claims. On January 20, the text of the response was approved by the tsar. But the Japanese no longer required any concessions: already at the end of 1903, the ruling Japanese circles came to the conclusion that war with Russia was necessary. On January 24, the Japanese broke off negotiations and diplomatic relations. Telegram with a response to the Japanese ultimatum to the Russian ambassador in Tokyo P.P. Rosen was detained by the Japanese and handed over only on January 25, i.e. after the severance of diplomatic relations. S.Yu.'s point of view Witte, in fact, coincides with the opinion of official Japanese historiography: the Japanese place all the blame on the Russians: “having lost hope for a peace agreement, Japan was forced to stop diplomatic relations.”
Regarding the shipbuilding program of 1898, it should still be noted that its implementation, in addition to the lack of financial allocations, faced many other problems and, first of all, the backwardness of the domestic shipbuilding industry: the capacity of the existing shipyards was insufficient, the technical equipment of shipbuilding industry enterprises was weak, there were not enough qualified personnel, the production culture was weak. In addition, the Marine Technical Committee constantly delayed the consideration of ship designs; changes were made to the designs of ships already on the stocks, which affected the construction time.
So, the mistake in the installment program of the shipbuilding program of 1898 was the most important, but not the only one in a number of mistakes in our preparation for the war at sea. Another serious mistake was that in 1902, an entire squadron was taken from the Pacific Ocean to the ports of the Baltic Sea for repairs: three squadron battleships (Sisoi the Great, Navarin, Imperator Nicholas I) and four armored cruisers (Admiral Nakhimov", "Dmitry Donskoy", "Vladimir Monomakh", "Admiral Kornilov"). All of them, with the exception of “Kornilov” and “Nicholas I”, will find their grave in the Tsushima Strait in 1905 (“Nicholas I” will be captured, and “Kornilov” will survive only because he will remain in the Baltic), and during his stay in the Baltic, they will not undergo all the expected repairs and modernization, and what they managed to do on them, all this could have been successfully carried out in Vladivostok and Port Arthur.
One more fact should also be mentioned. Chile and Argentina, preparing for war with each other, ordered a number of first-class warships abroad (Argentina - six excellent armored cruisers from Italy). Then both powers entered into an agreement with each other, according to which they stopped building up their navies and had to simultaneously sell two ships each, which were still at a high degree of readiness in foreign shipyards. Russia received an offer to purchase two Argentine cruisers, but the Navy Ministry rejected this offer. These cruisers (the future Japanese "Nisshin" and "Kassuga"), built according to an outstanding design (with a displacement the same as that of the Russian cruiser "Bayan", they carried twice as powerful artillery and were perfectly armored), purchased by Japan at the end of 1903 g., successfully acted against our fleet. In addition, there was a real opportunity to buy other four Argentine cruisers built according to the same project - the financial situation of Argentina at that time was extremely difficult and it was interested in improving it by selling ships of its fleet. After the outbreak of hostilities, the Russian government will make desperate but unsuccessful attempts to acquire these ships.
It cannot be said that the Russian naval command did not understand the need to strengthen the fleet in the Far East and did not take any measures in this direction. The governor of Nicholas II in the Far East, Admiral E.I. Alekseev, realizing the inevitability of a military clash with Japan, urgently demanded the sending of reinforcements by ships from the Baltic Fleet. In the fall of 1903, a detachment under the command of Rear Admiral A.A. was sent from the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East. Virenius. This detachment included: the squadron battleship "Oslyabya", the 1st rank cruisers "Dmitry Donskoy" and "Aurora", the 2nd rank cruiser "Almaz", 7 squadron destroyers, 4 numbered destroyers and 3 transports. However, due to insufficient organization and support, as well as frequent breakdowns of destroyers, the detachment moved extremely slowly. Events in the Far East developed very quickly, and the need for the presence of a naval detachment in the Pacific Ocean became more and more obvious every day. Meanwhile, Admiral A.A. Virenius was clearly in no hurry. When the detachment finally approached Djibouti, he received in response to his request via wireless telegraph the news that it was already the third day since the war with Japan began.
On February 2, the “highest order” followed to return to Russia. An attempt to strengthen the Pacific squadron with ready-made ships with a total displacement of 30,000 tons even before the start of the war ended in complete failure. It should be noted that at the same time, two armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga, purchased by the Japanese in Italy, were sailing from the Mediterranean Sea to the Far East. Despite the outbreak of hostilities in the Pacific Ocean, they safely reached Japan and in April 1904 joined the active Japanese fleet. Sending Virenius's detachment back to the Baltic should be considered a mistake. If this detachment had continued its movement, it most likely would have also reached its destination.
Along with the numerical composition of the Russian and Japanese fleets in the Pacific Ocean, the tactical and technical characteristics of ships of the Russian and Japanese fleets of all classes were important for subsequent military operations, since the actions of destroyers were one of the components of the actions of the entire fleet. The point is not only and, perhaps, not so much in the numerical superiority of the Japanese in armored ships, but in their quality. The Japanese squadron battleships were the same type of ships of the latest construction, while the Russian squadron battleships, built according to various shipbuilding programs with a time interval of up to seven years, belonged to four different types of ships that had different tactical and technical characteristics.
Most of the Russian ships were inferior in their tactical and technical characteristics to the Japanese. Three Russian battleships - Petropavlovsk, Sevastopol and Poltava - were already obsolete ships. By the beginning of hostilities, ships of the Poltava type could no longer compete on an equal footing with the newest Japanese battleships of the Mikasa type. Jane's famous reference book for 1904 correlated their fighting strength as 0.8 to 1.0 in favor of the latter. In addition, the Sevastopol vehicles, manufactured by the Franco-Russian plant in St. Petersburg, were distinguished by low quality manufacturing and assembly. Even during official tests in 1900, Sevastopol was unable to reach the contract speed (16 knots), and by the beginning of hostilities it was difficult to reach 14. The unreliable power plant was the main drawback of this ship, which seriously reduced its combat effectiveness.
The two squadron battleships Peresvet and Pobeda were significantly weaker than any battleship, as they had 254 mm main-caliber artillery and insufficient armor. The battleships Peresvet and Pobeda, similar to the Oslyabya, were more suitable for the type of strong armored cruisers, but for cruisers their speed was low. And only the two newest battleships “Tsesarevich” and “Retvizan”, both built abroad, were not inferior in their tactical and technical data to the best Japanese battleships. The diversity of Russian ships made it difficult to use them, especially to control them in battle, which reduced the combat power of the squadron. The Russian battleships that were part of the First Pacific Squadron were built according to three (!) shipbuilding programs.
The situation was even worse with armored cruisers. There were only 4 of them versus 8 for the Japanese and, in addition, the Russian cruisers were inferior to the Japanese in a number essential elements. Bayan's artillery was two times inferior to any of the armored cruisers of the Japanese fleet. When ordering the Bayan in France from the Forges and Chantiers company according to the design of the prominent French shipbuilder M. Lagan, the Marine Technical Committee included joint operations with squadron battleships in the task of this cruiser. But weak artillery armament did not allow the Bayan to be used in squadron combat as effectively as the Japanese used their armored cruisers. At the same time, during military operations, Bayan will show higher efficiency than Russian armored cruisers (although its cost was higher than that of the best armored cruisers Askold (the total cost with weapons and ammunition is 5 million rubles in gold) and “Bogatyr” (5.5 million rubles) - “Bayan” (without weapons cost almost 6.3 million rubles).
“Gromoboy”, “Russia” and “Rurik” were created primarily for cruising operations with the aim of disrupting maritime trade, but were not suitable for squadron combat. They were inferior to the Japanese armored cruisers in armor (including artillery protection), speed and broadside strength: their 203 mm guns were located in side mounts so that only two out of four guns could fire on one side. Japanese cruisers had 203 mm guns located in turrets and all four guns could fire on any side. Only on the cruiser Gromoboy did they try to take into account the requirements of squadron combat to some extent, and for this purpose, two bow 8-inch guns and twelve 6-inch guns were placed in armored casemates. In a heavy battle on August 1, 1904, this allowed the cruiser to confidently withstand the fire of Japanese tower cruisers.
As the Russo-Japanese War showed, Russian cruisers performed well in reconnaissance and in operations on enemy sea communications, but turned out to be ineffective in squadron combat, and it was this type of fleet combat that turned out to be predominant in the Russo-Japanese War. By the beginning of the war, the Rurik was already an outdated ship; its speed, due to worn-out vehicles, was only about 17 knots versus 21 knots for the Japanese armored cruisers. Moreover, “Rurik” could develop even such a speed for a short period of time, but for a long time it could maintain speed of no more than 15 knots.
Against 7 Russian armored cruisers, the Japanese had 14 and 1 more small armored cruiser "Chiyoda" at the beginning of hostilities. True, out of 14 armored cruisers, 7 were already outdated. All Russian cruisers of this type were new construction, three of them - “Varyag”, “Askold” and “Bogatyr” - were the strongest ships of this type, which had no equal in the Japanese fleet. However, soon after the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese fleet was replenished with a new armored light cruiser, the Tsushima, and in September 1904, another one, the Otowa, entered service. In addition, of the Russian cruisers, “Varyag” was lost on the first day of the war (January 27, 1904), “Boyarin” was blown up on January 29 and died on a minefield laid by the Russian minelayer “Yenisei”, and “Bogatyr” on May 2, 1904 In the fog, it hit the rocks at Cape Bruce, received heavy damage and did not take part in further hostilities.
In addition, it should be noted that the Russian cruisers "Diana" and "Pallada", created as "trade fighters", had weapons that were too weak for their displacement (eight 6-inch guns, not counting small-caliber ones) and low speed for ships of their class - they could not develop the design 20 knots even during acceptance tests (with difficulty they achieved just over 19).
In addition to all of the above, it should be noted that there is one more significant drawback that affected the combat readiness of Russian ships, namely, the imperfection of Russian shells. The most severe consequences in this regard were the decision of the Naval Technical Committee to adopt new lightweight projectiles for service in 1892, which was supposed to increase their initial flight speed by up to 20%, and, consequently, significantly increase the penetrating ability and flatness of the trajectory. The latter significantly improved shooting accuracy, which was considered the most important property. But these conclusions were valid only for combat distances up to 20 kb., which were considered limiting in the Russian rules of artillery service. The main trend in the tactics of armored fleets was the rapid increase in combat distances, which reached 55-70 cabs in the Battle of Tsushima. This circumstance, along with the use of charges with smokeless powder, which almost tripled the range of projectiles regardless of their mass, reduced the advantage of light projectiles to zero. At long distances they had low penetrating power and high dispersion, which sharply reduced shooting accuracy. In addition, Russian shells had a low high-explosive effect due to the insufficient content of pyroxylin explosive and its weaker effect compared to Japanese shimosa (melinite). The Russian 12-inch shell weighed 331.7 kg versus 385.5 for the Japanese. The explosive charge in the Russian 12-inch projectile was: armor-piercing - 4.3 kg, high-explosive - 6.0 kg. In a Japanese 12-inch projectile: armor-piercing - 19.3 kg of explosive, high-explosive - 36.6 kg. The war fully demonstrated the advantages of Japanese shells.
Thus, with regard to the armored and cruising fleet, the Russian fleet in the Far East at the beginning of the war was inferior to the Japanese not only in numbers, but also in the main tactical and technical characteristics of the ships. An important aspect when analyzing the state of the navies of Russia and Japan on the eve of the war is the conditions of their basing. By the beginning of the war, the forces of the Russian fleet were largely dispersed. The ships of the Russian squadron were separated between two bases with a distance of 1060 miles between them.
The dispersal of the Russian fleet was carried out according to a plan adopted on March 19, 1901. According to it, the main task of the Russian fleet was to seize supremacy at sea in the Gulf of Pecheli, as well as in the Yellow and South China Seas in order to prevent the landing of enemy troops in Chemulpo or at the mouth of the Yalu River. The plan said: “To successfully complete this task, it was necessary to group our naval forces into appropriate tactical units, of which: 1) the main forces, having Port Arthur as their base, could block the path of the enemy fleet into the Yellow Sea. 2) our secondary forces would divert part of the enemy fleet from the Pecheliysk and Korean basins, which was achieved by forming an independent cruising detachment based in Vladivostok, from which the cruisers were supposed to operate behind enemy lines, threaten his communications and pursue transports and commercial ships, as well as carry out raids and attacks on poorly fortified points Japanese shores" Subsequently, this plan was repeatedly discussed at meetings of the Russian naval command and was left unchanged.
This plan was criticized after the war, as it was believed that the division of the forces of the Russian fleet was not justified by the situation. Nevertheless, this criticism is unfair: while in Vladivostok, “Rurik”, “Russia” and “Gromoboy” diverted much larger Japanese forces from Port Arthur (4 armored cruisers of Vice Admiral Kamimura and a number of smaller ships). It was much more convenient for this cruiser to leave Vladivostok for operations on Japanese communications - but they were originally created as raiders, while they would not be able to provide significant support to the battleships in Port Arthur, since due to their design features not suitable for squadron combat. According to this plan, approved by E.I. Alekseev, the main forces of the fleet in the Pacific Ocean were based in Port Arthur, 3 armored ships and 1 light cruiser, as well as 10 numbered destroyers in Vladivostok. In addition, 1 light cruiser and 3 gunboats were stationed in the ports of China and Korea.
The basing system of the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean had significant shortcomings, the condition of the naval bases was unsatisfactory. The Russian Pacific Fleet had only two naval bases - Port Arthur and Vladivostok. As already noted, the distance between these bases was quite large and in the event of war, communication between them became very difficult. The shipping lines linking both bases passed through an area that was controlled by the entire Japanese fleet, so communications between the bases were unreliable. The land communication between Port Arthur and Vladivostok was also difficult, and during the war it was completely interrupted.
Port Arthur and Vladivostok were not prepared for the outbreak of war; their real capabilities were limited. The creation of land defense lines and coastal batteries was not completed. The defensive structures of Port Arthur were planned to be completed only by 1909; their construction was estimated at 15 million rubles. By 1904, only 4.6 million rubles were released from this amount. Construction plan defensive structures Port Arthur, designed by the outstanding Russian military engineer Velichko, was only 30% completed by 1904. The equipment of the bases did not support the deployment of all types of combat activities, the repair capabilities of Vladivostok and Port Arthur were very limited, and there were not enough spare parts to repair ship mechanisms. In addition, in Port Arthur, the construction of a dock capable of accommodating battleships was not completed. The absence of a dock for battleships in Port Arthur subsequently had the most severe consequences for the course of military operations.
It should be noted that Viceroy E.I. Back in 1900, Alekseev presented a work plan to expand the Arthur port, but loans for this were allocated in completely insufficient amounts. As the famous military historian A.A. rightly noted. Svechin: “Generally speaking, Vladivostok and Arthur, and especially the latter, as repair base for the fleet were so weak that even in peacetime it was difficult to destroy a squadron - and a squadron of smaller composition than the one that subsequently fought. Our base's supplies were also insufficient. In particular, the shortage of shells was especially serious, of which the fleet did not have two complete sets.” E.I. Alekseev, seeing the danger of the situation and without waiting for the appropriate allocations, just before the war, at his own risk, managed to do some necessary preparations, mainly coal. Port Arthur had another major drawback: the only entrance to the base was shallow and large ships could only enter and leave the base during full of water(tide).
The lack of a deployed and properly preparatory basing system had an extremely negative impact on the actions of the Russian fleet. As the commander of the cruiser “Oleg”, Captain 1st Rank L.F. Dobrotvorsky, subsequently wrote: “Without well-equipped private bases, a modern fleet cannot operate, because without them it is impossible to preserve ships and mechanisms.”
It should be noted that at a time when there was a constant lack of funds for the construction of fortifications and equipment of the port in Port Arthur, S.Yu. Witte allocated significant funds for the construction of a commercial port in the city of Dalny, 20 miles from Port Arthur. By 1904, Dalny had absorbed over 20 million rubles. The Japanese subsequently did not fail to take advantage of the amenities of Dalny, making it a base for their fleet during the war. In 1906 A.N. Kuropatkin, during the war of 1904-1905. the commander of the Russian ground forces in the Far East wrote sadly: “We spent many millions of rubles on equipping the piers and the Dalny dock, but Port Arthur was left without a dock.”
The Japanese fleet had an extensive basing system with well-equipped bases such as Kure, Sasebo, Maizuru and others. By the beginning of the war, the Japanese were preparing to use Takeshiki on the island of Tsushima and the Korean ports of Chemulpo and Mozampo as forward bases. Japanese bases due to their advantageous geographical location dominated the routes leading to the Russian coast. The short distance between Japanese naval bases and Korean ports (from 60 to 300 miles) allowed the Japanese navy to concentrate its main forces in any of them in the shortest possible time without much effort, and also facilitated the concentration of Japanese troops on the mainland.
Thus, by the beginning of hostilities, the Japanese navy was superior to the Russian fleet in the Pacific Ocean in quantitative and qualitative terms, and also had significantly the best system basing.
Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet
A detachment of cruisers on the roadstead in Vladivostok
General information
Number of members
Military conflicts
Story
The decision to create
The formation of a detachment of cruisers based in Vladivostok as an independently operating formation was envisaged back in March 1901. In addition to the cruisers “Russia”, “Gromoboy” and “Rurik”, the detachment at various times also included other cruisers (“Admiral Nakhimov”, “Varyag”, “Askold”).
The decision in 1901-1903 to create a detachment of cruisers into an independent detachment was motivated by the following:
- Armored cruisers are not battleships and are built specifically for cruising warfare. The effect of their action on a wide theater should be much greater than as part of a squadron.
- By distracting 6 Japanese armored cruisers, the detachment will weaken the superiority of the main forces of the Japanese fleet over the Russian one.
- Raiding along the enemy's coast, thereby disrupting the supply of enemy troops in the continental theater of operations.
This was also the task that was assigned to the detachment.
The correctness of this allocation of the best cruisers into a separate detachment was confirmed by experience Russo-Japanese War.
Formation
Squadron battleship "Tsesarevich"
The final composition of the Pacific squadron was announced at a meeting in Port Arthur on April 17, 1903. As a result of this meeting, naval forces in the Far East were distributed as follows:
1. “Combat squadron” based in Port Arthur (I and II squads of battleships, detachments of long-range and short-range reconnaissance ships (cruisers), 1st squadron of destroyers) and a defensive detachment.
2. Separate cruising detachment and defensive detachment based in Vladivostok.
In addition, groups were formed auxiliary vessels(transports) based in Port Arthur and Vladivostok.
The separate cruising detachment in Vladivostok was to include the armored cruisers "Russia" (flag of the 1st junior flagship of the squadron), "Gromoboy" and "Rurik", the armored cruiser "Bogatyr" and the Voluntary Fleet steamships "Moscow" and "Kherson". In addition to the designated ships, the Vladivostok detachment included: gunboats “Koreets”, “Mandzhur”, “Beaver” and “Sivuch”, mine transport “Aleut”, military transports “Kamchadal” and “Yakut”, destroyers No. 201, 202 and 209 , as well as six destroyers.
In July-August, 6 more numbered destroyers transferred by the cruisers Boyarin and Rurik arrived in Vladivostok, but the gunboats and the 20-knot steamship Moskva never made it to Vladivostok. At the same time, “Kherson” (renamed “Lena”), due to defects in the boilers, was unable to develop a full 19.5 knot speed, which was reflected in the failure better side on the initial plans for the use of the detachment.
Armored cruiser "Russia"
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on May 20, 1895. Launched April 30, 1896. Entered service on September 13, 1897. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. The flagship of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 12580 tons. Armament - 4 - 203/45, 22 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47/43, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 5 NTA. Speed - 19.74 knots, cruising range 7740 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 811 sailors.
Armored cruiser "Gromoboy"
Laid down on July 14, 1897 at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg. Launched April 26, 1889. Entered service in October 1900. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 12455 tons. Dimensions: 146.6/144.2/140.6x20.9x7.9 m. Initial armament - 4 - 203/45, 16 - 152/45, 24 - 75/50, 12 - 47 mm, 18 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des., 4 PTA. Speed 20.1 knots; cruising range 8100 miles. Crew of 28 officers and 846 sailors.
Armored cruiser "Rurik"
Unofficial construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down on May 19, 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service on October 16, 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment.
Displacement 11930 t. Dimensions: 132.6x20.4x8.3 m. Armament - 4 - 203/35, 16 - 152/35, 6 - 120/45, 6 - 47/43, 10 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm des ., 6 NTA. Speed 18.84 knots; cruising range 7790 miles. Crew of 27 officers and 692 sailors
Armored cruiser "Bogatyr"
Laid down in December 1898 in Stettin (Germany) on the shipyard of the Vulcan company. Launched on January 17, 1901. During the Russo-Japanese War he was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. On May 2, 1904, in the fog, he jumped onto the coastal rocks at Cape Bruce in the Amur Bay and, having received a hole in the hull, lay down on the ground. On June 18, 1904, she was refloated and docked for repairs, where she remained until the end of the war.
Displacement 6650 t. Dimensions: 134.1x16.6x6.3 m. Armament 12 - 152/45, 12 - 75/50, 8 - 47 mm, 2 - 37 mm, 2 - 64 mm (des), 2 NTA, 2 PTA. Test speed up to 23.55 knots; cruising range 4900 miles. Crew: 23 officers and 550 sailors.
During design and construction, all of these cruisers were designed for raider operations on the enemy’s ocean lines of communication. Because of this, in order to increase their cruising range, they had relatively weak side armor and imperfect protection for deck artillery.
Squad names
The order to form the detachment was signed on June 7, 1903. In which his first name was given: “Detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Ocean squadron.”
After the start of the Russo-Japanese War, the commander of the squadron was given the rights of fleet commander. As a result, on February 25, 1904, the detachment was transformed into a “Separate detachment of cruisers of the Pacific Fleet.”
On May 12, 1904, the structure of the fleet was changed and the detachment received a new name: “Separate detachment of cruisers of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet.”
On December 20, 1904, after the death of the remnants of the squadron in Port Arthur, the detachment of Vladivostok cruisers was given a new name “Cruiser Detachment in the Pacific Ocean”.
Fighting
First campaign (January 27 - February 1, 1904)
On the night of January 26-27, 1904, an order was received from the command, which read: “The detachment should begin military operations and inflict the most sensitive blow and damage to Japan’s communications with Korea.” The ships were prepared for combat operations in advance and went to sea on the same day. But the campaign was not particularly successful, despite the absence of serious enemy forces. During the voyage, only one steamer IJN Nakanoura-Maru (1084 tons) was sunk and another one was shelled. A storm at sea forced us to return to our home port.
Second campaign (February 11 - 14, 1904)
The next trip to sea took place on February 11, 1904. The area of the second campaign was the coast from the border with Korea to the port of Genzan. But this campaign was even less effective - apart from small coastal vessels, the cruisers did not meet anyone.
Third campaign (February 24 - March 1, 1904)
Having put to sea on February 24, the detachment again headed to the shores of Korea, to the ports and bays located in the Korean Gulf and to the north of it, as well as to the approaches to them from the coast of Japan, in particular, from the ports of Wakasa Bay.
Based on the results of a very superficial inspection of a number of bays on the Korean coast, the commander of the detachment, Reizenstein, reported the following information to the governor: “Two-time cruising gave the right to assume that the presence of our detachment here will not prevent the Japanese from conducting operations in the Sea of Japan; they are not conducting them here. Troops to Genzan they don’t transport, there is no trade or transportation of goods along the Korean coast; having walked along the entire coast of Korea, seeing all the bays clearly, not a single signal station was seen, which also confirms the absence of operations.”
Bombardment of Vladivostok by Japanese cruisers (March 6, 1904)
But even such small successes of the detachment were enough to alarm the main headquarters of the Japanese, which decided to take retaliatory actions against the detachment. Admiral Kamimura with a squadron of five armored and two armored cruisers entered the Ussuri Gulf on March 6, 1904 and shelled Vladivostok. Immediately after the shelling of the city began, a detachment of Vladivostok cruisers began to weigh anchor, but leaving the bay was complicated by ice conditions and minefields. Upon entering the Ussuri Gulf, the ships saw only the smoke of the Japanese squadron on the horizon, so they did not pursue it and returned to the roadstead. The shelling resulted in the death of one woman and the injury of five sailors.
Inactivity (March 1 – April 9, 1904)
Among the first measures taken by S.O. Makarov to increase the combat effectiveness and intensify the actions of the fleet, the order of February 24 was the appointment of Rear Admiral K.P. as head of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. Jessena. And Jessen was given a new task for the detachment: to actively prevent the transfer of enemy troops from Japan to Korea.
But Jessen, for a number of reasons, could not begin to carry out orders:
- It took time to master units that were new to him and to train them appropriately for combat.
- It was necessary to choose the direction in which the cruiser detachment should strike. This required reliable information about the intentions and actions of the Japanese fleet.
However, the information about the enemy that the Russian command had during this period was very contradictory.
Fourth campaign (April 10 - 14, 1904)
But due to ice conditions, the detachment was able to go to sea only on April 10, after the death of Makarov. The detachment headed to the Korean coast to attack the port of Genzan. But Jessen did not know that on April 9, Admiral Kamimura sent his squadron to Vladivostok, after entering the same Genzan to replenish water and coal supplies. The reports note that there was thick fog at sea. On the morning of April 12, the detachment, entering Genzana Bay, sank the steamer IJN Goyo-Maru, which was standing in the roadstead, and then in the afternoon they sank the coaster IJN Haginura-Maru. Then the detachment went to the Sangar Strait. At 22:20, the IJN Kinsu-Maru transport appeared on the way of the Vladivostok detachment. He was also sunk. After this, the detachment commander, having numerous prisoners from sunken ships on board the cruisers, decided to return to Vladivostok.
Second approach of Kamimura's squadron to Vladivostok (April 16, 1904)
Admiral H. Kamimura
On April 15, 1904, the Japanese squadron approached Shkota Island, where it remained for some time, producing signals, then went south. On April 16, the destroyers IJN Sirakumo, IJN Asasivo, IJN Akatsuki and IJN Asagiri laid three mine banks at the entrance to Ussuri Bay. Russian cruisers did not go to sea for fear of running into mines. Eight Russian destroyers were sent to monitor the Japanese ships. The trawling of Japanese mines was very poorly organized. Because of this, on July 4, destroyer No. 208 hit a mine in the Ussuri Gulf and sank.
Accident of the cruiser "Bogatyr" (May 2, 1904)
On May 2, 1904, the cruiser Bogatyr hit rocks at Cape Bruce in Slavyanka Bay. Soon the cruiser was removed from the rocks and docked for repairs. But due to a poorly equipped port and a lack of materials for repairs, the cruiser remained in dock until the end of the war.
Fifth campaign (May 30 - June 7, 1904)
The next time the cruisers went to sea and headed for the eastern passage of the Korean Strait only on May 30. On June 1, the detachment went to about. Tsushima, where Japan's main communications routes were located and where Admiral Kamimura's base was located in Ozaki Bay. On the same day, the steamships IJN Idzuma-Maru and IJN Hitachi-Maru were sunk by the Thunderbolt. IJN Hitachi-Maru carried 1,095 Japanese Army soldiers and officers, 320 horses and 18 heavy 11-inch howitzers, which were intended to bombard Port Arthur. Another IJN transport, Sado-Maru (with 1,350 soldiers and officers, was stopped by warning shots from the Rurik. The Japanese officers refused to surrender and the Russians had no choice but to sink the transport, which was done. A detachment of cruisers went into the Sea of Japan. Kamimura, who was at the base, received a report about the Russian detachment and went out to search for him. But on June 3, the Russian cruisers inspected the English steamer Allanton, which was sailing with smuggled cargo to Japan.
On June 6, Russian cruisers returned from a successful raid in Vladivostok. Kamimura also returned to his base.
Sixth campaign (June 15 - 20, 1904)
On June 15, the detachment again went to Genzan. In order to achieve great success in the campaign, the auxiliary cruiser Lena and eight numbered destroyers joined the detachment. On June 17, the detachment entered Genzan and sank the schooner IJN Seiho-Maru and the coastal steamer IJN Koun-Maru in the roadstead, losing one destroyer due to the accident. After this, the Lena and the destroyers went to Vladivostok, and the cruisers to the Korean Strait. But having met Kamimura’s squadron in the Tsushima area, the detachment did not accept the battle and retreated. On June 19, on the way to their native shores, the English steamer Cheltenham, which was transporting timber for the Fuzan - Seoul - Chemulpo railway, was detained and delivered to Vladivostok. On June 20, the detachment entered the port of Vladivostok.
Seventh campaign (July 4-19, 1904)
The active actions of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment under the command of Jessen forced the Japanese government to send the bulk of transports with troops and military cargo to Korea and Manchuria through the Yellow Sea. Because of this, an order was received from Alekseev to proceed to the east coast of Japan for active operations on the routes of communication with America.
On July 7, 1904, a detachment of cruisers entered the Pacific Ocean through the Sangar Strait and turned south. On July 9, the cruiser was inspected by the English steamer Arabiya; it was carrying contraband cargo; the ship was sent to Vladivostok. On July 10, the cruisers approached the entrance to Tokyo Bay. Here the English steamer Night Commender was inspected, carrying smuggled cargo, and sunk due to the lack of opportunity to reach Vladivostok. On the same day, several schooners were sunk, the German steamer Tea, which was traveling with smuggling, and the English steamer Kalhas was also captured, which, after inspection, was sent to Vladivostok. After this, the cruisers headed back to Vladivostok. On July 19, the cruisers arrived in Vladivostok.
The actions of Russian ships in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Japan, excited the whole world. The world stock exchange reacted very actively to the actions of our cruisers; the price of freight increased greatly, but even the high cost could not stop some companies from refusing to operate voyages to the shores of Japan.
Eighth campaign (July 30 - August 4). Battle in the Korean Strait (August 1, 1904)
On July 29, a telegram came from Admiral Alekseev to Vladivostok (which did not yet know about the results of the tragic battle on July 28), announcing the order for the cruisers to immediately proceed to the Korean Strait. The purpose of this campaign for the detachment was to meet with Vitgeft’s squadron and provide assistance to him. But the telegram did not indicate which way Vitgeft’s detachment would go, and the exact time of its departure to sea was also unknown. Therefore, it was reported that the meeting was expected to take place north of the Korea Strait. Cruisers were prohibited from entering south of the Fuzan parallel. According to the instructions, when meeting with Kamimura, the cruisers should retreat to Vladivostok, taking the Japanese with them. The cruiser should not be distracted by any other tasks during the cruise.
Early in the morning of July 30, "Russia", "Gromoboy" and "Rurik" left Vladivostok. On the morning of August 1, in the southern part of the Korea Strait, as was written in the order, a detachment of cruisers stopped to wait for Vitgeft's squadron.
Cruiser IJN Iwate
When it began to get light, at 4:50 a.m., signalmen from the Rossiya spotted four ships that were sailing parallel to the detachment. The cruisers IJN Izumo, IJN Tokiwa, IJN Azuma and IJN Iwate were soon identified. Enemy ships cut off the detachment's path to retreat to Vladivostok. The fight was inevitable.
The battle began at 5:20 am. The Japanese cruisers were the first to open fire. Soon retaliatory salvos followed from "Russia" and "Gromoboya". Immediately there were strong explosions at IJN Iwate and at IJN Azuma. The beginning of the battle was left to the Russian cruisers. As it became known later, a heavy shell hit IJN Iwate, destroying three 152 mm and one 75 mm guns.
But soon the Japanese artillerymen took aim and began hitting Russian ships, killing and wounded appeared. Around the fourteenth minute of the battle, a fire started on the Rurik. The fire disabled the cruiser, but not for long. The fire was soon put out. About 40 minutes after the start of the battle, the light cruiser IJN Naniwa approached the Japanese to help. The Russian cruisers changed course and headed northwest; Japanese ships, in turn, took a parallel course.
About an hour after the start of the battle, the Rurik suffered the fate that experts had predicted for it immediately upon entering service: a Japanese shell hit the unprotected tiller compartment and disabled it. steering. And the cruiser raised a signal: “The steering wheel does not work.” The cruisers "Russia" and "Gromoboy" turned around to help the damaged "Rurik". But they could not fix the damage on the Rurik.
Seeing that there was no way to help the damaged cruiser, but on the contrary, it was possible to lose two other cruisers, the commander of the cruiser detachment decided to break through to Vladivostok. Kamimura, with his detachment, pursued the Russian cruisers, but the light cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho remained to fight the immobilized Rurik.
The battle ended at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning, the enemy ships ceased fire and turned back.
Kamimura’s decision was influenced by the following factors: casualties among personnel; shortage of shells and damage to ships. In addition, he did not know about the results of the battle in the Yellow Sea and had to be ready at any moment to rush to the aid of Togo or start a battle with the Russian squadron that had broken through from Port Arthur.
Cruiser "Rurik"
"Rurik" continued to fight the Japanese cruisers IJN Naniwa and IJN Takachiho, but soon all its guns were knocked out, almost the entire command staff was killed or wounded. The cruiser commander, Captain 1st Rank Trusov, and senior officer Captain 2nd Rank Khlodovsky died from their wounds. Of the 22 officers, seven remained unharmed; almost half of the entire crew was out of action.
When Kamimura's cruisers, who had returned from the chase, began to approach the Rurik, Lieutenant Ivanov, who took command, in order to prevent the ship from being captured, decided to scuttle it by opening the seams.
According to data from Japanese cruisers, at half past ten o'clock the cruiser "Rurik" completely disappeared under water. Outdated and poorly armored, it fought for five hours against superior enemy ships. The behavior of his team was heroic.
According to Japanese official figures, there were 44 killed and 71 wounded on Kamimura's ships. But according to other sources, on IJN Iwate alone, one shell killed 40 people and wounded 37. The flagship IJN Izuma had up to 20 holes; the cruiser IJN Azuma received 10 shells, IJN Tokiwa - several shells.
Last actions (August 1904 - November 1905)
The battle in the Korea Strait was actually the detachment's last active combat action. Due to the weak capacity of the repair base of the Vladivostok port, the repair of serious damage on the Rossiya and Gromoboe took a long time.
On October 13, 1904, the cruiser Gromoboy, immediately after repairs, ran into rocks while moving to Posyet Bay and spent the entire winter in the dock undergoing repairs.
In the spring of 1905, the detachment made a small raid on Hokkaido and sank the schooners IJN Yaya-Maru, IJN Senrio-Maru, IJN Koyo-Maru and IJN Hokuzey-Maru.
In the summer of 1905, in view of the real threat of the war spreading to the Russian mainland (Sakhalin was captured by the Japanese in July 1905) and the creation of a unified regional defense command headed by the commandant of the Vladivostok fortress, General G.N. Kazbek subordinated the detachment of cruisers to the head of the Separate detachment of ships assigned to protect the waters of the Ussuri region (led by the commander of the Vladivostok port, Rear Admiral N.R. Greve).
On November 11, 1905, in accordance with the instructions of the General Naval Staff (dated October 11), a detachment of cruisers set out for the European part of Russia. On March 30, 1906, upon arrival in Libau, the detachment headquarters ended the campaign, and the detachment itself was disbanded.
Conclusion
The Vladivostok detachment of cruisers did not fully live up to the hopes that the Admiralty had placed on it. But still, during the entire raid, the detachment sunk 3 Japanese transports, 5 Japanese steamers, 1 English steamer, 1 German steamer and 14 sailing schooners. In addition, 4 foreign ships were captured (2 of which were later released) and 1 Japanese schooner.
But the experience of raiding enemy communications during the Russo-Japanese War was the basis for the German action plan for their raiders (auxiliary cruisers) at the very beginning of the First World War.
Battle in the Yellow Sea(Japanese: 黄海海戦 Kōkai kaisen) - the first major naval battle of the Russo-Japanese War. It occurred during the attempt of the 1st Pacific Squadron to break out from besieged Port Arthur to Vladivostok. Despite the fact that both sides did not suffer any losses in ships, the Russian squadron was unable to complete its task and was forced to return. After this battle, the 1st Pacific Squadron was virtually inactive, allowing the Japanese Combined Fleet to provide unhindered supplies to the troops besieging Port Arthur. Ultimately, this led to the capture of the fortress by Japanese troops.
General information
In 1898, Russia concluded a convention with China, according to which Port Arthur was transferred to Russia for a period of 25 years. The Russian naval forces received an ice-free base on the coast at their disposal Yellow Sea. Port Arthur becomes the main naval base of the Russian military fleet in the Pacific Ocean. At the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese command sets the priority task of destroying the Russian naval forces based in Port Arthur. The operation to capture the fortress was necessary for the Japanese fleet.
| Official work of the German General Staff The siege of Port Arthur was necessary; the Japanese could complete their operations on land only by having supremacy at sea. It was for this reason that the Russian fleet in East Asia had to be destroyed, and since most of it had taken refuge from the Japanese attack ... in the harbor of Port Arthur, the fortress had to be attacked from land. The Japanese fleet had to wait for the arrival of the Baltic squadron, and for Japan it was a vital issue to create for itself... favorable conditions for the future sea battle with the Russian 2nd Pacific Squadron, that is, take Port Arthur first. |
On April 22 (May 5), 1904, the Japanese 2nd Army of General Oku landed in Bidzywo, and Port Arthur was soon cut off from land communications with the Manchurian Army. On May 13 (26), Japanese troops broke through the Russian defenses on the Jinzhou Isthmus (the narrowest point of the Liaodong Peninsula) and by May 19 (June 1) occupied the port of Dalniy, in which the 3rd Army of General Nogi, intended for operations against Port Arthur, was concentrated. . On July 13-15 (26-28), the 3rd Army, after heavy fighting, broke through the last fortified Russian positions on the Green Mountains and reached the closest approaches to the fortress.
On July 17 (30), Japanese troops found themselves within range of the main caliber guns of Russian battleships. The ships of the 1st Pacific Squadron opened fire on the enemy directly from the harbor. The actual siege of Port Arthur began. On July 25 (August 7), a Japanese battery of 120-mm naval guns mounted on wheeled siege gun carriages opened fire on the city and harbor for the first time. The battery fired in short bursts of 7-8 rounds. The first shells landed on the main street of the Old Town. Soon the Japanese artillerymen shifted their fire to the harbor, and several shells exploded not far from the flagship Tsarevich. But there was only one hit: the shell destroyed the radio room. The telegraph operator who was in it died, and the squadron commander, Rear Admiral Vitgeft, was easily wounded in the leg by shrapnel. Over the next two days, shelling of Russian ships in the harbor was repeated, and many of them received numerous, although minor, damage. The most dangerous of them was an underwater hole caused by a 120-mm shell hitting the bow of the battleship Retvizan on July 27 (August 9) at about 12.10. The damage was quickly repaired, and soon the battleship was ready for battle. The next day, the Russian squadron under the command of Rear Admiral Wilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft left Port Arthur to try to break through to Vladivostok.
The commander of the Japanese combined fleet, Admiral Togo Heihachiro, was confident that the siege of Port Arthur and the shelling of the harbor that had begun would force the Russian squadron to go to sea, and in advance he strengthened surveillance of the raid. In addition, he relocated his main forces from the Elliot Islands closer to Port Arthur - to Rowan Island.
Characteristics of the parties involved
Ships of the 1st squadron of the Pacific Fleet, making a breakthrough to Vladivostok
The goal of the 1st Pacific Squadron is to redeploy ships from Port Arthur to Vladivostok, maintain forces to link up with the 2nd Pacific Squadron for the subsequent destruction of the Japanese fleet and interrupt the enemy’s sea communications from Japan to Korea and Manchuria. When preparing the squadron to break through the Japanese blockade of Port Arthur, the ships were equipped with personnel and ammunition. A certain amount of medium artillery (10 - 152 mm and 12 - 75 mm guns) was removed and installed on the fortress for its defense.
Compound:
Vitgeft V.G.
Japanese Combined Fleet
At 8.50 the signal was raised on the flagship "Tsesarevich": "Prepare for battle", and at 9.00: "The fleet is informed that the Emperor has ordered to go to Vladivostok."
At 10.30 the minesweeper convoy was released to Port Arthur under the protection of gunboats and a second detachment of destroyers.
The squadron marched in the following order: ahead was the cruiser Novik, followed in the wake column by the battleships Tsesarevich (flag of Rear Admiral Vitgeft), Retvizan, Pobeda, Peresvet (flag of the junior flagship of Prince P.P. Ukhtomsky ), "Sevastopol" and "Poltava", followed by the cruisers "Askold" (the flag of the head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral N.K. Reitzenstein), "Pallada" and "Diana". The first detachment of destroyers was abeam the flagship battleship. At first, the squadron moved at 8 knots. Soon, problems arose with the steering gear on the Tsesarevich, and the battleship was out of commission for some time. After a few minutes, the problems were corrected, and the squadron continued to move.
At 10.00 the order was given to increase speed to 10 knots. The stroke was increased gradually in order to determine the strength of sealing the hole in the bow of the battleship Retvizan.
At about 11.30, the main forces of the Japanese fleet appeared on the horizon to the east of the squadron. The cruiser Novik took its place in the squad of cruisers.
Japanese fleet before the battle
Armadillo IJN Mikasa
As of the morning of July 28 (August 10), the deployment of the Japanese fleet was as follows. There were armadillos in the Round Island area IJN Mikasa , IJN Asahi , Fuji And IJN Shikishima, as well as an armored cruiser IJN Asama. Armored cruiser IJN Yakumo and cruisers IJN Kasagi , IJN Takasago And IJN Chitose were located 15 miles south of Liaoteshan. Cruisers IJN Akashi , IJN Suma And IJN Akitsushima were near the islet of Encounter Rock. Old cruisers IJN Hashidate And IJN Matsushima stood in Sikau Bay near Port Arthur. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd detachments of destroyers carried out a blockade of the Port Arthur raid. Armadillo IJN Chen Yuan, armored cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin were near Port Arthur. Cruisers IJN Itsukushima And IJN Izumi- near the Elliot Islands. 4th destroyer detachment and cruiser IJN Chiyoda stood in Dalny.
A detachment of armored cruisers under the command of Vice Admiral Kamimura was in the Korea Strait with orders to prevent Vladivostok cruisers from entering the Yellow Sea.
Progress of the battle
First phase of the battle
By 12.00 the situation was as follows. The Russian squadron was sailing in a wake column heading southeast 25 o. The main forces of the Japanese fleet (1st combat detachment) consisting of battleships IJN Mikasa , IJN Asahi , Fuji And IJN Shikishima and armored cruisers IJN Kasuga And IJN Nisshin were heading southwest to cross the course of the Russian squadron. The 3rd combat detachment of Admiral Dev walked to the right of the Russian squadron on a course almost parallel to it. The 5th and 6th combat detachments were located to the left of the Russian squadron at a very great distance.
At 12.20, to prevent head coverage, the Russian squadron changed course 4 points to the left, that is, almost on a counter course with the enemy. Just at this moment the armored cruiser IJN Nisshin opened fire from a distance of about 80 cables. Soon he was joined by the rest of the ships of the 1st combat detachment.
The commander of the 3rd combat detachment, Admiral Deva, seeing that the battle had begun, turned his ships successively 16 points to bypass and attack the Russian squadron from the rear.
Soon after turning from the flagship battleship Tsesarevich, directly ahead, objects were found floating in the water, reminiscent in appearance of mines, which could have been laid by Japanese destroyers that had previously been on the course of the Russian ships. The battleship immediately warned the squadron about this with whistles and semaphore. As a result of maneuvering to avoid these mines, the ships had to change courses several times in one direction or another, which made it very difficult to open and return fire. At about 12.45, for a second attempt to enter the head of the Russian squadron, Admiral Togo turned the ships of the 1st combat detachment “all of a sudden” 8 points to the left. After walking like this for some time, perhaps in order to increase the distance, the Japanese ships made another similar turn and set off on the opposite course.
Other ships of the squadron were also damaged. "Retvizan" received 12 hits. One of the shells pierced the starboard side of the bow in the area of the conductor's wardroom. Since the hole was located just above the waterline, it was heavily overwhelmed by water while moving. The rest of the damage was not so significant.
The battleship Poltava, slightly behind the squadron, opened fire first. Behind him, the rest of the squadron's ships entered the battle, concentrating their fire on the flagship of the Japanese fleet. IJN Mikasa immediately received several direct hits (mainly from the battleship Poltava) and was forced to turn aside. But, having recovered from the blow, he soon returned to his previous course.
The Japanese ships also concentrated fire on the flagship Tsesarevich, trying to disable it and disrupt control of the squadron. Trying to get out from under enemy fire, and also in order to improve conditions for firing his ships and prevent the enemy from engulfing the head of the squadron, Vitgeft turned two points to the left and increased the speed to 15 knots. However, the battleships Sevastopol and Poltava could not move at such speed and began to lag behind. As a result, the speed had to be reduced again. At about 17.05, a 12-inch shell from one of the Japanese battleships hit the middle of the Tsarevich's foremast. As a result of the explosion, all the officers of Vitgeft's headquarters who were on the open lower bridge were killed or seriously injured. Vitgeft himself was torn to pieces. In order not to cause confusion on the ships of the squadron in the midst of the battle, the commander of the Tsarevich, Captain 1st Rank Ivanov, took command of the squadron.
Second phase of the battle in the Yellow Sea
At 17.45 another large-caliber shell exploded near the conning tower of the Tsesarevich. The shell fragments flew into the very wide viewing slots of the conning tower, killing and wounding everyone in it. The ship's commander was seriously wounded. The fire control devices and steering gear were damaged.
The Tsarevich lost control and began to describe the circulation, but there was no one to raise the signal that the ship was out of order. The commanders of the ships following the Tsarevich first began to repeat the flagship’s maneuver, believing that it was maneuvering to set a new course. But after the Tsarevich, having described the circulation, cut through the squadron's formation, it became clear that it had lost control. But by that time the formation of the Russian squadron had broken down, and the Japanese ships had increased their fire.
At this moment, the commander of the battleship "Retvizan", captain 1st rank E.N. Shchensnovich ordered to turn towards the enemy in order to ram one of his ships. Seeing the battleship approaching them at full speed, the Japanese ships concentrated their fire on it. The high speed of the Retvizan helped it avoid many hits - the Japanese gunners simply did not have time to rearrange the sights, and the shells fell behind the stern of the battleship.
Commander of the battleship "Retvizan" E.N. Shchensnovich
This is how the editor of the Portarthur newspaper “New Region”, who was on board the hospital ship “Mongolia”, following the squadron, describes this moment.
But when there were no more than 17 cables left to the enemy (about 3.1 km), a stray fragment of an exploding shell flew into the Retvizan’s conning tower, wounding the commander. E.N. Shchensnovich briefly lost control of the ship. Having come to his senses and seeing that the Japanese ships had left the danger zone, and none of the Russian ships followed his example, Shchensnovich ordered to turn back.
The desperate maneuver of the Retvizan allowed the commanders of other Russian ships to level the formation. On the Tsesarevich, the senior officer of the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Shumov, took command. Having difficulty restoring control of the ship, he raised the signal that the admiral was transferring command to the junior flagship, Rear Admiral P.P. Ukhtomsky. Ukhtomsky, who was on the Peresvet, raised the signal for the squadron to “follow me.” But since both topmasts were knocked down on the Peresvet, the signal had to be hung on the wings of the bridge.
After some time, having difficulty making out the signal, the remaining battleships entered the wake of the Peresvet, and P.P. Ukhtomsky led the squadron back to Port Arthur. "Retvizan", not noticing Ukhtomsky's signal to slow down, soon overtook the squadron.
Admiral Togo turned his squadron to the north, blocking the path to the open sea, but, since his ships were also heavily damaged, he did not pursue the Russian squadron.
Breakthrough of "Askold" and "Novik"
After the battleships turned back towards Port Arthur, the cruisers followed suit. By this time, the 5th and 6th detachments of the Japanese fleet came closer. The head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral Reizenstein, decides to make a breakthrough. This decision was supported by the Askold commander and other officers who were nearby in the conning tower.
Having raised the signal “Cruisers follow me,” the cruiser “Askold” increased its speed. The rest of the squadron's cruisers followed his example. At 18.50 "Askold" headed straight for the armored cruiser IJN Asama, opening fire on him. According to the logbook, soon IJN Asama a fire broke out and he turned away.
Having assessed the situation, Reitzenstein decides to break through in a southwestern direction past the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment of the Japanese fleet. Having overtaken their battleships on the starboard side, the detachment of cruisers turned left, to cross their course. But only the cruiser Novik was able to follow Askold. "Diana" and "Pallada" immediately fell behind, unable to develop the required speed.
After some hesitation, the Japanese ships rushed to intercept the Russian cruisers. Separated from the 1st combat detachment IJN Yakumo, firing at "Askold", which became the final IJN Nisshin also transferred the fire to him. To the left and behind, the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment fired at the breaking through ships and set off in pursuit.
Breakthrough of the cruisers "Askold" and "Novik"
Firing on both sides, showered with shells, the cruisers developed the maximum possible speed. The Japanese ships concentrated their fire on the lead Askold. Columns of water from exploding shells rose around the cruiser, showering the ship with a hail of fragments. But high speed and maneuvering allowed the Askold to survive the crossfire. But the hits could not be avoided. Soon it was reported to the conning tower that water was flowing into the left aft engine room, and then into the right coal pit of the second stoker. While below they were fighting against the influx of water, above they were extinguishing fires arising from hits here and there. The number of killed and wounded increased every minute, and the sailors of the fire division had to stand up to the guns, replacing those who were out of action. But still, the cruiser managed to maintain the maximum rate of fire and speed. IN critical moment battle, when an armored cruiser rushed to cut off the Russian cruisers IJN Yakumo, the Askold machines developed 132 revolutions - more than in tests.
Cruiser "Askold"
"Novik", following "Askold", at that time fired at the cruisers of the 3rd and 5th combat detachments. Four Japanese destroyers came out to attack the cruisers, but all the torpedoes they fired missed, and the destroyers themselves were driven away by fire. By 19.40, the Russian cruisers managed to break through, and by 20.20 they ceased fire on the Askold, as the Japanese ships became invisible in the growing darkness. The damage to the cruiser turned out to be quite significant. Only 4 152 mm guns remained in serviceable condition. At night we managed to restore another one. Gun No. 10, although in good working order, could not fire, since the shell that exploded under it destroyed the reinforcements and the deck. 75-mm cartridges, which were lying in gazebos on the elevator rails of the battery deck in the officer's compartment, exploded when they were hit by shrapnel. Both rangefinder stations were out of order due to electrical wires broken in many places, and 10 combat dials were broken.
Cruiser "Novik"
IN top part The fifth chimney was hit by a large shell, which caused a flame to blaze from the ashpits in the fifth stoker room during the battle, and the compartment was filled with smoke. However, traction was quickly restored due to excess pressure. The fragments flying through the armor grille pierced the casing and several water-heating tubes of boiler No. 8. There was some minor steaming, but the boiler was left in operation for the duration of the battle. The three middle pipes of the cruiser, which escaped hits, were heavily damaged by shrapnel.
Head of the cruiser detachment, Rear Admiral N.K. Reitzenstein
The Askold had four small underwater holes on the starboard side and two on the left. In addition, there were several surface holes. Crew losses were 11 killed and 48 wounded.
Since the main attention was attracted by the lead Askold, the Novik received only three surface holes, apparently inflicted by the cruisers of the 3rd combat detachment. Crew losses were 2 killed and one wounded. In the evening after the battle on Novik, interruptions in the operation of refrigerators began. At about 23.00, the salinity of the boiler water on the cruiser increased, and Novik was forced to slow down to inspect the refrigerators. The signal was sent to ask the Askold to slow down, but the flagship apparently did not understand it, and soon the Novik fell behind. During the night, the damage in the refrigerators was repaired, but the pipes in the boilers began to burst.
The next morning, the cruiser Askold could also reach a speed of no more than 15 knots, therefore, considering that the ship in this condition could not take the fight, Reitzenstein decided to call at Shanghai to repair the damage, and then go to Vladivostok.
On July 30, "Askold" dropped anchor at the mouth of the Vuzung River. A few days later an order was received from St. Petersburg to disarm the ship.
The day after the battle, the cruiser Novik entered the port of Qingdao to replenish coal supplies. After this, the commander of the cruiser M.F. von Schultz decided to lead the cruiser to Vladivostok around Japan. On August 7, the cruiser entered the roadstead of the village of Korsakovsky post on the island. Sakhalin to replenish coal reserves, at the exit from which it was intercepted by the IJN cruiser Tsushima. During the ensuing battle, the Novik received serious damage, forcing it to return to the Korsakov post, where it was scuttled by the crew.
Diana's departure
Despite the fact that “Diana”, due to its slow speed, lagged behind “Askold” and “Novik”, its commander, Captain 2nd Rank Prince A.A. Lieven still decided to follow the order of his commander and go for a breakthrough. He considered that this could only be done at night, since the low speed of the ship would not allow him to break away from the enemy.
With the onset of darkness at about 20.00, "Diana" crossed the course of the squadron and the floor to the east, to where the main forces of the Japanese fleet had just been. The cruiser was followed by the destroyer Grozovoy. 10 minutes after the turn, four Japanese destroyers came out from the bow corners towards the Russian ships. They dodged the fired torpedoes with a sharp turn, exposing the stern.
Cruiser "Diana"
Since the commander of the Diana was a miner by profession, he knew that it was very difficult to detect and attack a ship sailing without lights at night. Therefore, they avoided attacks by maneuvering, trying not to open fire. When destroyers appeared from the bow corners, they turned towards them, threatening them with a ram; when they appeared from the stern corners, they were transferred behind the stern. During one of the attacks, at about 22.15, the cruiser almost rammed one of the Japanese destroyers. The attacks stopped soon after.
The cruiser sailed all night in full swing, fearing persecution. In the morning, a meeting took place with the cruiser Novik, to which Grozovoy was sent for negotiations. Having found out Novik's intention to go to Qingdao, but fearing that Japanese ships would block it there, Lieven headed south. "Grozovoy", whose boilers and refrigerators were leaking, left with "Novik" for Qingdao.
Captain "Diana" A.A. Liven
A.A. Lieven was going to cross the Yellow Sea, and at night pass the Korean Strait at full speed, and then go to Vladivostok by economic means. But the increased consumption of coal due to its low quality, as well as the unsuccessful design of the coal pits (from the reserve pits located above the engine room, coal could not be supplied directly to the fireboxes - it was required to be reloaded manually through the upper deck) did not allow this intention to be realized.
Having refueled at the French bases of Kwan Chau Van and Haifang, “Diana” reached French Saigon on August 8 (21), where A.A. Lieven intended to repair the damage. The cruiser received two direct hits and a lot of damage from shrapnel. Crew losses were 5 killed and 20 wounded. On August 21 (September 3) “Diana” was interned.
"Tsesarevich"
After the battle, “Tsesarevich” was the last one in the squadron, but soon, due to a drop in thrust in the boilers due to a badly damaged stern pipe, it began to lag behind. Having finally left the squadron in the dark, having taken command, Shumov turned south, deciding to go to Vladivostok. At about 23.00, the commander of the battleship, Captain 1st Rank Ivanov, who had come to his senses, took command. At night, the battleship was attacked by several destroyers, which were successfully repulsed.
In the morning, having assessed the damage to the ship, Ivanov decided to call at the port of Qingdao to repair the damage. But on August 2 (15), the battleship was interned at the request of the German authorities.
In the second phase of the battle, the Tsarevich received more hits from enemy shells than in the first. The biggest troubles were caused by two successive hits of 12-inch shells on the foremast and conning tower, which first disabled the squadron headquarters and then the ship’s command. In addition, the steering gear, engine telegraph and all speaking pipes were disabled, and telephone communication remained with only one of the engine rooms.
In addition, a large shell hit the bow turret (without damage); another shell pierced the bunk nets and damaged the hull structures and the steam launch; another one - he smashed a bakery. Two shells hit the stern tube, and medium-caliber shells also hit the deck in the bow and the porthole located in front of the left bow turret of the 152 mm guns. After the Tsarevich was out of action, two more shells hit the poop deck.
Losses on the Tsesarevich during the battle amounted to 12 killed and 42 wounded.
Russian squadron after the battle
At night after the battle, the Russian squadron, returning to Port Arthur, was attacked by Japanese destroyers. However, none of the torpedoes they fired hit the target. In the morning, the battleships Retvizan, Peresvet, Pobeda, Sevastopol, Poltava, the cruiser Pallada, three destroyers and the hospital ship Mongolia returned to Port Arthur.
Fall of Port Arthur Shirokorad Alexander Borisovich
Appendix 2. Ships of the Japanese fleet (1904–1905)
Appendix 2.
Ships of the Japanese Navy (1904–1905)
Squadron battleships
"Mikasa"
Died on the night of September 12, 1905 in the port of Sasebo from an explosion of ammunition in the aft cellar. Raised on August 14, 1906 and, after repairs, put into service on August 24, 1908. On November 12, 1926, the Mikasa was converted into a memorial ship. The ship was brought into a pit specially dug and filled with water near the waters of the Yokosuka port, which was then covered with earth to the waterline. There they tried to restore the Mikasa to its original form, and from November 26, 1926 until 1945, the battleship was preserved as a relic. After World War II, the guns and superstructures on the battleship were dismantled, but the remaining hull was difficult to disassemble, and it stood until January 20, 1960. Then the Mikasa began to be restored again. On May 27, 1961, work was completed and Mikasa once again became a monument to the Japanese Navy and Admiral Togo at the Battle of Tsushima.
Normal displacement is 15,352 tons. Machines with a power of 16,000 hp. Coal reserve 700/1521 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 4600 miles.
Armament: 4 - 305/40 mm/club guns in barbette mounts; 14 - 152/40 mm/club guns (in casemates); 20 - 76/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/33-mm/klb guns; 4 underwater 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Asahi"
On October 13 (26), 1904, it hit a mine and was damaged. It was repaired in Sasebo until April 1905. In 1922–1923. disarmed. In 1926–1927 turned into a submarine base. On May 25, 1942, it was sunk by the American submarine Salmon near Cape Paderas.
Normal displacement is 15,200 tons. Machines with a power of 16,000 hp. Coal reserve 700/1549 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 305/40 mm/club guns in barbette mounts; 14 - 152/40 mm/club guns (in casemates); 20 - 76/40 mm/klb; 6 - 47/33-mm/klb guns; 4 underwater 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Shikishima"
Built in 1896 in England. Since 1921 - a coastal defense ship. In 1922 she was disarmed and reclassified as a training ship. Since 1923, transport, then blocking. Dismantled for metal in 1947.
Normal displacement is 14,850 tons. Machines with a power of 14,500 hp. Coal reserve 700/1722 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 5000 miles.
"Hatsuse"
Built in 1896 in England. On May 2 (15), 1904, 10 miles from Port Arthur, it was blown up by a Russian mine, was taken into tow by the Asahi, but was blown up by a second mine and sank instantly due to the detonation of the magazines.
Normal displacement is 15,000 tons. Machines with a power of 14,500 hp. Coal reserve 700/1900 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 5000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 305/40 mm/club guns in barbette mounts; 14 - 152/40 mm/club guns (in casemates); 20 - 76/40 mm/klb; 6 - 47/40 mm/klb (on mars); 8 - 47/33-mm/klb guns; 1 bow surface torpedo tube.
"Fuji"
Laid down on August 1, 1894 in England, launched on March 31, 1896, entered service on August 17, 1897. In 1910, she underwent repairs with the replacement of boilers and weapons and was reclassified as a coastal defense ship, being also a training ship. In 1922 it was disarmed, removed from the lists of the fleet and became a transport. Until 1945 it served as a residential block. Capsized during an American air raid on Yokosuka. Dismantled for metal in 1948.
Normal displacement is 12,533 tons. Machines with a power of 14,000 hp. Coal reserve 700/1200 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
"Yashima"
Laid down on December 28, 1894 in England, launched on February 28, 1896, entered service on September 9, 1897. May 2 (15), 1904 hit a mine near Port Arthur, was taken in tow, but sank.
Normal displacement is 12,320 tons. Machines with a power of 14,000 hp. Coal reserve 700/1200 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 305/40 mm/klb; 10 - 152/40 mm/klb; 20 - 47/40 mm/klb; 4 - 47/33-mm/klb guns; 5 - 457 mm torpedo tubes (1 bow surface, 4 onboard underwater). Since 1901, instead of 16 - 47/40 mm/club guns, 16 - 76/40 mm/club guns.
Coastal defense battleships
"Chin-Yen"
Laid down in 1880 in Stettin (Germany), launched on November 28, 1882. In 1885, commissioned into the Chinese fleet under the name "Zhen-Yuan". On February 12, 1895, it was captured by the Japanese during the surrender of the Weihaiwei naval base and renamed "Chin-Yen". In 1901, a major overhaul took place, but the vehicles and Krupp main caliber artillery remained the same. On April 1, 1911, the Chin-Yen was removed from the fleet lists and turned into a target ship.
Normal displacement is 7670 tons. Machines with a power of 6200 hp. The speed at full speed was initially 14.5 knots, but by 1905 it gave no more than 11 knots. Coal reserve 650/1000 tons. Cruising range 4500 miles.
Armament (after 1901): 4 - 305/20-mm/club in barbette installations; 4 - 152/40 mm/klb; 2–57/40-mm/klb; 8 - 47/40 mm/klb guns; 2 - 37 mm revolver guns. Before 1901; 4 - 305/20-mm/klb; 2 - 150/30 mm/klb; 8–10-lb; 2 - 6-pound guns.
"Fuso"
Laid down in England in September 1875, launched on April 20, 1877, entered service in 1878. In combat in 1904–1905. did not participate, but was used as a training ship, as well as for coastal protection. Since 1908 there has been a fire guard.
Normal displacement is 3800 tons. Machines with a power of 3932 hp. Coal reserve 250/360 tons. Speed at full speed initially 13 knots, by 1904 - about 10 knots. Cruising range 4500 miles.
Armament: initial: 4–240/30 mm/klb Krupp; 2 - 170/25-mm/klb Krupp; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. Since 1894: 4–240/30 mm/clb; 4 - 152/40 mm/klb; 11 - 47/40 mm/klb; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. Since 1900: 2 - 152/40 mm/clb; 4 - 120/40 mm/klb; 11 - 47/40 mm/klb; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
Armored cruisers
"Kasuga"
Laid down on March 10, 1902 in Genoa (Italy), launched on October 22, 1902, entered service on January 7, 1904. Since 1927 a training ship, since 1942 a blockade. Sunk by American aircraft in Yokosuka on July 18, 1945. Dismantled for metal in 1946–1948.
Normal displacement is 7628 tons. Machines with a power of 13,500 hp. Coal reserve 581/1190 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 5500 miles.
Armament: 1 - 254/45 mm/clb; 2 - 203/45 mm/klb; 14 - 152/40 mm/klb; 10 - 76/40 mm/klb; 6 - 47/40 mm/klb; 2 machine guns; 4 surface 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Nissin"
Laid down in May 1902 in Genoa (Italy), launched on February 9, 1903, entered service on January 7, 1904. Since 1927, a training ship and base in Yokosuka. In 1935 he was expelled from the fleet. Sunk as a target in 1936. The hull was scrapped in 1936. Normal displacement is 7698 tons. Engines have a power of 13,500 hp. Coal reserve 581/1190 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 5500 miles.
Armament: 1 - 254/45 mm/clb; 4 - 203/45 mm/klb; 14 - 152/40 mm/klb; 10 - 76/40 mm/klb; 4 - 47/40 mm/klb; 2 machine guns; 4 surface 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Izumo"
Laid down in May 1898 in England, launched on September 19, 1899, commissioned on September 25, 1900. In 1921, reclassified as a coastal defense ship. In 1932–1942 flagship of the fleet operating in China. Since July 1942, 1st class cruiser, since 1943, training ship. Sunk by aircraft in Kura on July 28, 1945. In 1947, dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 9750 tons. Machines with a power of 14,500 hp. Coal reserve 600/1402 tons. Full speed 20.75 knots. Cruising range 4900 miles.
"Iwate"
Laid down in May 1898 in England, launched on March 29, 1900, entered service on March 18, 1901. Since 1921, a coastal defense ship, since 1923, a training ship, since 1942, a 1st class cruiser, since 1943 .training ship. Sunk by aircraft in Kura on July 24, 1945. Dismantled for metal in 1947.
Normal displacement is 9750 tons. Machines with a power of 14,500 hp. Coal reserve 600/1412 tons. Full speed 20.75 knots. Cruising range 4900 miles.
Armament: 4 - 203/40 mm/klb; 14 - 152/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 4 underwater 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Asama"
Laid down in November 1896 in England, launched on March 22, 1898, entered service on March 18, 1899. Since 1921, a coastal defense ship, since 1937, a training ship. Dismantled for metal in 1947.
"Tokiwa"
Laid down in January 1898 in England, launched on July 6, 1898, entered service on May 18, 1899. Since 1921, a coastal defense ship. Since September 30, 1922 minelayer. Sunk by American aircraft at Maizuru on August 8, 1945. The hull was dismantled for metal in 1947.
Normal displacement is 9700 tons. Machines with a power of 18,000 hp. Coal reserve 600/10406 tons. Full speed 21.5 knots. Cruising range 4600 miles.
Armament: 4 - 203/40 mm/klb; 14 - 152/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 5 - 457 mm torpedo tubes (4 underwater and 1 surface bow).
"Azuma"
Laid down in March 1898 in France, launched on June 24, 1899, entered service on July 28, 1900. Since 1914, a training ship. In 1921, the 4-152 mm cannons and all small-caliber guns were removed. Since 1941 it has been blocked. On July 18, 1945, he was seriously damaged during an American air raid. In 1946 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 9278 tons. Machines with a power of 17,000 hp. Coal reserve 600/1275 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 3900 miles.
Armament: 4 - 203/40 mm/klb; 12 - 152/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 5 - 457 mm torpedo tubes (1 bow surface and 4 underwater).
"Yakumo"
Laid down in March 1898 in Germany, launched on July 18, 1899, entered service on June 20, 1900. Since 1921, a coastal defense ship, then a training ship. In 1942, she was reclassified as a 1st rank cruiser. In 1946 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 9735 tons. Machines with a power of 15,500 hp. Coal reserve 600/1242 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 5000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 203/40 mm/klb; 12 - 152/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 5 - 457 mm torpedo tubes (1 surface bow and 4 underwater).
"Chyoda"
Laid down in November 1888 in England, launched on June 3, 1890, entered service in December 1890. Modernized in 1898 (new boilers were installed, combat tops were removed). On July 13 (26), 1904, it was blown up by a mine in Takhe Bay and was towed to Dalny, where it underwent repairs. Since 1912, a 2nd class coastal defense ship. Submarine base since 1920. Expelled from the fleet in 1922, sunk as a target on August 5, 1927.
Normal displacement is 2400 tons. Machines with a power of 5600 hp. Coal reserve 240/420 tons. Full speed 19 knots. (since 1898 21 knots). Cruising range 6000 miles.
Armament: 10 - 120/40 mm/clb; 14 - 47/40 mm/klb; 3 machine guns; 3 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
Armored cruisers
"Kasagi"
Laid down in March 1897 in the USA, launched on January 20, 1898, entered service in December 1898. Since 1910, a training ship. On July 20, 1916, she was wrecked in the Tsugaru Strait and finally abandoned on August 13, 1916.
Normal displacement is 4900 tons. Machines with a power of 15,000 hp. Coal reserve 350/1000 tons. Full speed 22.5 knots. Cruising range 4200 miles.
"Chitose"
Laid down on May 16, 1897 in the USA, launched on January 23, 1898, entered service on March 1, 1899. Disarmed in 1922, served in coastal defense until 1928. Sunk as a target on July 19, 1931 in Sakki Bay.
Normal displacement is 4760 tons. Machines with a power of 13,492 hp. Coal reserve 350/1000 tons. Full speed 22.75 knots. Cruising range 4500 miles.
Armament: 2 - 203/40 mm/klb; 10 - 120/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 6 - 47/33 mm/klb; 5 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Takasago"
Laid down in April 1896 in England, launched on May 18, 1897, entered service on April 6, 1898. November 30 (December 13), 1904, hit a Russian mine 37 miles from Port Arthur, sank the next day.
Normal displacement: 4160 tons. Machines with a power of 15,500 hp. Coal reserve 350/1000 tons. Full speed 22.5 knots. Cruising range 5500 miles.
Armament: 2 - 203/40 mm/klb; 10 - 120/40 mm/klb; 12 - 76/40 mm/klb; 6 - 47/33 mm/klb; 5 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Ioshino"
Laid down in February 1892 in England, launched on December 20, 1892, entered service in September 1893. On May 2 (15), 1904, rammed by the cruiser "Kasuga" near Cape Shantung and sank.
Normal displacement is 4150 tons. Machines with a power of 15,000 hp. Coal reserve 400/1000 tons. Full speed 23 knots. Cruising range 9000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 152/40 mm/klb; 8 - 120/40 mm/klb; 22 - 47/40 mm/klb; 5 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Tsushima"
Laid down on October 1, 1901 in Japan, launched on December 15, 1902, entered service on February 14, 1904. On August 22 (September 4), 1904, it was blown up by a mine and was repaired. In 1922, it was re-equipped and reclassified as a coastal defense ship. Partially disarmed in 1930. Since 1936, a training ship. In 1939 he was completely disarmed. In 1944, it was seriously damaged during an American air raid, and in 1947 it was dismantled for metal.
"Niitaka"
Laid down on January 7, 1902 in England, launched on November 15, 1902, entered service on January 27, 1904. Since 1921, a coastal defense ship. On August 26, 1922 he died in a typhoon off the coast of Kamchatka.
Normal displacement is 3366 tons. Machines with a power of 9500 hp. Coal reserve 250/600 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
Armament: 6 - 152/45 mm/clb; 10 - 76/40 mm/klb; 4 - 47/33 mm/klb.
"Otova"
Laid down on January 3, 1903 in Japan, launched on November 2, 1903, entered service on September 6, 1904. On July 25, 1917, it crashed off the coast of Japan and was lost.
Normal displacement is 3000 tons. Machines with a power of 10,000 hp. Coal reserve 270/575 tons. Full speed 21 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
Armament: 2 - 152/45 mm/klb; 6 - 120/40 mm/klb; 4 - 76/40 mm/klb; 2 machine guns.
"Suma"
Laid down in August 1892 in Japan, launched on March 9, 1895, entered service in December 1896. Disarmed in 1922, removed from the fleet list in 1923, dismantled for metal in 1928.
Normal displacement is 2657 tons. Machines with a power of 8500 hp. Coal reserve 200/600 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
"Akashi"
Laid down in August 1894 in Japan, launched on December 18, 1897, entered service in March 1899. On November 27 (December 10), 1904, it was blown up by a Russian mine 11 miles from the island. Encounter Rock has been renovated. Disarmed in 1922, removed from the navy list in 1923, and sunk as a target in August 1930.
Normal displacement is 2756 tons. Machines with a power of 8500 hp. Coal reserve 200/600 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 4000 miles.
Armament: 2 - 152/40 mm/clb; 6 - 120/40 mm/klb; 12 - 47/40 mm/klb; 4 canisters; 2 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Akitsushima"
Laid down in March 1890 in Japan, launched on July 6, 1892, entered service in February 1894. In 1921, it was excluded from the lists of the fleet and became a submarine base. In 1927 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 3100 tons. Machines with a power of 8400 hp. Coal reserve 500/800 tons. Full speed 19 knots.
Armament: 4 - 152/40 mm/klb; 6 - 120/40 mm/klb; 10 - 47/40 mm/klb; 4 canisters; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Itsukushima"
Laid down in January 1888 in France, launched on July 11, 1889, entered service in August 1891. Since 1906 - a training ship, in 1919 excluded from the lists of the fleet and in 1922 dismantled for metal.
Armament: 1–320/38 mm/klb; 11 - 120/38 mm/klb; 6 - 57 mm; 12 - 37 mm; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Matsushima"
Laid down in February 1888 in France, launched on January 22, 1890, entered service in March 1891. Since 1906, a training ship. On April 30, 1908, he died in Mako harbor from an ammunition explosion.
Normal displacement is 4217 tons. Machines with a power of 5400 hp. Coal reserve 405/680 tons. Full speed 16.5 knots. Cruising range 5500 miles.
Armament: 1–320/38 mm/klb; 12–120 mm; 16 - 57 mm; 6 - 37 mm; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Hasidate"
Laid down in September 1888 in Japan, launched on March 24, 1891, entered service in June 1894. Since 1906, a training ship. Excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1923, dismantled for metal in 1927.
Normal displacement is 4217 tons. Machines with a power of 5400 hp. Coal reserve 405/680 tons. Full speed 16.5 knots. Cruising range 5500 miles.
Armament: 1–320/38 mm/klb; 11 - 120/38 mm/klb; 6–57 mm; 12 - 37 mm; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Naniva"
Laid down on March 27, 1884 in England, launched on March 18, 1885, entered service on December 1, 1885. After the Sino-Japanese War, it was rearmed and the combat tops were removed. Since 1907, a minelayer. On July 26, 1912 he died on the rocks near Fr. Urup.
Armament: 2–260/35 mm/klb Krupp; 6–150/35-mm/Klb Krupp; 6 - 47 mm; 14 cards; 4 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. (In 1900, instead of 6-150/35-mm/klb, 6 - 152/40-mm/klb guns were installed. In 1903, the armament was: 8 - 152/40-mm/klb; 6 - 47/40- mm/klb; 2 machine guns; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.)
"Takachiho"
Laid down on April 10, 1884 in England, launched on May 16, 1885, entered service on March 26, 1886. After the Sino-Japanese War, it was rearmed and the combat tops were removed. Since 1907, a minelayer. On October 17, 1914, she was sunk by the German destroyer S-90 during the siege of Qingdao.
Normal displacement is 3650 tons. Machines with a power of 7500 hp. Coal reserve 350/800 tons. Full speed 18 knots. Cruising range 8000 miles.
Armament: 2–260/35 mm/klb Krupp; 6–150/35-mm/Klb Krupp; 6–47 mm; 14 cards; 4 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. (In 1900, instead of 6-150/35-mm/klb, 6 - 152/40-mm/klb guns were installed. In 1903, the armament was: 8 - 152/40-mm/klb; 6 - 47/40- mm/klb; 2 machine guns; 4 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.)
"Izumi"
Laid down on April 5, 1881 in England, launched on June 6, 1883, entered service on July 15, 1884. Purchased by Japan in 1894. In 1899 and 1901 it underwent modernization (tops were removed, new boilers and rapid-fire guns were installed guns). Removed from the navy list on April 1, 1912.
The normal displacement is 2920 tons (in 1901 - 2800 tons). Machines with a power of 5500 hp. (after 1901 - 6500 hp). Coal reserve 400/600 tons. Full speed 18 knots. (after 1901 - 18.25 knots). Cruising range 2200 miles.
Armament: 2 - 254/32-mm/Armstrong class; 6 - 152/26-mm/Armstrong klb; 2 - 57 mm; 5 - 37 mm; 2 canisters; 3 - 381 mm torpedo tubes (1 bow and 2 onboard). In 1899, instead of 6 152/26 mm/club guns, 6 rapid-fire 120/40 mm/club guns were installed. In 1901, the weapons were: 2 - 152/40 mm/klb; 6 - 120/40 mm/klb; 2 - 57 mm; 6 - 47 mm; 3 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Sayen"
Laid down in 1880 in Germany, launched in 1883, entered service in 1885. Former Chinese armored cruiser Ji-Yuan. On February 12, 1895, it was captured by the Japanese at Weihaiwei. Reclassified as a gunboat. On November 17 (30), 1904, it hit a mine near Golubinaya Bay and sank.
Normal displacement is 2300 tons. Machines with a power of 2800 hp. Coal reserve 230/300 tons. Full speed 15 knots. Cruising range 1000 miles.
Armament: 2–210/30 mm/klb; 1–150/35-mm/klb; 4 - 75/30 mm/klb (all Krupp companies); 6 - 37 mm; 4 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. In 1898, small-caliber guns were replaced with 8 - 47/40 mm/klb, and 381 mm torpedo tubes with 457 mm.
Armored gunboat
"Hey-Yen"
Laid down in 1883 in China, launched in June 1888, entered service in 1889. Former Chinese armored cruiser Ping-Yuan. On February 12, 1895, it was captured by the Japanese at Weihaiwei. During the Russo-Japanese War it was used as a coastal bombardment ship. On September 5 (18), 1904, it hit a mine and sank 1.5 miles from the island. Iron.
Normal displacement is 2150 tons. Machines with a power of 2400 hp. Coal reserve 350 tons. Full speed 10.5 knots. Cruising range 3000 miles.
Armament: 1 - 260/22-mm/klb Krupp; 2–150/35-mm/klb Krupp; 4 - 457 mm surface torpedo tubes. After rearmament: 1 - 260/22 mm/klb; 2 - 152/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47/40 mm/klb; 4 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
Armorless cruisers
"Takao"
Laid down in October 1886 in Japan, launched on October 15, 1888, entered service on November 16, 1889. During the Russo-Japanese War it was used as a coastal defense ship. In 1907 it was rearmed. On April 1, 1911, she was removed from the lists of the fleet and reclassified as a hydrographic vessel. In 1918 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 1778 tons. Machines with a power of 2330 hp. Coal reserve 300 tons. Full speed 15 knots. Cruising range 3000 miles.
Armament: 4 - 150/35 mm/klb Krupp; 1 - 120/25-mm/klb Krupp; 1 - 57 mm; 2 machine guns; 2 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. (Since 1901: 4 - 152/40 mm/klb; 2 - 47/40 mm/klb; 6 machine guns; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.)
"Tsukushi"
Laid down on October 2, 1879 in England, launched on August 11, 1880, entered service in June 1883. Purchased by Japan in 1885. During the Russo-Japanese War it was used as a coastal defense ship. Removed from the lists in 1907, reclassified as a training ship, and scrapped in 1910.
Normal displacement is 1350 tons. Machines with a power of 2600 hp. Coal reserve 250/300 tons. Full speed 16 knots. Cruising range 3000 miles.
Armament: 2 - 245/32-mm/Armstrong class; 4 - 120/35 mm/Armstrong klb; 2 - 9-pound guns; 4 - 37 mm, 2 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. In 1898, small-caliber guns were replaced by 1 - 76/40 mm/klb; 2 - 47/40 mm/klb; 2 machine guns; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
Screw-driven corvettes
"Katsuragi"
Laid down in December 1882 in Japan, launched on March 31, 1885, entered service in October 1887. In 1898, reclassified as a coastal defense ship, in 1900, re-equipped with the removal of the mast. In 1907, she was reclassified as a hydrographic vessel and re-equipped with 4 - 76/40 mm/klb guns. Scrapped in 1913
"Musashi"
Laid down in October 1884 in Japan, launched on March 30, 1886, entered service in February 1888. In 1898, reclassified as a coastal defense ship, in 1900, re-equipped with the removal of the mast. In 1907, she was reclassified as a hydrographic vessel and re-equipped with 4 - 76/40 mm/klb guns. Scrapped in 1930
Normal displacement is 1478 tons. Machines with a power of 1622 hp. Coal reserve 100/145 tons. Full speed 13 knots.
Armament: 2 - 170/35 mm/clb; 5 - 120/35 mm/klb; 1 - 75/30 mm/klb (all Krupp companies); 4 canisters; 2 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. (In 1900: 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 6 machine guns; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.)
"Yamato"
Laid down in February 1883 in Japan, launched in April 1885, entered service in October 1887. In 1898, reclassified as a coastal defense ship, in 1900, re-equipped with the removal of the mast. In 1907, she was reclassified as a hydrographic vessel and re-equipped with 4 - 76/40 mm/klb guns. Scrapped in 1931
Normal displacement is 1478 tons. Machines with a power of 1622 hp. Coal reserve 100/145 tons. Full speed 13 knots.
Armament: 2 - 170/35 mm/clb; 5 - 120/35 mm/klb; 1 - 75/30 mm/klb (all Krupp companies); 4 canisters; 2 - 381 mm surface torpedo tubes. (In 1900: 8 - 47/33 mm/klb; 6 machine guns; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.)
"Ternu"
Laid down in January 1878 in Japan, launched in September 1883, entered service in March 1885. During the Sino-Japanese War it was used as a transport, during the Russian-Japanese War - as a coastal defense ship. Removed from the lists in 1906
Normal displacement is 1525 tons. Machines with a power of 1267 hp. Coal reserve 204 tons. Full speed 12 knots.
Armament: 2 - 150/22 mm/clb; 4 - 120/25 mm/klb; 1 – 75 mm (all Krupp companies); 4 cards.
"Kaimon"
Laid down in August 1877 in Japan, launched in September 1882, entered service on April 13, 1884. During the Sino-Japanese War it was used as a transport, during the Russian-Japanese War - as a coastal defense ship. On June 22 (July 5), 1904, he was blown up by a Russian minefield in Talienvan Bay near the island. Dasinypandao and sank.
Normal displacement is 1358 tons. Machines with a power of 1267 hp. Coal reserve 197 tons. Full speed 12 knots.
Armament: 1 - 170/35 mm/clb; 6 - 120/25 mm/klb; 1 – 75 mm (all Krupp companies); 5 cards.
"Tsukuba"
Laid down in 1851 in Burma, launched on April 9, 1853, entered service in 1854. Former English corvette Malacca.
Purchased in 1870. Since 1900 a training ship. In the Russo-Japanese War it was actively used to support troops. Removed from the lists and dismantled in 1906.
Normal displacement is 1947 tons. Machines with a power of 526 hp. Full speed 10 knots. (by 1905 - 8 knots).
Armament: 6 - 114 mm; 2 - 30-lb; 2 - 24-lb (since 1892, 4 rapid-fire 152/40-mm/klb guns).
Gunboats
"Uji"
Laid down in September 1902 in Japan, launched on March 14, 1903, entered service in August 1903. Intended for operations on rivers and off the coast. Participated in the battle with the Russians on May 1 (14), 1904 on the river. Yalu. Excluded from the lists and dismantled for metal in 1932.
Normal displacement is 620 tons. Machines with a power of 1000 hp. Coal reserve 150 tons. Full speed 13 knots.
Armament: 4 - 76/40 mm/club guns; 6 machine guns.
"Oshima"
Laid down in August 1889 in Japan, launched in September 1891, entered service in March 1892. On May 3 (16), 1904, near Port Arthur, it collided with the Akagi in the fog and sank.
Normal displacement is 630 tons. Machines with a capacity of 1216 knots. Fuel capacity 140 tons. Full speed 16 knots.
Armament: 4 - 120/40 mm/klb; 5 - 47/40 mm guns.
"Mayan"
Laid down in May 1885 in Japan, launched on August 18, 1886, entered service in December 1887. Delisted in April - May 1908, dismantled in 1913–1914.
Armament: 2 - 150/25 mm/club guns; 2 machine guns.
"Chokay"
Laid down in December 1885 in Japan, launched on September 20, 1887, entered service in October 1888. Delisted in April - May 1908, dismantled in 1913–1914.
Normal displacement is 612 tons. Machines with a power of 960 hp. Coal reserve 60 tons. Full speed 12 knots.
"Atago"
She was laid down in July 1886 in Japan, launched in June 1887, and entered service in March 1889. On October 24 (November 6), 1904, she hit a rock near Port Arthur and sank.
Normal displacement is 612 tons. Machines with a power of 960 hp. Coal reserve 60 tons. Full speed 12 knots.
Armament: 1 - 210/22 mm/clb; 1 - 120/25-mm/club gun; 2 machine guns.
"Akagi"
Laid down in June 1886 in Japan, launched in August 1888, entered service in July 1890. Delisted in April - May 1908, dismantled in 1913–1914.
Normal displacement is 612 tons. Machines with a power of 960 hp. Coal reserve 60 tons. Full speed 12 knots.
Armament: 4 - 120/25 mm/klb; 6 - 47/40 mm/klb guns.
"Iwaki"
Laid down in February 1877 in Japan, launched in July 1878, entered service in August 1880. During the Russo-Japanese War it was used to support troops. In 1907, it was excluded from the lists of the fleet and was used to protect fisheries. In 1913 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 656 tons. Machines with a power of 659 hp. Coal reserve 60/120 tons. Full speed 10 knots.
Armament: 1 - 150/22 mm/klb; 1 - 120/25 mm/klb; 2 - 80 mm guns (all Krupp companies); 3 cards.
Gunboats of the "Chinchu" type "Chinchu", "Chimpen", "Chinto", "Chinhoku", "Chinnan", "Chinsei"
Built 1878–1881 in England. Former Chinese gunboats. February 12, 1895 captured by the Japanese at Weihaiwei. During the Russo-Japanese War they were used to defend ports. Removed from the lists in 1906, scrapped in 1906–1907.
Displacement 440–490 tons. Engine power 380–455 hp. Coal reserve 60 tons. Full speed 10.2–10.4 knots. Cruising range 1400 miles.
Armorless cruisers (advice)
"Yayeyama"
Laid down in June 1887 in Japan, launched in March 1889, entered service in March 1892. Wrecked near Nemoro on May 11, 1902. On September 1, 1902, it was removed from the shore and repaired with the replacement of boilers. The renovation was completed after the start of the Russo-Japanese War. Excluded from the lists in 1906, used for experiments with oil boilers, dismantled for metal in 1911.
Normal displacement is 1584 tons. Machines with a power of 5400/5630 hp. Coal reserve 350 tons. Full speed 21/20.7 knots. Cruising range 5000 miles.
Armament: 3 - 120/40 mm/klb; 8 - 47 mm; 2 - 381 mm torpedo tubes.
"Tatsuta"
Laid down in January 1893 in England, launched on April 6, 1894, entered service on July 24, 1894. Torpedo gunboat. On the way to Japan it was confiscated and returned only in December 1896. Since 1898, the advice note. May 2 (15), 1904 sat on the stones near Fr. Eliot, was removed a month later, repaired by September. Since 1918, the submarine base and repair ship has been renamed Nagau-ra-Maru. In 1925 it was dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 830 tons. Machines with a power of 5000 hp. (since 1903 4700 hp). Coal reserve 152/228 tons. Full speed 21 knots. (since 1903 20.5 knots). Cruising range 3000 miles.
Armament: 2 - 120/40 mm/klb; 4 - 47/40 mm/klb; 5 - 356 mm surface torpedo tubes.
"Miyako"
Laid down in March 1894 in Japan, launched in October 1898, entered service in March 1899. On May 1 (14), 1904, she died on a Russian mine near Port Arthur. After the war, the hull was raised and scrapped.
Displacement 1722 tons. Machines with a power of 6130/4140 hp. Coal reserve 400 tons. Full speed 20/18 knots. Cruising range 5000 miles.
"Chihaya"
Laid down in May 1898 in England, launched on May 26, 1900, entered service in September 1901. Before the Russo-Japanese War, the torpedo tubes were removed. Delisted in 1927 and reclassified as a training ship. The hull remained afloat on the Kura until 1945.
Displacement 1243 tons. Machines with a power of 6000/5700 hp. Coal reserve 123/344 tons. Full speed 21/21.43 knots.
Armament: 2 - 120/40 mm/klb; 4 - 76/40 mm/klb; 5 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
Destroyers (fighters)
"Ikazuchi", "Inazuma", "Oboro", "Akebono", "Sazanami", "Niji"
Built 1899–1900 in England. Actively participated in the Russo-Japanese War. The Ikazuchi was lost in a boiler explosion on October 10, 1910. The Inazuma was lost in December 1909 in a collision with a schooner. "Akebono" tender since 1918, broken up in July 1921. "Oboro" on October 20 (November 2), 1904, was blown up by a mine near Cape Liaoteshan, was repaired, since 1918 - a tender, broken up in 1921. "Sazanami" was broken up in 1921.
Normal displacement is 306 tons. Machines with a power of 6000 hp. Coal reserve 40/110 tons. Full speed 31 knots.
"Kasumi"
Built in England 1901–1902. Removed from the lists in 1913, served as a target until the 1920s, then scrapped.
Normal displacement is 363 tons. Machines with a power of 6500 hp. Coal reserve 40/89 tons. Full speed 31 knots.
Armament: 1 - 76/40 mm/klb; 5 - 57 mm; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. In 1905, the 57-mm bow gun was replaced with a 76/40-mm/klb.
"Akatsuki"
Normal displacement is 363 tons. Machines with a power of 6500 hp. Coal reserve 40/89 tons. Full speed 31.3 knots.
Armament: 1 - 76/40 mm/klb; 5 - 57 mm; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. In 1905, the 57-mm bow gun was replaced with a 76/40-mm/klb.
"Murakumo", "Sinonome", "Yugiri", "Kagero", "Shiranui", "Usugumo"
Built in England 1897–1900. "Murakumo" was thrown ashore by a typhoon on May 10, 1909, repaired, and after 1921 served as a base for minesweepers and destroyers. "Sinonome" was thrown ashore by a typhoon on May 10, 1909, repaired, and lost in a typhoon on July 20, 1913 near the island. Formosa. "Yugiri" collided with "Harusame" in the Battle of Tsushima, received heavy damage, was repaired, and since 1921 has been a base for minesweepers and destroyers. "Shiranui" and "Kagero" were excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1918, served as tenders, dismantled in 1923. "Usugumo" was thrown ashore in July 1913, repaired, excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1922, dismantled in 1923
Normal displacement is 275 tons. Machines with a power of 5470 hp. Coal reserve 40/80 tons. Full speed 30 knots.
Armament: 1 - 76/40 mm/klb; 5 - 57 mm; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. In 1905, the 57-mm bow gun was replaced with a 76/40-mm/klb.
"Shirakumo", "Asashio"
Built in England in 1901–1902. Excluded from the lists of the fleet in April 1922, disarmed in Kura in 1923 and dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 342 tons. Machines with a capacity of 7000 liters. Coal reserve 40/95 tons. Full speed 31 knots.
Armament: 1 - 76/40 mm/klb; 5 - 57 mm; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes. In 1905, the 57-mm bow gun was replaced with a 76/40-mm/klb.
"Harusame", "Hayatori", "Murasame", "Asagiri", "Ariake", "Arare", "Fubuki"
Built in Japan in 1902–1905, and three of them (“Ariake”, “Arare”, “Fubuki”) were launched after the start of the Russo-Japanese War: December 7, 1904, April 5, 1905. and January 21, 1905, respectively. The first Japanese-built destroyers.
"Harusame" was seriously damaged by a mine explosion on October 11 (24), 1904, southeast of Port Arthur, and died in a storm in the Sea of Japan on November 24, 1911. "Hayatori" died on August 21 (September 3), 1904, by a mine at 2 miles from Longwantan Cape near Port Arthur. The remaining ships in 1921–1925 excluded from the lists of the fleet and dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 375 tons. Machines with a power of 6000 hp. Coal reserve 40/100 tons. Full speed 29 knots. Cruising range 1200 miles.
Armament: 2 - 76/40 mm/klb; 4 - 57 mm; 2 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
Destroyers 1st class
"Hayabusa", "Chidori", "Manazuru", "Kasasaga"
Built 1899–1901 in France, collected in Japan in 1900–1901. Excluded from the navy lists in 1919–1923.
"Hato", "Aotaka", "Kari", "Tsubami", "Hibari", "Kiji", "Otori", "Kamone", "Hashitaka", "Sagi", "Uzura"
Built 1902–1904 in Japan. Excluded from the navy lists in 1919–1923.
Normal displacement is 152 tons. Machines with a power of 3500 hp. Coal reserve 26 tons. Full speed 28 knots. Cruising range 2000 miles.
Armament: 1 - 57 mm; 2–42 mm; 3 - 457 mm torpedo tubes.
"Kotaka"
Built 1885–1886 in England. Assembled in Japan 1886–1888. In April 1908, she was excluded from the lists of the fleet and was used as an auxiliary vessel. January 27, 1927 scrapped.
Normal displacement is 203 tons. Machines with a power of 1600 hp. Coal reserve 30 tons. Full speed 19.5 knots.
Armament: 4 - 37 mm 4-barrel guns; 6 - 381 mm torpedo tubes.
"Fukuryu"
Built in Germany in 1885–1886. Former Chinese "Fulung". Captured by the Japanese on February 8, 1895 at Weihaiwei. In 1908, it was excluded from the lists of the fleet and dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 120 tons. Machines with a power of 1015 hp. Coal reserve 14/24 tons. Full speed 20 knots.
Armament: 2 - 37 mm; 4 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
"Shirataka"
Built in Germany in 1897–1898. Collected in Japan 1899–1900. In 1923, it was excluded from the lists of the fleet and dismantled for metal.
Normal displacement is 127 tons. Machines with a power of 2600 hp. Coal reserve 30 tons. Full speed 28 knots.
Armament: 3 - 47 mm revolver guns; 3 - 356 mm torpedo tubes. Then: 1 - 76/40 mm/klb and 2 - 57 mm guns.
Destroyers 2nd class
№ 21, № 24
No. 21 was built in 1891–1895. in Le Havre (France), and No. 24 was built in 1894–1895. in Japan (in Kure) from French materials. Removed from the lists of the fleet in 1911 and scrapped.
Normal displacement is 80 tons. Machines with a power of 255 hp. Coal reserve 10 tons. Full speed 21 knots. Cruising range 1800 miles.
Armament: 1 - 47 mm; 3 - 381 mm torpedo tubes.
Built in Germany, assembled in Japan 1894–1895. Removed from the lists of the fleet in 1913 and scrapped.
Normal displacement is 85 tons. Machines with a power of 1000 hp. Coal reserve 24 tons. Full speed 21 knots. Cruising range 300 miles.
Armament: 2 - 37 mm revolvers; 3 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
№ 29, № 30
Built in France, assembled in Japan 1898–1900. No. 29 was excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1916, and No. 30 in 1913. They were scrapped.
Normal displacement is 88 tons. Machines with a power of 2000 hp. Coal reserve 15. Full speed 26 knots.
Armament: 1 - 47 mm; 3 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
№ 31–38; № 44–49; № 60, № 61
Nos. 31–38 built in Germany, assembled in Japan 1899–1900. Nos. 44–49, 60, 61 were built in Japan from German materials in 1900–1901. No. 48 was killed by a Russian mine near Dalny on April 30 (May 12), 1904. No. 34 and No. 35 were sunk by artillery of Russian ships on the night of May 15 (28), 1905. No. 47 sank during a typhoon on September 22–23, 1912. No. 31, 32, 36, 37, 44, 45, 46 were excluded from the fleet lists in 1913 and were used for auxiliary purposes before being scrapped. No. 33 was killed by a German mine on November 11, 1914 in Kiao Chao Bay. No. 49, 60, 61 were excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1915 and scrapped.
Normal displacement is 89 tons. Machines with a power of 1200 hp. Coal reserve 15 tons. Full speed 24 knots. Cruising range 2100 miles.
№ 39–43; № 62–66
Built in England. Collected 1899–1902 in Japan. No. 42 was sunk by the destroyer "Angry" on December 2 (15), 1904 in White Wolf Bay near Port Arthur. No. 66 was blown up by a Russian mine on November 10 (23), 1904 near Cape Liaoteshan, repaired, excluded from the lists of the fleet in 1916 and scrapped. Nos. 39–41,43, 62–65 were excluded from the fleet lists in 1913 and were used for auxiliary purposes before being scrapped.
Normal displacement is 102 tons. Machines with a power of 1920 hp. Coal reserve 25 tons. Full speed 26 knots. Cruising range 1600 miles.
Armament: 2 - 47 mm; 3 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
№ 67–75
Built 1901–1904 in Japan according to the drawings of the Yarrow company (England). No. 67 received heavy damage on April 20 (May 3), 1904 near Cape Liaoteshan, was repaired, removed from the lists in 1922 and scrapped. No. 69 May 15 (28), 1905, rammed by the destroyer Akatsuki-2 and sank. No. 68, 70–75 in 1922–1923. excluded from the lists of the fleet and scrapped.
Normal displacement is 87 tons. Machines with a power of 1200 hp. Coal reserve 26.5 tons. Full speed 23.5 knots.
Armament: 2 - 47 mm; 3 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
Destroyers 3rd class
№1–4
Built in England, assembled in Japan 1878–1880. Since May 1899 they were used to guard ports, in 1904 they were excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Displacement 40 tons. Machines with a power of 430 hp. Full speed 22 knots.
№ 5–14; № 17–19
Built in France, assembled in Japan 1890–1894. No. 8, 9.14 seriously damaged in attack by Weihaiwei on 4 February 1895, repaired. No. 16 was lost in a storm on May 11, 1895.
In the Russo-Japanese War they were used for coastal defense. Excluded from the navy lists in 1907–1910. and scrapped.
Displacement 54 tons. Machines with a power of 130 hp. Coal reserve 8.3 tons. Full speed 20 knots. Cruising range 200–500 miles
№ 15, № 20
Built in France, assembled in Japan 1891–1893. Removed from the lists in 1910 and scrapped.
Displacement 52 tons. Machines with a power of 657 hp. Coal reserve 5 tons. Full speed 21 knots.
Armament: 2 - 37 mm; 2 - 381 mm torpedo tubes.
Displacement 66 tons. Machines with a power of 338 hp. Coal reserve 5 tons. Full speed 13.8 knots.
Armament: 2 - 37 mm; 2 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
Built in 1894 in Germany for China. Captured by the Japanese at Weihaiwei on February 7, 1895. In 1908, she was removed from the lists of the fleet and scrapped.
Displacement 74 tons. Machines with a power of 442 hp. Coal reserve 5 tons. Full speed 15.5 knots.
Armament: 2 - 37 mm; 2 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
№ 50–59
Built in Japan 1899–1902. according to French drawings. No. 51 died on the rocks 9 miles from the island. Sanshandao June 15 (28), 1904 No. 53 died on a mine on December 1 (14), 1904 during a night attack of the battleship Sevastopol. The rest were excluded from the fleet lists in 1912–1915. and scrapped.
Displacement 52 tons. Machines with a power of 660 hp. Coal reserve 14 tons. Full speed 20 knots.
Armament: 1 - 47 mm; 2 - 356 mm torpedo tubes.
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Ships of the Russian fleet - participants in the Russo-Japanese War. There is probably no more disappointing defeat in Russian history.
1st rank cruiser "Askold"
Laid down in 1898 in Kiel (Germany). Shipyard - "Germany" (Deutschland). Launched in 1900. Entered service in 1902. In 1903 he went to the Far East. One of the most actively operating ships. In July 1904, he took part in an unsuccessful breakthrough to Vladivostok. Together with the cruiser Novik (later sunk in Korsakov Bay on Sakhalin), he managed to escape the encirclement. Unlike Novik, Askold went to the nearest port - Shanghai, where he was interned until the end of the war. After the end of the Russo-Japanese War, he became part of the Siberian Flotilla and was stationed in Vladivostok. During WWI he participated in various military operations together with Allied ships against the squadron of Admiral Spee. After that, he went to the Mediterranean Sea, participated in the Dardanelles operation (a joint operation of Allied ground and naval forces against Ottoman Empire, whose goal was a breakthrough to Constantinople, ended in the failure of the coalition forces despite the numerical advantage over the Ottomans). After which he went to Toulon, where he was undergoing repairs (spring 1916 - summer 1917). From Toulon the cruiser went to Murmansk, where it became part of the Arctic Ocean fleet. In 1918, in the Kola Bay, it was captured by the British and became part of the British fleet under the name "Glory IV". In 1922 it was bought by Soviet Russia. Due to the unsatisfactory condition of the hull and mechanisms, it was decided to sell the cruiser for scrap. Also in 1922, "Askold" was dismantled for metal in Hamburg.
During the Dardanelles operation, Askold fought alongside the British cruiser HMS Talbot - the same one that the Varyag team switched to.
before launching
hull "Askold" (left) in the water
at the outfitting wall - installation of the bow pipe, 1901
the cruiser has almost taken on its final form, winter 1901
drydocking in the Blom & Foss floating dock, Hamburg, 1901
sea trials, 1901
additional installation of the navigation bridge, autumn 1901, Kiel, Germany
acceptance tests. Since the cruiser has not yet been enlisted in the navy, there is a state (tricolor) flag on the flagpole, and not a naval (Andreevsky) flag
in the Kiel Canal, 1902
Great Kronstadt raid, 1902
already part of the Baltic Fleet, 1902
Dalian Bay, 1903
Port Arthur, 1904. The cruiser has already been repainted in the standard combat paint of the Pacific formations of those years - dark olive
on a combat course, 1904
during the Dardanelles operation, 1915
in Toulon, 1916
as part of the Arctic Ocean flotilla, 1917
note from the magazine "Niva", 1915
drawing and axonometric projection, "Modelist-Constructor" magazine. An axonometric view of anti-mine networks shows them in combat position
"Askold" during service on the Baltic Sea, modern drawing
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during service in the Pacific Ocean
livery of the cruiser "Askold" during combat operations in the Mediterranean Sea
Laid down at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg on September 5, 1899, launched on July 21, 1901 and commissioned on June 20, 1904. Before moving to Libau and further to the Far East, it was equipped with a Guards crew.
In the Battle of Tsushima he led a column of Russian ships. Having received heavy damage to the bow, it gave way to the lead ship of the Borodino EBR. Due to the loss of speed, he found himself under fire from the armored cruisers Nissin and Kassuga. A fire broke out on board. Water entering through the holes worsened the situation and at 18:50 on May 14, 1905, the ship capsized and sank. The entire crew died. In the same year, he was formally excluded from the lists of the fleet.
Before leaving for Port Arthur, captain 1st rank, crew commander of the Imperator Alexander III"Nikolai Mikhailovich Bukhvostov said 2:
You wish us victory. Needless to say, how much we wish for her. But there will be no victory! I'm afraid that we will lose half the squadron along the way, and if this does not happen, then the Japanese will defeat us: they have a more serviceable fleet and they are real sailors. I guarantee one thing - we will all die, but we will not give up.
The squadron reached the Tsushima Strait without losses, and died there. But the honor remained untarnished. N. M. Bukhvostov and his crew died all together. Your coffin is an armadillo. Your grave is the cold depths of the ocean. And your faithful sailors' family is your centuries-old guard... 1
squadron battleship "Emperor Alexander III"
before launching, 1901
during outfitting work at the Baltic Shipyard
transition from St. Petersburg to Kronstadt
in the dry dock of Kronstadt, 1903
at the Kronstadt roadstead, 1904
August 1904
on the Revel roadstead, September 1904
view of the starboard side, a crane with a steam boat is given away
at one of the stops during the transition to the Far East, from left to right - EDB "Navarin", EDB "Emperor Alexander III", "Borodino"
The armored cruiser "Rurik" is the last ship of its class with full sail weapons in the Russian Navy
The last Russian cruiser with full sails. Development of the project "Memory of Azov". The subsequent ships - "Russia" and "Gromoboy" - became the development of this project (initially it was planned to build them according to the same project as the "Rurik"). The main task is to conduct combat operations and raiding operations on British and German communications. The peculiarity of the ship was that when loading additional coal reserves, it could travel from St. Petersburg to the nearest Far Eastern bases for additional coal loading at a 10-knot speed.
Construction began at the Baltic Shipyard in St. Petersburg in September 1889. Officially laid down in May 1890. Launched October 22, 1892. Entered service in October 1895. Transferred from the Baltic Sea to the Far East to the 1st Pacific Squadron,
arrived in Nagasaki on April 9, 1896. He was part of the Vladivostok cruiser detachment. In the battle on August 1, 1904 near Fr. Ulsan was flooded by the crew as a result of the damage received. Of the 796 crew members, 139 were killed and 229 were injured.
on a voyage, view of the deck from the top of the foremast
painting the side in preparation for the show 
on a hike
"Rurik" in black paint
"Rurik" in Nagasaki, 1896
in the eastern basin of Port Arthur
in the dock of Vladivostok 
Port Arthur
cruiser on a voyage, Far East
the cruiser's stem - the decoration of the bow is clearly visible - the legacy of the "nose figures" of sailing ships
squadron battleship "Sevastopol"
Laid down on March 22, 1892. Launched May 25, 1895. Entered service on July 15, 1900. Participated in the battle in the Yellow Sea. On December 20, 1904, on the eve of the surrender of Port Arthur, it was scuttled by its crew. The last ship of the Poltava class.
near Galerny Island before being transferred for completion to Kronstadt, 1898
"Sevastopol" and "Petropavlovsk" in Vladivostok, 1901
on the right (near the wall) is the Sevastopol EDB. A crane carries a faulty 12-inch gun from the Tsarevich, Port Arthur, 1904
EDB "Sevastopol" on the march
"Sevastopol", "Poltava" and "Petropavlovsk" near the wall of the eastern basin of Port Arthur, 1901-1903
ventilation deflector torn by a shell, 1904
in Port Arthur. Ahead - stern to the photographer - "Tsesarevich", in the distance in the background - "Askold"
in Port Arthur, campaign of 1904, on the right is the stern of the Sokol-class destroyer, on the left is the stern of the Novik
after being hit by a Japanese torpedo in White Wolf Bay, December 1904
sailors leave for the land front. after this, the Sevastopol EDB will be sunk in the internal roadstead of Port Arthur on the eve of the surrender of the fortress
Squadron battleship "Sevastopol", color postcard
Armored cruiser of rank II "Boyarin"
Laid down at Burmeister og Wein, Copenhagen, Denmark in early 1900. The official laying took place on September 24, 1900. On May 26, 1901 it was launched.
Entered service in October 1902. On October 27, 1902, the cruiser left Kronstadt and on May 10, 1903, arrived in Port Arthur.
It was blown up by a Russian mine near the port of Dalniy on January 29, 1904 (6 people died). The team abandoned the ship, which remained afloat for another two days and only sank after a repeated explosion at a minefield.
still under the Danish flag, sea trials, 1902
1902 - St. Andrew's flag is already on the flagpole. Before moving to Kronstadt.
"Boyarin" in the Far East, 1903 
in the Denmark Strait, 1903
in Toulon
Port Arthur, 1904
Armored cruiser II rank "Boyarin", photo postcard
1 - these are stanzas from the poem "In Memory of Admiral Makarov". Its author is S. LOBANOVSKY, a cadet of the Vladimir Kyiv Cadet Corps, graduated in 1910. It is completely engraved on the pedestal of the monument to Admiral Stepan Osipovich Makarov in Kronstadt. But these drains are a memory to all those who remained with their crew, with their ship, until the last. Such as N. M. Bukhvostov, S. O. Makarov and many others...
Sleep, northern knight, sleep, honest Father,
Taken by untimely death, -
Not laurels of victory - crown of thorns
You accepted with a fearless squad.
Your coffin is an armadillo, your grave
Cold depths of the ocean
And faithful sailors' native family
Your age-old protection.
Shared laurels, from now on with you
They also share eternal peace.
The jealous sea will not betray the land
A hero who loved the sea -
In a deep grave, in a mysterious darkness
Cherishing him and peace.
And the wind will sing a dirge over him,
Hurricanes will cry with rain
And the shroud will be spread with a thick cover
There are thick fogs over the sea;
And the clouds, frowning, the last fireworks
The thunder will be given to him with a roar.
Let me remind you that Admiral Makarov died along with the Petropavlovsk nuclear submarine, which was blown up by a mine in Vladivostok. The Russian battle painter Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin (author of the paintings “The Apotheosis of War”, “Before the Attack at Plevna”, “Napoleon on the Borodino Heights”, “Skobelev at Plevna”, etc.) also died along with the ship.
2 - who regularly follows the TV project "Living History" of the TV channel "Channel 5 - St. Petersburg", could have heard this quote in one of the parts of the film about the Russian fleet "Yablochko". True, Sergei Shnurov shortened it - he removed the words regarding the loss of ships during the voyage.
