Defense of Shipka and siege of Plevna. “The fall of Plevna decided the whole issue of the war
From the Bulgarian appeal Central Committee to the Bulgarian people
Brothers! Hordes of Turkish monsters drowned our protest in blood and committed those unheard-of atrocities for which there is no justification, atrocities that shocked the whole world. Our villages were burned: mothers, loved ones, children were dishonored and slaughtered without pity; priests crucified on crosses; the temples of God were desecrated, and the fields were strewn with innocent bloodied victims. We bore the martyr's cross for a whole year, but amidst the indescribable oppression and suffering, hope glimmered and strengthened us. The hope that never left us for a minute was the great Orthodox Rus'.
Brothers! It was not in vain that we waited for her powerful support, a year has passed, she comes and asks for an account for the blood of the martyrs.
Soon the victorious Russian banners will rise in our fatherland, and under their shadow the beginnings of a better future will be laid.
The Russians are coming unselfishly, like brothers, to help, to do now the same thing that they previously did to liberate the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs.
Bulgarians! Let us all meet the liberating brothers as one and assist the Russian army...
COURSE OF EVENTS
During the siege of Plevna, four battles were fought: the first three were attacks on the tour. fortifications, the fourth - the last attempt of Osman Pasha to break through the battle formations of the besiegers. July 20, 1877 vanguard of the corps of General. Schilder-Schuldner numbering 6,500 people. attacked the defensive fortifications north and east of Plevna; the Russians lost two-thirds of their officers and approx. 2000 soldiers. The second battle took place on July 30, when Gen. Kridener with two Russian divisions (30,000 people) attacked the tour. redoubts to the north and east of the city; gene. Shakhovskoy commanded the offensive. The attack on the Grivitsky redoubt (north of Plevna), which turned out to be completely unsuccessful, was led by Kridener himself; Shakhovskoy by 17.30 captured two redoubts located east of the fortress, but even before darkness they were retaken by the Turks, and the Russians retreated, suffering defeat along the entire front. Their losses amounted to 169 officers and 7,136 soldiers, including 2,400 who were left dead on the battlefield. 11 and 12 September an army of 95,000 people besieging the city. under the command of Grand Duke Mikhail attacked Plevna from three sides. Osman Pasha at that time had 34,000 people under his command. 11 Sep. the attack on the Omerbey redoubt was repulsed, Russian losses amounted to 6,000 people. Skobelev captured two of the six internal redoubts that protected the corner of the fortress from the southwest. 12 Sep. The attack on the second Grivitsky redoubt was repelled, and after a fierce battle, the two redoubts captured by Skobelev were again occupied by the Turks. As a result of the two-day battle, Russian losses amounted to 20,600 people, including 2,000 prisoners, from the tour. sides - 5000. 10 Dec. Osman Pasha, at the head of a 25,000-strong detachment, with 9,000 wounded and recovering in carts, tried to break through the Russian army besieging the city, which by this time numbered 100,000 people. (under the nominal leadership of the Romanian Prince Karol, chief of staff - General Totleben). Having successfully crossed the river. Vit, Osman attacked the Russian troops on a two-mile front and captured the first line of field fortifications. However, Totleben hastily sent reinforcements there, and the Turks, in turn, were attacked and driven back across the river in disorder; Osman was seriously wounded. Here the Turks are last time tried to gain a foothold, but were crushed and pushed back to Plevna; the city capitulated before evening after 143 days of defense. In this battle, the Turks lost 5,000, the Russians - 2,000 killed and wounded. The Russian army continued its movement deep into the Balkan Peninsula.
SKOBELEV UNDER THE PLEVNA
...He was extremely popular in Russian society. “Our Achilles,” said I.S. about him. Turgenev. Skobelev’s influence on the mass of soldiers could only be compared with the influence of. The soldiers idolized him and believed in his invulnerability, since he, who spent his entire life in battle, was never wounded. Soldiers' rumor “certified” that Skobelev knew a conspiracy word against death (“in Turkestan he bought it from a Tatar for 10 thousand gold”). Near Plevna, a wounded soldier told his comrades: “The bullet went through him (Skobelev - N.T.), nothing to him, but it wounded me.”
N. Troitsky
UNSTOPPABLE "HURRAY!"
At the end of November, the Turks left the fortress and tried to break through the Russian defense lines in one of the sections and join the main forces of their army. But they failed. They were stopped, attacked and surrounded by reserves of Russian troops that quickly arrived from other areas.
On command, the troops quickly moved apart, and as soon as the Turks rushed into the space open to them, forty-eight copper throats threw fire and death into their solid and crowded ranks... Buckshot with an angry whistle burst into this living mass, leaving another mass along the way, but already either motionless, lifeless, or writhing in terrible agony... The grenades fell and exploded - and there was nowhere to escape from them. As soon as the grenadiers noticed that the fire on the Turks had the proper effect... they rushed at a quick pace with a bang. Once again bayonets crossed, once again the copper jaws of the guns roared, and soon the countless crowd of the enemy fell into disorderly flight... The attack proceeded brilliantly. The retreaters hardly fired back. Redif and Nizam, bashi-buzouks and cavalrymen with Circassians - all this was mixed into one sea of \u200b\u200bhorses and lava, uncontrollably rushing back...
At the head of his best camps, himself in front, Osman Pasha rushed in to try one last time to break through our lines. Each soldier who followed him fought for three... But everywhere... a wall of menacing bayonets grew in front of him, and an uncontrollable “hurray!” thundered right in the pasha’s face. Everything was lost. The duel was ending... The army must lay down its arms, fifty thousand of the best fighting troops will be eliminated from the already significantly thinned resources of Turkey...
Nemirovich-Danchenko V. I. Year of the war. Diary of a Russian correspondent, 1877-1878, St. Petersburg, 1878
ALL RUSSIA REJOICES
The battle on November 28 with Osman Pasha decided the fate of his army, which had so steadfastly resisted all the efforts of our weapons for almost 8 months. This army, with its worthy commander at its head, numbering 40 thousand, surrendered to us unconditionally...
I am proud to command such troops and must tell you that I cannot find words to adequately express my respect and admiration for your military prowess.
Bearing with full consciousness of your sacred duty all the difficulties of the blockade service near Plevna, you completed it in battle on November 28, like real heroes. Remember that I am not alone, but all of Russia, all its sons are rejoicing and rejoicing at your glorious victory over Osman Pasha...
Commander of the Grenadier Corps, Lieutenant General P.S. Ganetsky
A. Kivshenko. Surrender of Plevna (Wounded Osman Pasha before Alexander II). 1880. (Fragment)
RUSSIAN WINNERS
Emperor Alexander, who was in Tuchenitsa, having learned about the fall of Plevna, immediately went to the troops and congratulated them... Osman Pasha, the “lion of Plevna,” was received by the sovereign and his senior commanders with distinction and delicacy. The Emperor said a few flattering words to him and returned the saber. Russian officers showed the captured marshal high respect at every opportunity.
On December 11, the Russians entered the conquered city, surrounded on all sides by mountains, lying completely in a basin opening only to the west... The sanitary situation of the city was simply terrifying. Hospitals, mosques and other buildings were overflowing with corpses, dying sick and wounded. These unfortunates were left without help and charity; Great energy and dedication were required to separate the living from the dead and establish at least some order.
On December 15, the emperor left the theater of military operations, returning to St. Petersburg, where he was received with indescribable delight.
MONUMENT TO THE HEROES OF PLEVNA
From an appeal to the troops about the opening of a voluntary subscription for the monument to the heroes of Plevna
Serving as a tribute of deep respect to the memory of those who fell in this battle, the erected monument will serve to maintain high military feelings in future descendants: valor, bravery and courage, and for the peoples of the Balkan Peninsula - a reminder that they owe their freedom and new life to the Christian generosity of the Russian people, who redeemed their liberation through the blood of faithful sons.
December 10, 1877 during the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. Russian troops, after a difficult siege, captured Plevna, forcing the surrender of the 40,000-strong Turkish army. This was an important victory for Russia, but it came at a considerable cost.
“Defeated. Memorial Service"
Heavy battles near Plevna, which cost the Russian army tens of thousands of killed and wounded, are reflected in painting. The famous battle painter V.V. Vereshchagin, who was a participant in the siege of Plevna (one of his brothers was killed during the Third assault on the fortress, and the other was wounded), dedicated the canvas “The Vanquished. Requiem service." Much later, after the death of V.V. Vereshchagin himself in 1904, another participant in the events near Plevna, scientist V.M. Bekhterev, responded to this picture with the following poem:
The entire field is covered with thick grass. Not roses, but corpses cover him. The priest stands with his head naked. While swinging the censer he reads... And the choir behind him unanimously, drawlingly sings one prayer after another. He pays eternal memory and sorrow to all those who fell for their homeland in battle.
Under a hail of bullets
One of the factors that determined the high losses of the Russian army during the three unsuccessful assaults on Plevna and a number of other battles for the capture of Turkish strongholds around this fortress was the high density of fire from the Turkish infantry.
Often, Turkish soldiers had two types of firearms at the same time - an American Peabody-Martini rifle for long-range shooting and Winchester repeating carbines for close combat, which made it possible to create high density fire.
Of the famous battle paintings where the Turks are depicted simultaneously with rifles and carbines is the painting by A. N. Popov “Defense of the Eagle’s Nest by the Oryol and Bryants on August 12, 1877” (events at the Shipka Pass) - the appearance of the Turkish soldiers near Plevna was similar .
In the 16th division
Associated with the name of Mikhail Dmitrievich Skobelev a whole series bright episodes of the Russian-Turkish war. Noteworthy is the preparation of Skobelev's 16th division for the crossing of the Balkans after the capture of Plevna. Firstly, Skobelev rearmed his division with Peabody-Martini rifles, which were taken in huge quantities from the Plevna arsenals.
Most Russian infantry units in the Balkans were armed with the Krynka rifle, and only the Guard and the Grenadier Corps had more modern Berdan rifles. Unfortunately, other Russian military leaders did not follow Skobelev’s example.
Secondly, Skobelev, using the shops (warehouses) of Plevna, provided his soldiers with warm clothing, and when moving to the Balkans also with firewood - therefore, moving along one of the most difficult areas Balkan - At the Imetli pass, the 16th division did not lose a single person to frostbite.
Troop supply
The Russo-Turkish War and the siege of Plevna were marked by enormous difficulties in military supply, which, under very dark circumstances, was entrusted to the Greger-Gerwitz-Cogan Partnership. The siege of Plevna was carried out in extremely difficult conditions of the beginning of the autumn thaw. Diseases increased and there was a threat of famine.
Up to 200 people were out of action every day. During the war, the size of the Russian army near Plevna constantly increased, and its needs increased. Therefore, in September 1877, two civilian transports were formed, consisting of 23 departments of 350 horse-drawn carts each, and in November 1877, two more transports, consisting of 28 departments of the same composition. By the end of the siege of Plevna in November, 26 thousand 850 civilian carts and a large number of other vehicles were involved in the transport. Fighting The autumn of 1877 was also marked by the first appearance of field kitchens in the Russian army, much earlier than other European countries.
E. I. Totleben
After the Third unsuccessful assault on Plevna on August 30-31, 1877, the famous engineer, hero of the defense of Sevastopol E. I. Totleben was called to lead the siege work. He managed to establish a tight blockade of the fortress, destroy Turkish water mills in Plevna by releasing streams of water from open dams, depriving the enemy of the opportunity to bake bread. The outstanding fortifier did a lot to improve the life of the troops besieging Plevna, preparing the Russian camp for the inclement autumn and the approaching cold weather.
Refusing frontal attacks on Plevna, Totleben organized constant military demonstrations in front of the fortress, forcing the Turks to maintain significant forces in the first line of defense and suffer heavy losses from concentrated Russian artillery fire. Totleben himself noted: “The enemy is only defensive, and I conduct continuous demonstrations against him so that he assumes on our part the intention to storm.
When the Turks fill the redoubts and trenches with men, and their reserves approach, I order volleys of a hundred or more guns to be fired. In this way I am trying to avoid losses on our part, thereby inflicting daily losses on the Turks.”
War and diplomacy
After the capture of Plevna, Russia once again faced the threat of war with England, which was extremely sensitive to any Russian successes in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Back in July 1877, the English fleet was introduced into the Dardanelles. And after the fall of Plevna, English Prime Minister Disraeli even decided to declare war on Russia, but did not receive support from the cabinet.
On December 1, 1877, a memorandum was sent to Russia threatening to declare war if Russian troops occupied Istanbul. In addition, it was deployed active work to organize collective international mediation (intervention) to conclude peace. However, at that time, Russia rejected such a development of events, indicating agreement only to direct Russian-Turkish negotiations.
Results
The siege and capture of Plevna by Russian troops became one of the key events of the war of 1877-78. After the fall of this fortress, the path through the Balkans was opened for Russian troops, and Ottoman Empire lost a first-class 50,000-strong army. Further rapid actions of the Russian troops made it possible to carry out a rapid transition through the Balkan Mountains and achieve the signing of the San Stefano Peace Treaty, which was beneficial for Russia. And yet, the siege of Plevna became part of the Russian military history as one of the bloodiest and most difficult. During the siege, the losses of Russian troops amounted to more than 40 thousand people killed and wounded.
On August 26 (September 7) the third battle of Plevna began. Russian troops numbered 46.5 thousand bayonets and 5.6 thousand sabers, Romanian troops - 29 thousand bayonets and 3 thousand sabers, Turkish troops - about 32.5 thousand The calculation was made for a long artillery preparation (4 days), during which Russian troops gradually approached the enemy’s fortified positions. But artillery preparation was ineffective due to the weak high-explosive effect of the shells.
Before launching an attack on Plevna, the Russian command decided to occupy Lovcha - important node roads leading to Plevna. Through Lovcha, Osman Pasha's troops maintained contact with Suleiman Pasha's army and received reinforcements. The capture of this point was supposed to ensure the upcoming attack on Plevna from the south.
Lovcha was defended by a Turkish detachment under the command of Rifat Pasha (consisting of about 8 thousand people with six guns). The detachment of Major General A.K. Imeretinsky (total number of more than 22 thousand people with 98 guns) was supposed to capture Lovcha. The Russians outnumbered the enemy almost three times in men, and their superiority in artillery was overwhelming. The main blow was delivered by the left column under the command of Major General M.D. Skobelev. The battle ended with the complete defeat of the enemy.
In the battle near Lovcha, the power of hand-held weapons and the unsuitability of old methods of attack were especially clearly revealed. The defensive fire required the attackers to advance in dashes. This was primarily understood by ordinary soldiers and junior commanders.
On the day of the battle of Lovcha, Osman Pasha made an attempt to help Rifat Pasha. With eighteen battalions (about 12 thousand people), he left the Plevna fortifications and attacked the positions of the 4th Corps southwest of Plevna. The Russians repelled the Turkish advance. Important role Artillery played a role in this. But the command missed the opportunity to defeat Osman Pasha’s detachment and burst into Plevna with a surprise attack on his shoulders. The commander of the 4th Corps, General P. D. Zotov, and the commander of the 9th Corps, General N. P. Kridener, did not take measures to ensure that; destroy the enemy in field battle, although they had superior forces. While the 4th Corps fought a stubborn battle, the 9th Corps passively followed the course of events. “Thus,” noted D. A. Milyutin, “and this time, when the enemy dared to stumble upon our two corps with 25 thousand, our strategists did not know how to take advantage of the favorable opportunity and beat the enemy, but were content with repelling him attack".
By this time, the troops of Osman Pasha, defending in the Plevna region, numbered 32 thousand people with 70 guns. The number of Russian-Romanian troops reached 84.1 thousand people with 424 guns. During the time that elapsed after the second assault on Plevna, the Turks strengthened their positions. Numerous strong points - redoubts, connected by continuous trenches in several tiers, represented a strongly fortified position. The approaches to the fortifications were under cross rifle and artillery fire. From the west, Plevna was not covered by fortifications, since here the approaches to the city were blocked by the Vid River.
The Russian command hoped to destroy enemy fortifications with a four-day artillery bombardment, and then begin an assault, delivering the main blow from the east. An auxiliary attack was planned from the south. When organizing the assault, an attempt was made for the first time to plan artillery preparation. However, this was a new matter, and it was not possible to fully implement it.
The artillery preparation, which involved 152 guns, lasted four days and was generally ineffective due to the weak high-explosive effect of the shells. The Turkish fortifications were not destroyed. The assault on August 30 had to begin after additional bombing. In addition, the disposition for the assault was sent out only a few hours before the start of the assault, and the troops did not have enough time to thoroughly organize the attack. The direction of the main attack was also chosen incorrectly. It was applied to the most fortified area. They did not take advantage of the opportunity to carry out a roundabout maneuver and attack Osman Pasha from the west, where he had almost no fortifications.
The timing of the assault was also poorly chosen. It rained all night and half a day on August 30th. It gave way to drizzling rain. The soil is wet. Visibility was poor. The assault should have been postponed. But it was the royal name day, and no one dared to make such a proposal. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the cabinet; Ministers P. A. Valuev wrote that “if not for the 30s, we would not have stormed Plevna.”
Bravery, courage and perseverance in achieving the goal were equally demonstrated by all participants in the assault. However, the offensive on the main direction was unsuccessful. But events developed favorably on the left flank, where a detachment under the command of M.D. Skobelev operated. Here the Russians managed to break through all enemy defense lines and reach the southern outskirts of Plevna. The soldiers, who had not slept for two days, were extremely tired. Due to the lack of an entrenching tool, it was not possible to secure it properly.
At this time, the Turkish command, concentrating superior forces against Skobelev, managed to push his detachment back to its original position.
So, despite the heroism and courage of the soldiers, the assault on Plevna was unsuccessful and led to large losses: among the Russian troops they reached 13 thousand people, among the Romanian troops - 3 thousand; Turkish losses were also significant.
After the unsuccessful assault on Plevna, the command decided to blockade the fortress and force its garrison to capitulate. Russian and Romanian troops besieged Plevna from the north, south and east. However, in the west and southwest, the paths for the enemy actually remained open. The Sofia road was especially important for the besieged garrison, along which Osman Pasha’s army received ammunition and food. In order to retain this important communication, the enemy positioned considerable forces along it. To completely block Plevna, it was necessary to interrupt communication with Sofia. For this purpose, a detachment was formed under the command of Gurko. With bold and energetic actions, the detachment completely drove the enemy off the road by October 20. From this; moment the city of Plevna found itself closely surrounded on all sides by allied Russian-Romanian troops.
On October 25, General Gurko proposed to the commander-in-chief a plan for crossing the Balkans: Its goal was to defeat the new enemy army that was being formed in the Orhaniye region and not give it the opportunity to come to the aid of Osman Pasha. At the same time, it was intended to provide routes to Southern Bulgaria for Russian troops.
The plan was approved and the offensive began in mid-November. Gurko's detachment now consisted of 50 thousand bayonets and sabers with 174 guns; his offensive developed successfully. Overcoming stubborn enemy resistance, the Russians reached the Balkan ridge by the end of November and stopped in front of the heavily fortified Arabkonak position.
Meanwhile, the situation of the besieged in Plevna became critical: food and ammunition supplies were running out, there was no fuel. The Bulgarian population of Plevna provided great assistance to the Russian siege troops. It provided information about the condition of the Turkish garrison, its supply of ammunition and food. Despite the brutal repressions, the Bulgarians often ran over to the Russians, bringing them valuable information about the state of affairs in Plevna.
On November 24, four days before the capitulation of the garrison, defectors Ilya Tsanev, Ivan Tsvetkov, Hristo Slavka, Toma Pavlov, Vena Nikolov said that each soldier of the garrison was given 100 g of bread, 20-25 g of meat and two ears of corn. corn per day, and there are up to 10 thousand sick Turks in the city. The Bulgarians Dmitry Georgiev, Ivan Kostov, Hristo Bozhnov, Kosto Hristov reported that the food in Plevna would only last for five to six days, that “Osman Pasha is thinking of breaking through these days... The Turks took all the shells and cartridges to the redoubts.” Having received such information, the Russian command took measures to repel enemy attempts to escape from Plevna.
Desperate, Osman Pasha actually decided to break through. On the night of November 28, (December 10) his troops set out from Plevna and crossed the river. View and, forming in columns, attacked the positions of the 3rd Grenadier Division at dawn. They pushed back parts of the division and even occupied the second line of defense, but soon they themselves came under crossfire and were unable to build on their success. The approaching reserves attacked them from all sides. The enemy, gripped by panic, fled, losing 6 thousand people killed and wounded. This failure completely demoralized Osman Pasha's army, and at 13 o'clock on the same day he capitulated. 10 generals, 2,128 officers and 41,200 soldiers surrendered; 77 guns were taken.
The fall of Plevna was of great importance. Now the Russian command could, without fear for its right flank, plan a decisive offensive through the Balkans.
“Not a single victory of ours,” wrote one of his contemporaries, “caused such noisy enthusiasm as the victory at Plevna. It is unlikely that the joy of the Russians would have manifested itself with greater force even if the capital of Constantinople had been captured.” The victory of the Russian-Romanian troops filled the hearts of the Bulgarians with joy and hope for imminent liberation. After the Russian army entered Plevna, the newspaper “Bulgarin” wrote: “The fall of Plevna, which became a significant holiday for us, will be written down in history in capital letters.”
Exhausted, having endured incredible hardships and hardships, the residents of Plevna presented their liberators with an address of gratitude on December 30, 1877, in which they expressed their delight at an exceptional event in the history of the city, in the history of the entire country. “The liberation of Pleven,” the address said, “is the dawn of the liberation of ancient Bulgaria. Pleven was the first to rise again, just as he was the last to die several centuries ago! This resurrection will forever remain in the memory of our descendants.”
Russian-Romanian troops suffered enormous sacrifices in the struggle for the liberation of Plevna. Every inch of earth is soaked in their blood. In the battles for Plevna, the Russians lost about 32 thousand, and the Romanians - 4.5 thousand people. Plevna became a symbol of the brotherhood of the Russian, Bulgarian and Romanian peoples.
Source: Barbasov A.P., Zolotarev V.A. About the past for the sake of the future. M., 1990)
November 28 (December 11 according to the “new style”), 1877. Capture of Plevna by Russian troops. Surrender of the Turkish army to Osman Pasha
Monument to the heroes of Plevna in Moscow (1887)
During the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878. For the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, the Turkish fortress of Plevna in Bulgaria was a serious threat to the right flank and rear of the Russian army, it riveted its main forces to itself and slowed down the offensive in the Balkans.
After a bloody four-month siege and three unsuccessful attacks, the besieged army of Osman Pasha ran out of food supplies, and on November 28 at 7 o’clock in the morning he made the last attempt to break through to the west of Plevna, where he threw all his forces. The first furious onslaught forced our troops to retreat from the forward fortifications. But artillery fire from the second line of fortifications did not allow the Turks to escape from the encirclement. The grenadiers went on the attack and drove the Turks back. From the north, the Romanians attacked the Turkish line, and from the south, General Skobelev burst into the city.
Osman Pasha was wounded in the leg. Realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he threw out a white flag in several places. When Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich appeared on the battlefield, the Turks had already surrendered. The last assault on Plevna cost the Russians 192 killed and 1,252 wounded, the Turks lost up to 4,000 people. 44 thousand surrendered, including Osman Pasha. However, by personal order of Emperor Alexander II, for the courage shown by the Turks, his saber was returned to the wounded and captured Turkish general.
In just four months of the siege and fighting near Plevna, about 31 thousand Russian soldiers died. However, this became a turning point in the war: the capture of this fortress allowed the Russian command to free up over 100 thousand people for the offensive, and a month later the Turks requested a truce. The Russian army occupied Andrianople without a fight and approached Constantinople, but the Western powers did not allow Russia to occupy it, threatening a severance of diplomatic relations (and England with mobilization). Emperor Alexander II did not risk a new war, since the main goal was achieved: the defeat of Turkey and the liberation of the Balkan Slavs. So it seemed. Negotiations have begun on this. On February 19, 1878, peace with Turkey was signed in San Stefano. And although the Western powers did not allow the complete unification of the Bulgarian lands to be achieved at that time, this war became the basis for the future independence of a united Bulgaria.
Battle of Plevna November 28, 1877
On the day of the tenth anniversary of the heroic battle, in the center of Moscow at the beginning of Ilyinsky Square, a chapel-monument to the grenadiers who fell in the battle near Plevna was consecrated. The chapel was built on the initiative and with voluntary donations from the surviving grenadiers who took part in the Battle of Plevna. The author of the project was academician of architecture V.O. Sherwood. The cast-iron octagonal chapel ends with a tent with an Orthodox cross trampling the Muslim crescent. Its side faces are decorated with 4 high reliefs: a Russian peasant blessing his grenadier son before a campaign; a Janissary snatching a child from the arms of a Bulgarian mother; a grenadier taking a Turkish soldier prisoner; a Russian warrior tearing the chains off a woman representing Bulgaria. On the edges of the tent there are inscriptions: “Grenadiers to their comrades who fell in the glorious battle near Plevna on November 28, 1877”, “In memory of the war with Turkey of 1877-78” and a list of the main battles - “Plevna, Kars, Aladzha, Hadji Vali” . In front of the monument there are cast-iron pedestals with the inscription “In favor of the crippled grenadiers and their families” (there were donation mugs on them). The interior of the chapel, decorated with polychrome tiles, contained picturesque images of saints Alexander Nevsky, John the Warrior, Nicholas the Wonderworker, Cyril and Methodius, and bronze plates with the names of the fallen grenadiers - 18 officers and 542 soldiers.
140 years ago, on September 11-12, 1877, the third assault on Plevna took place. During the stubborn and bloody battle, the Russian-Romanian troops achieved some successes. The breakthrough of Skobelev’s detachment on September 11 in the southern direction could have decided the outcome of the battle in favor of the Russian army. But the Russian high command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves. As a result, the Turks counterattacked the next day and drove our troops back. Third assault Turkish fortress ended in defeat for the Allies.
Preparing the assault
Simultaneously with organizing the attack on Lovcha, the Russian high command was preparing a new assault on Plevna. They planned to throw the Russian-Romanian Western detachment against the Turkish stronghold: 52.1 thousand Russians and 316 guns, 32 thousand Romanians and 108 guns. Total - 84.1 thousand people 424 guns. The army of the Turkish commander Osman Pasha numbered 32 thousand people and 70 guns. The Allies had great superiority in manpower and artillery. However, the task was very difficult. The Turks turned Plevna into a strong fortified area, consisting of a system of redoubts and trenches. The approaches to the fortifications were shot through. The most powerful fortifications were in the northeast and south.
The unsuccessful experience of the first two assaults on Plevna showed that it was impossible to take the fortress without first destroying the enemy defenses. Therefore, it was decided to subject enemy positions to heavy bombardment and only then launch an assault. The artillery was tasked with destroying enemy fortifications, suppressing Turkish artillery, and demoralizing the garrison. The general idea of using artillery was stated as follows: “Deploy strong artillery, including 20 siege weapons, and carry out preliminary infantry attacks, prolonged shelling of enemy fortifications, at the same time gradually approaching the enemy infantry position, supporting it by advancing to close range masses of field artillery and, having completely defeated the enemy fortifications and artillery with the mass of our artillery shells, then attack with infantry.” However, it was impossible to solve this problem, since there were no large-caliber guns or ammunition for them to destroy the Turkish fortifications. But the Russian command did not take this circumstance into account. Thus, serious mistakes were made already at the planning stage.
At 6 o'clock on August 26 (September 7), 1877, artillery preparation began. It lasted four days, until August 29 (September 10). On the right flank, 36 Romanian and 46 Russian guns took part in it. In the center are 48 Russian guns. No preparations were made on the left flank. The fire was directed at the most important fortifications of Plevna, but it was not effective enough. The artillery was unable to destroy the redoubts and trenches and disrupt the enemy’s defense system. At night they approached Turkish fortifications and the next day continued shelling enemy positions. Again, no tangible results were achieved. During the shelling, the Turks left the fortifications for shelter or to the rear, and returned at night and corrected all the damage.
On August 27 (September 8), Romanian troops captured the enemy’s forward trench at the Grivitsky redoubt. Great value there was an advance of Russian troops on the left flank, where two ridges of the Green Mountains were occupied on the southern approaches to Plevna. A cavalry detachment under the command of General Loshkarev advanced towards the fortified camp from the west. Attempts by Turkish troops to counterattack to push the enemy back to their original position did not achieve their goal.
On August 28 (September 9) artillery preparation continued. The prolonged shelling of the fortress led to a large consumption of ammunition. “Although our batteries have moved forward,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “and are generally operating successfully, a positive result is not yet noticeable, and meanwhile the chief of artillery, Prince Masalsky, is already complaining about the excessive consumption of charges and the difficulty of replenishing them in a timely manner. The flying and moving parks barely have time to deliver.” General Zotov gave instructions not to rush too much into the assault on the enemy’s fortified area, but to “patiently let the artillery do its job of destroying barriers, moral exhaustion and material disorganization of the defender.” It was decided to continue to bring the batteries closer to enemy positions, where the terrain allows for continued artillery preparation for some more time. However, four days of intensive artillery preparation did not produce serious results. Nevertheless, at the military council on August 29 (September 10), it was decided to begin the assault the next day.
Thus, on August 26 (September 7) - August 29 (September 10), Russian and Romanian guns fired at Turkish fortifications. Despite the duration of the artillery preparation and the large number of shells fired, it was not possible to inflict significant losses on the Turkish garrison; the damage to the Plevna fortifications was also insignificant; the Turks easily restored the damaged buildings in between shelling of their positions.
By this time, the allied forces were covering Plevna from the north, east and south. The right wing consisted of Romanian troops, with the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions on the heights north and north-east of Grivica, and the 2nd Division in reserve. In the center, between Grivitsa and Radishevo, was the 9th Corps, and between Radishevo and Tuchenitsky Stream - the 4th Corps. Left wing consisted of a detachment of Prince Imereti, which occupied the area between the Tuchenitsky stream and the village of Krishin. The general reserve of the Western Detachment was located behind the 4th Corps south of Radishevo.
Romanian troops with part of the forces of the 9th Army Corps (1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division) were supposed to attack from the northeast, with the aim of capturing the Grivitsky redoubts. The troops of the 4th Corps were given the task of attacking Plevna from the southeast, directing their main efforts to capture the Omar Bey Tabiy redoubt. The detachment of General M.D. Skobelev, allocated from the troops of Prince Imereti, was supposed to attack the enemy from the south. The assault was scheduled to begin at 3 p.m. The artillery was given the following tasks: “At dawn, from all batteries, open the most intense fire on enemy fortifications and continue it until 9 o’clock in the morning. At 9 o'clock, simultaneously and suddenly stop all firing at the enemy. At 11 o'clock in the afternoon, re-open increased artillery fire and continue it until one o'clock in the afternoon. From an hour to 2.5 hours, stop again at all batteries, and at 2.5 hours, begin an intensified cannonade again, stopping it only at those batteries whose action can be impeded by the advancing troops.”
The disadvantage of the operation plan was that the disposition was sent out only a few hours before the assault began, and the troops did not have enough time to carefully organize the attack. The direction of the main attack was also chosen incorrectly (as during previous assaults). The Allies planned to storm Plevna from the three most fortified sides. The opportunity to carry out a roundabout maneuver and attack the Turkish garrison from the western direction, where the Turks had almost no fortifications, was not used. The day of the third assault was also chosen poorly due to weather conditions. It rained all night and half a day on August 30 (September 11), 1877, then it gave way to drizzling rain. The soil was soaked, which prevented the movement of artillery and troops, and visibility was poor. The assault had to be postponed. But it was the royal name day, and no one dared to make such a proposal. In his memoirs, the former chairman of the Committee of Ministers P. A. Valuev wrote that “if not for the 30s, we would not have stormed Plevna.”
Storm
At 6 o'clock on August 30 (September 11), 1877, artillery preparation began. Thick fog covered the battlefield and hampered the artillerymen. As a result good plan It was not possible to fully implement the use of artillery on this day. The artillery was unable to fully support the advancing infantry.
On the right flank, at 15:00, Romanian troops launched an attack on two Grivitsky redoubts, which were located about 400 meters from each other. Suffering heavy losses from rifle and artillery fire, the Romanians attacked the fortifications three times, but were unsuccessful. The unfired Romanian soldiers, having encountered stubborn enemy resistance, were at a loss. Then the 1st Brigade of the 5th Infantry Division under the command of Lieutenant General M.V. Rodionov was brought forward to help them. With the arrival of the Russians, the Romanians perked up and went into battle again. Russian-Romanian troops launched a fourth attack and, at the cost of heavy losses, captured Grivitsky redoubt No. 1. The Turks tried to recapture the redoubt, but they were driven back. The Allies were unable to advance further. The Turks took measures to strengthen defense in this direction. “The Grivitsky redoubt remained behind us,” wrote D. A. Milyutin, “but the Turks managed to build new fortifications against it, while ours, having settled in the redoubt, did nothing all day to firmly establish themselves in it, and did not even bring in artillery into it."
On central section Due to an error, the attack began not at 15:00, as was the plan of the operation, but around noon. Russian troops came under heavy fire from the Omar redoubt. The Russian command consistently threw regiment after regiment into battle, but without success. Russian troops suffered heavy losses - about 4.5 thousand people. As a result, the Russian regiments went on the attack at different times, entered the battle in parts, and acted frontally. Such attacks were easily repelled by the enemy. The infantry offensive itself was poorly prepared by artillery. The strongest Turkish fortification in this direction, the Omar redoubt, was not destroyed.
Battle on the Romanian part of the redoubt at the village. Grivitsa. G. Dembitsky
The Russian troops achieved the greatest success on the left wing, where Skobelev’s detachment operated. Here the enemy occupied positions that the chief of staff of the Western detachment and its de facto leader, General P. D. Zotov, considered the “strategic-tactical key” of Plevna. They stretched from southwest to northeast, from a group of redoubts near the village of Krishin to the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts. Ahead of this position, Turkish troops occupied the third ridge of the Green Mountains. Skobelev considered the main task to be the capture of the Kavanlyk and Isa-Aga redoubts (they were later called Skobelevsky). At dawn, artillery preparation began, and at 10 o'clock our troops went on the offensive and knocked down the enemy from the third ridge of the Green Mountains. The Turks retreated.
General Skobelev began the main task - the assault on the two main Turkish fortifications in this direction. True, the nature of the terrain was not conducive to the success of the Russian troops. In order to reach the redoubts, the advancing troops had to descend along the gentle northern slope of the third ridge into a ravine in which the Zelenogorsk stream flowed on steep banks inaccessible to artillery. There was only one bridge across the stream. Having crossed the stream, it was necessary to climb a steep slope to a height where strong enemy fortifications No. 1 (Kavanlyk) and No. 2 (Isa-Aga) were located, which were connected by a deep trench. In front of the redoubts, on the slope, rifle trenches were located.
At about 3 p.m., Skobelev’s troops launched an assault on enemy fortifications. The Vladimir and Suzdal regiments advancing in the first echelon suffered heavy losses from enemy fire and lay down near the Zelenogorsk stream. Skobelev launched the second echelon - the Revel Regiment - into the attack. Our troops attacked again, but this attack was stopped by heavy fire from the Turkish army. Skobelev launched his last, third echelon - the Libavsky regiment and two rifle battalions - into the attack. And he himself led the attack. Our troops reached the enemy, hand-to-hand combat began. At 16:30, Russian troops took the Kavanlyk redoubt; after a stubborn battle, at 18:00 the Isa-Aga redoubt was occupied. Turkish troops, having received reinforcements from the reserve, made several attempts to knock out the enemy, but to no avail. The shooting continued throughout the night.
In fact, Skobelev’s detachment opened the road to Plevna itself. There were no longer any Turkish fortifications in front of the detachment's troops and the city. A situation was created in which the further development of the offensive gave the entire city into the hands of the Russians. Panic began in the ranks of the Turkish army; the enemy soldiers were tired of the fierce battle. However, Skobelev’s detachment also needed serious reinforcements. The soldiers had been fighting since the morning, they were tired, many had not slept for 2-4 days. The detachment lost a lot of people, the troops had to be brought together into combined teams with random commanders at their head. There were mountains of corpses everywhere. There was a groan from the wounded, whom there was no one to remove. Ammunition was running low. All reserves have been used. The soldiers could not even dig in, since there was no entrenching tool, but “despite fatigue, hunger, fatigue from battle, the soldiers felt the need to dig in and did not spare the rest of their strength for this. They dug, or rather, picked the ground with bayonets, cutlasses, scraped with mannequins, raked with their hands, just to somehow protect themselves from fire on three sides” (Kuropatkin. Actions of General Skobelev’s detachments in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1-878, part .I.). Even corpses of their own and Turkish soldiers were used to construct barriers.
Further development events depended on who would more accurately assess the situation and direct reserves to this area. Skobelev demanded that reinforcements be sent in a timely manner, but this was categorically refused. Neither the commander-in-chief nor Nepokochitsky agreed to expose the Bolgarenskoe highway; they did not believe that the Turks would dare to expose other directions in order to push back Skobelev’s detachment. The Russian high command had the opportunity to regroup forces to the south and take the city itself. But the Russian command refused to regroup forces to the south and did not support Skobelev’s detachment with reserves, believing that the assault had failed and there was no point in supporting the success of the Russian general. Although, by introducing fresh reserves on the Russian left flank, it was still possible to correct the errors of the attack plan and the failure of the troops of the right flank and center, achieving, albeit at an unnecessarily high cost, a decisive victory. Thus, the Russian command did not understand the benefits of the current situation created in connection with the breakthrough of the flank of the Turkish defense and Skobelev’s access to Plevna itself, and did not take advantage of the real opportunity to win a decisive victory. The breakthrough of fresh Russian troops into Plevna itself decided the outcome of the battle for the entire fortified area. Thus, the Russian command itself abandoned a sure chance of victory.
On August 31 (September 12), 1877, there were no active hostilities on the right flank and in the center. The Turks launched one attack on Grivitsky redoubt No. 1, but it was repelled. The Turkish commander-in-chief Osman Pasha, unlike the Russian command, correctly assessed the situation and, given the great danger from Skobelev’s detachment, which occupied two of the most important fortifications of the Turkish army near Plevna itself, decided to throw large forces against it. Osman Pasha almost completely strengthened his right flank, transferring 15 fresh battalions to this direction, taken from various defense sectors and from the general reserve of the Plevna garrison. The fulfillment of the Turkish commander's plan was facilitated by the inaction of the main forces of the Russian-Romanian army in other directions. At the same time, Skobelev’s detachment was not even supported by strong reinforcements so that he would retain these fortifications in the hands of the Russian army, which would help in a future offensive. Krylov, who temporarily commanded the 4th Corps, sent to the redoubts only the Shuisky regiment, exhausted by the battle on September 11 and weak (1300 people). In addition, the regiment was late; it had to be used only to cover the retreat of Skobelev’s detachment. Together with Shuisky, Krylov also sent the Yaroslavl regiment, but Zotov took him into his general reserve.
On the morning of August 31 (September 12), the Turks launched a decisive counterattack on the Skobelev redoubts. Our troops repulsed four Turkish attacks. Then the Turkish commander ordered the fifth attack to draw up all reserves, extremely reducing the composition of the garrisons in the trenches and redoubts in all other positions. To inspire the counterattacking units, they were ordered to carry a green banner in front of them, and the mullahs in the camps to chant prayers. Behind the attacking troops, Osman Pasha placed a battery and two cavalry regiments, ordering them to shoot at anyone who decided to retreat.
Meanwhile, after repelling the fourth Turkish attack, the position of the troops of the Russian left wing became hopeless. Skobelev in his report described the state of the redoubts as follows: “The redoubts presented a terrible picture by this time (3.5 hours in the afternoon). A mass of corpses of Russians and Turks lay in heaps. The interior of the redoubt was especially filled with them. In the deep trench that connected the redoubts, dozens of people were killed by enemy longitudinal shots at once, and piles of corpses filling the trench alternated with still living defenders. At redoubt No. 2, part of the parapet facing the city of Plevna was made up of corpses. At Redoubt No. 1, three guns of the 5th Battery of the 3rd Artillery Brigade were partly mangled and stripped of their servants and horses. I ordered the remaining two guns of the 2nd Artillery Brigade, which also lost their servants, to be taken away earlier. The gun stationed in the redoubt was also knocked out. I took the rings out of the gun in case they fell into the hands of the Turks.” The position of the Russians in the rear of the redoubts was also difficult. Kuropatkin wrote about it this way: “The section of the position between the third ridge and the redoubts also presented a painful picture: thousands of wounded and corpses lay in this area. Hundreds of bodies... lying mixed with Turkish corpses, decomposed and contaminated the air."
The final fifth attack at 16:00 was led by the Turkish commander Osman Pasha himself. During the defense of the Kavanlyk redoubt, its commandant, Major F. Gortalov, died heroically. However, despite the heroism and steadfastness of the Russian soldiers, the Turkish army was able to recapture the redoubts. The Russian troops retreated in an orderly manner, carrying away the wounded.
General M.D. Skobelev on horseback. N. D. Dmitriev-Orenburgsky
Results
Thus, the third assault on Plevna, despite the high military valor, dedication and perseverance of Russian and Romanian soldiers and officers, ended in failure. Allied forces suffered serious losses. 13 thousand Russians and 3 thousand Romanians died. The losses were especially serious on the left wing: the troops lost 6.5 thousand people killed and wounded, which amounted to 44% of officers and 41% of soldiers and non-commissioned officers of the troops of Skobelev and Imeretinsky. The Turks estimated their losses at 3 thousand people. Apparently they underestimated it.
The failure of the third assault was caused by a number of reasons, based on the mistakes of the Russian high command. Many mistakes were “inherited” from the first and second assaults on Plevna, that is, they did not bother to work on the mistakes. Among the reasons for the failure of the assault: poor reconnaissance of the location of the Turkish army and its defense system; underestimation of enemy forces and means; a patterned attack in the same directions on the most fortified areas of the Turkish fortified area; lack of maneuver of troops to attack Plevna from the west, where the Turks had almost no fortifications; refusal to transfer the main efforts to more promising direction, where Skobelev’s detachment successfully broke through; lack of interaction between groupings of troops advancing in different directions (when some troops advanced, others stood) and clear control of all allied forces. In addition, they were unable to organize full-fledged artillery preparation with the use of large-caliber guns - the Turkish fortifications were almost not damaged during the shelling, the Turks were quickly restored. They chose the wrong day for the attack.
As historian N.I. Belyaev noted: “The Third Plevna clearly showed that during 2.5 months of the war the Russian High Command I didn’t learn anything, I didn’t take any of my previous mistakes into account, and I managed to add new ones to the old ones. Ultimately, it is necessary to admit that the third assault on Plevna was not based on real calculation, but was built only based on the valor of the Russian soldier, on the unexpected appearance of favorable circumstances, on chance" (N.I. Belyaev. Russian-Turkish War 1877-1878).
The lack of a unified command played a negative role. Formally, the Western detachment was headed by the Romanian Prince Karl, but in fact the head of the troops was the chief of staff of the detachment, General Zotov. The Romanian troops were under the command of their general Cernata. Near Plevna were the Russian Emperor Alexander II, Minister of War D. A. Milyutin, Commander-in-Chief of the Danube Army Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich. Everything did not allow for clear control of the allied forces.
The unsuccessful outcome of the third assault on Plevna forced the Russian high command to change the way they fought the enemy. On September 1 (13), Tsar Alexander II arrived near Plevna and convened a military council, at which he raised the question of whether the army should remain near Plevna or whether it should retreat beyond the Osma River. The chief of staff of the Western detachment, Lieutenant General P. D. Zotov, and the chief of army artillery, Lieutenant General Prince N. F. Masalsky, spoke in favor of retreat. The continuation of the fight for the fortress was advocated by the assistant chief of staff of the Danube Army, Major General K.V. Levitsky and Minister of War D.A. Milyutin.
The situation was not as dangerous as some generals saw it. The allied Russian-Romanian troops in the Balkans numbered 277 thousand people. The Ottoman Empire had an army of 350 thousand, but could only field about 200 thousand people against the allies. The main group of the Russian army, consisting of more than 100 thousand people with 470 guns, was located at Kalafat, Lovchi and Plevna. The enemy opposed these troops with 70 thousand soldiers and 110 guns stationed in the area of Vidin, Orhaniye and Plevna. Therefore, Milyutin insisted on continuing operations in the Plevna area. At the same time he suggested new way fighting the enemy. In his opinion, it was necessary to abandon direct assaults on Plevna and break enemy resistance through a blockade. Milyutin correctly noted that the active army, without large-caliber artillery mounted fire, would not be able to reliably suppress and destroy enemy fortifications, therefore, victory in a frontal assault is unlikely. In the event of a complete siege, quick success can be achieved, since the Turkish army does not have the reserves to conduct a long-term fight. Indeed, the enemy was already in a bad position. On September 2 (14), 1877, Osman Pasha reported to the high command that shells and food were running out, there were no reinforcements, and losses had greatly weakened the garrison. The Turkish commander noted that the army was put “in the need to retreat, but it is very difficult to carry out the retreat.”
As a result, Alexander II supported Milyutin's point of view. There have been changes in the leadership of the Western detachment. Engineer-General E.I. Totleben, summoned from St. Petersburg, was appointed assistant commander of the detachment of the Romanian Prince Charles. He was a hero of the Crimean War of 1853-1856. General Zotov returned to command of the 4th Corps. The entire cavalry was subordinated to the brave and decisive I.V. Gurko. These changes improved troop control. In addition, the newly arrived Guards Corps joined the Western detachment: 1st, 2nd, 3rd Guards Infantry and 2nd Guards Cavalry Divisions, Guards Rifle Brigade. A proper siege of Plevna began, which ultimately led to victory.
